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Abstract
This dissertation explores the varied phenomena of “automatic writing” in Victorian
Gothic fiction, reading the genre’s fascination with the irrepressible signifying practices
of the body in light of the medical, criminological and scientific discourses that
underwrite the “scriptural economy” of the late nineteenth century with their own arsenal
of automatic writing machines.
Though critics tend to describe Gothic as genre, the fundamental distinctiveness
of Gothic inscription is derived from the pronounced and often dramatically visceral
relation it enacts between script and medium. Indexical inscription constitutes the
privileged mode of signifying within Gothic fiction; as such, the tradition is uniquely
positioned to explore the entanglement of bodies and signs within a modern information
society often misunderstood as a disembodied network of dematerialized signs.
I have titled the project Graphomania, and I consider the term a keyword of lateVictorian culture—one that names a distinctly Victorian pathology of compulsive
writing, but that alludes also to the widespread epistemic hope that writing could render
objectively the internal and subjective experiences of individuals. Asserting the centrality
of representation-machines in the construction of modern bodies and subjectivities, the
project draws upon the natural sciences, pseudo-sciences, technology and literature (as
well as many curious hybrids of these discourses), to develop a heterogeneous conception
of automatic writing. This species of writing—the trace of unconscious gestures, rather
than the imprint of deliberate expression—opened up a significant gap between writing
and authoring. To the trained experts produced by the Victorian age of science, this gap
granted un-authorized admittance to the subject.
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In a chapter devoted to Victorian graphomania and the three studies that follow
(graphology in Jekyll and Hyde, retinal photography in The Beetle, and phonography in
Dracula), the project is particularly interested in convergences and correspondences
between graphical machines and human bodies. In this study, Victorian technology and
Gothic literature emerge as twin registers of the divided self, joined in their shared
strategy of externalizing conflicts traditionally understood as invisible processes, but also
in the consequent tendency of each uncanny text to expose its ghostly remainders and
excesses in the process of trying to contain them.
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Introduction
This dissertation explores the varied phenomena of “automatic writing” in
Victorian Gothic fiction, reading the genre’s fascination with irrepressible signifying
practices of the body in light of the medical, criminological and scientific discourses that
underwrite the “scriptural economy” (de Certeau) of the late nineteenth century with their
own arsenal of automatic writing machines. I have titled the project Graphomania, and I
consider the term a keyword of late-Victorian culture—one that names a distinctly
Victorian pathology, but that alludes also to the widespread epistemic hope that writing
was capable of rendering objectively the internal and subjective experiences of
individuals.
Asserting the centrality of representation-machines in the construction of modern
bodies and subjectivities, this dissertation analyzes the Gothic novel within the context of
other nineteenth-century technologies of inscription, machines that embody and enact
“theories of language” and of the subject (Gitelman 4). In conversation with recent
studies of the body-machine complex (Kittler, Rabinbach, Seltzer), this project draws
upon the natural sciences, psychology, the occult and literature (as well as many curious
hybrids of these discourses), to develop a heterogeneous conception of “automatic
writing,” the contours of which provide a kind of exoskeleton of the modern subject. For
the Victorians, graphomania named a pathological compulsion to write, and this study
examines the culture’s newfound fascination with this concept of “symptomatic” and
indexical writing that rendered visible the invisible idiosyncrasies of a profusion of
deviant bodies. This species of writing, not the imprint of deliberate expression, but the
trace of unconscious gestures, opened up a significant gap between writing and authoring.
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To the trained experts produced by the Victorian age of science, this gap granted unauthorized admittance to the subject. In a study of Victorian graphomania and the three
Gothic readings that follow (graphology in Jekyll and Hyde, retinal photography in The
Beetle, and phonography in Dracula), the project is particularly interested in
convergences and correspondences between graphical machines and human bodies, and
the uncanny capacity of the former to capture the automatic and unconscious gestures of
the latter as a means of securing “direct” access to latent truths of the mind and body.
Perhaps the most cited source within recent discussions of the nineteenth
century’s body-machine complex is Friedrich Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/1900. If
discourse, in its Foucauldian acceptation, determines the preconditions of who may speak
and the limits of what can be said, Kittler’s analysis takes another step back to consider
the technological networks responsible for the material production of these cultural
communications. Kittler pursues the post-humanist trajectory traced out elliptically in the
closing lines of The Order of Things, where Foucault imagines the concept of man
“erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (422). As unsentimental as
Foucault’s position may be, its organic imagery (one might even call it Romantic) grants
his statement an undeniable poetic flourish. By contrast, the severity of Kittler’s thought
and prose methodically purges such materially imprecise imagery from his history of the
human, strictly charting out the specific technologies responsible for the inscription and
erasure of the subject “drowned out” by the static of physiological and psychical “noise.”
This assiduous technologist perspective also serves to temper overly capacious
post-structuralist theories of “writing” that tacitly endorse the neutrality of recording
devices through habitual critical neglect of the historically-situated means and media of
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inscription. In Kittler’s reading, for example, the typewriter (the linchpin of his 1900
discourse network) produces a very particular style of writing. Its impersonal,
standardized type converts the personal expression connected with handwritten script into
anonymous bureaucratic information. Embodied in the operations of its composition, the
typewriter presents a challenge to the holographic fallacy: the romantic notion of
immediacy enabled by the uninterrupted circularity that penmanship physically suggests.
The material practice of typewriting displaces the hand from the scene of discursive
production, while subtracting the mind from the equation entirely (195). The automatic
discourse-production made possible by the typewriter “designates the turning point at
which communications technologies can no longer be related back to humans. Instead,
the former have formed the latter” (211). In this dark vision of the modern technosphere,
humans serve as channels for mechanical expression, not vice versa.
Kittler has noted that Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900, the original German title of
his Discourse Networks, alludes to the fearful visions of Judge Daniel Paul Schreber, the
successful German judge who furnished Sigmund Freud with his case on paranoia, and
who suffered from delusions that included being persecuted by a god who penetrated his
body with writing (Armitage 18). Hidden away in the belly of Kittler’s discourse
machine (not unlike Walter Benjamin’s dwarf, crouching inside Maelzel’s automaton
chess-player), Schreber’s paranoid philosophy endows modern inscription machines with
fantastic power and efficacy.1 In the opening words of Kittler’s Gramophone, Film,
Typewriter: “Media determine our situation” (xxxix). One might be tempted to
characterize Kittler’s position as technophobic, if not for the undeniable pleasure he takes
in this submission that is the inheritance of Schreber’s passivity. We find in these pages a
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strange reversal of Freud’s fort / da scenario, where satisfaction is derived from the
fantasy that we are completely at the mercy of the toys we are playing with (BPP 12-17).
This masochism marks Kittler as a gothic writer in his own right, and makes every
encounter with technology a fixed match.
In the manner of his forebears Nietzsche and McLuhan, Kittler’s emphatic
rhetoric reproduces stylistically the power of the technologies being described with its
own ballistic, aphoristic argumentation of unequivocal thought. Among English scholars
of nineteenth-century technology, the measured response to Kittler’s arguments has been
fairly consistent, attempting to harness the ingenuity and power of his insights while
reining in its rhetorical excesses. For instance, Lisa Gitelman’s Scripts, Grooves, and
Writing Machines: Representing Technology in the Age of Edison (1999) resists Kittler’s
determinism with “a ‘thick’ description of culture” (6) that takes into account the
vagaries of use and consumption. Her subtle account of the pre-conditions of emergence
for Edison’s phonograph emphasizes the broad-based cultural negotiation of
technological change over “Big Bang” theories of technology that single out individual
inventors and inventions as epoch-defining polestars. Accordingly, though Gitelman’s
somewhat equivocal argument that “new inscriptions signal new subjectivities” may
sacrifice some of the potency of Kittler’s maxims, this “softer determinism” (7) advances
a nuanced, decentralized understanding of technological networks that recognizes the
mutually dependent forces of technology and culture, scientific innovation and popular
opinion.2
The past decade of Victorian scholarship has produced a number of important
studies of the correspondences established between nineteenth-century technologies and
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bodies. First among these would be Laura Otis’ Networking: Communicating With Bodies
and Machines in the Nineteenth Century (2001). Bridging the discourses of physiology,
technology, and literature, her impressive interdisciplinary study centres on the network
of the telegraph (5), an object that Otis reads at once as a technological device for the
electrical transmission of signals and a metaphorical device for the communication of
conceptual linkages and analogies. Quoting James W. Carey, Otis announces her
intention to employ the telegraph, as the Victorians did, as “a thing to think with” (2).
The principle thrust of Victorian thinking on the matter, Otis argues, was devoted to
establishing metaphoric correspondences between telegraphic networks and the human
nervous system. This metaphor furnished many insights into the complex workings of
each, but also inspired a great deal of anxiety about where ‘we’ end and our networks
begin (10).
In what follows, I concern myself primarily with this latter consequence; perhaps
the most direct means of signaling my divergent interests with regard to the
human/machine networks described by Otis would be to remark that these “thing[s] to
think with” were just as often employed by the Victorians as tools for the abdication of
thought. I am interested here in the special lure automatic writing technologies held for
the Victorian unconscious. In their enlightening history of the emergence of objectivity as
a paramount scientific virtue, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison make the compelling
assertion that: “instead of freedom of will, machines offered freedom from will – from
the willful interventions that had come to be seen as the most dangerous aspects of
subjectivity” (123). Scientific rhetoric employs this “negative ideal” (Daston 123) of
nonintervention, intending to cancel out subjectivity with objectivity in a neat equation
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with no remainder. Gothic fiction, alongside the range of pseudo-sciences explored in this
dissertation, turns its gaze upon the residue of this evacuated and automatized subject,
divorced from the scene of inquiry, but also from herself. These uncanny discourses
inhabit and investigate the space within that has been hollowed out by this newly
emergent ideal of mechanical empiricism. They find the correlative production of the
objective examiner is the objectified subject of examination, one whose internal life has
been externalized and instrumentalized.
As Lacan suggests, self-identification is impossible without compulsive reference
to external technologies of representation. The child requires the mirror’s external (and
essentially alienated) perspective in order to translate a sequence of fragmentary closeups of limbs into the gestalt of the body. For their part, the Victorians were especially
preoccupied with devising a variety of mirrors that could permit glimpses of internal life.
They were driven to invent machines that re-enact, transcribe, and otherwise mimic
hidden processes of physiology, emotion, consciousness, and the unconscious. The
uncanny dimension of this mimicry arises out of the troubled relation between
identification and objectification that technology instates. After the fashion of the Gothic,
these machines made possible radically exteriorized practices of introspection. It is this
paradoxical exteriority of the subject’s interiority that prompts Zizek to return to “the
fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology” (SO 34), a
disclaimer that rejects stringently subjectivized or individualized economizations of the
psyche.
These techniques of externalization render technology uncanny, and make Gothic fiction
a rewarding lens through which to view technology. Nineteenth-century representational
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technologies engineered a phantasmagoria of the human body, materializing and
projecting internal reality upon external surfaces, and putting on public display the
unsettling vitality of the flesh.

Bare Writing
Writing in blood, writing in flesh—even when the formulas are figurative, they
represent a special access to the authoritative, inalienable, and immediate; the
writing of flesh and blood never lies. What the writing gains in immediacy,
though, it loses in denotative range, since writing that cannot lie is only barely
writing. The marks traced out in earth, flesh, paper, architecture, and landscape
are often not part of any language but, rather, circles, blots, a cross, a person’s
image, furrows, and folds. Whether stamps of authenticity or brands of shame,
and however rich in symbolism, they act as pointers and labels to their material
ground and not as elements in a syntactic chain that could mean something else.
(154)
This crucial passage from Sedgwick’s The Coherence of Gothic Conventions delineates
Gothic as a mode of writing marked by its peculiar techniques of inscription. The
semantic content of Gothic literature is inseparable from (and often secondary to) its
material basis. Though critics tend to describe Gothic as genre, I argue in what follows
that the fundamental distinctiveness of gothic inscription is derived from the pronounced
and often dramatic relation enacted between script and medium. While genre nominates
formal and stylistic criteria as paramount, characterizing Gothic as medium helps call
attention to crucial questions of materiality given prominence within Gothic fiction. The
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Gothic hysterically insists upon an embodied, phenomenological poetics: to “conceive”
an idea, we must pass through the flesh, with all of its noise and distortions.
It is this accentuation of materiality that inspires Anne Williams’s alignment of
Gothic with poetic rather than novelistic traditions. “As narratives of ‘otherness’ distant
in time and space,” Williams notes that: “Gothic fictions necessarily emphasize writing
rather than speech” (66). The two most common figurations of this writing within the
Gothic are the fragment and the found manuscript. Both of these forms of inscription
present readers with singular texts that are subject to contingency, loss, and even
mortality, exploiting a contemporary fascination with architectural ruins by transposing
the aura of decay to the text. Disturbing mimesis with the physical residue of the text,
Gothic writers direct readings toward the apparatus that palpably brings text into texture,
and writing into being.
Such conceits reveal the surprising extent to which the Gothic novel manifests
anxiety over its own textual body. With the infamous introduction to his Gothic Romance
The Castle of Otranto, Horace Walpole introduces a new kind of novel, uniquely troubled
by its material existence, and nervously reiterating the Gothic trope of illegitimacy at the
level of the text. While Otranto’s narrative concerns the violent correction of a perverted
patrilineal inheritance, the novel’s paratext finds Walpole himself constructing a false
genealogy of the text, employing the found manuscript conceit that would become the
generic standard for gothic authors seeking to confer upon their narratives the aura of
authenticity. Over a century later, Dracula’s Jonathan Harker will sift through the “mass
of material of which the record is composed” to find “there is hardly one authentic
document; nothing but a mass of typewriting” (419). Most novels implicitly request a
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kind of automatic reading: we open the text and the voice simply begins speaking, no
questions asked. The weight of the book disappears from our hands as we drift into the
fiction. By contrast, the Gothic novel resists the sublimation of the book and,
consequently, often finds itself struggling with a problem that few literary texts feel they
need to account for: how did this writing come to be inscribed upon this body? This is
uncanny mimesis: literature trembling before its own mirror.
The uncanny quality of this textual “doubling” finds succinct expression in the
“monstrous text,” a peculiarly persistent metaphor within Gothic fiction that induces a
hallucination of reading that reincarnates the word as flesh. In her introduction to the
1831 version of Frankenstein, Mary Shelley beckons her “hideous progeny” to “go forth
and prosper” (358), proposing a metaphor that imagines publication not as a matter of
paper and ink, but flesh and blood. We might turn as well to Stevenson’s description of
The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde as “a Gothic Gnome” (Works 66), a
fantastic designation that captures something of the awkward and even unsettling position
of the novella (and particularly the “shilling shocker”) within literature by framing the
question as one not of literary form, but of physical deformity.3
This analogy between text and flesh represents a figural innovation that is also a
critical history of inscription. If, as Michel de Certeau argues, “books are only metaphors
of the body,” Gothic fiction stages the collapse of the literary into the corporeal. “In times
of crisis,” de Certeau claims, “paper is no longer enough for the law, and it writes itself
again on the bodies themselves” (140). The crises most commonly introduced within
Gothic narrative serve as pretexts for the reversion to an archaic scriptural economy that
indelibly marks its authority through the conscription of bodies. From De Quincey’s
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restless nocturnal struggle under the compositor’s blocks in Suspiria de Profundis to the
harrow that inscribes its “death sentence” upon the enthusiastic commandant in Franz
Kafka’s “Penal Colony,” the Gothic rehearses endlessly this primal scene of writing. In
positioning bodies under the mechanisms of inscription and interpretation, the genre
comes to terms with the gravity of writing through sympathetic consultation of the
surfaces that have yielded under its weight. In other words, the Gothic has much to tell us
about writing, but possibly more about the experience of being written.
The recurrent enactment of violent scenes of writing within Gothic narrative
grants imaginative substance to the theoretical connotations of “inscription.” Employed
critically, the term “inscription” signals a figural strategy intended to make readers wince,
by calling attention to the corporeal embodiment of cultural signs. This term disrupts the
metaphysics of writing by revealing its physics, desublimating the process of writing in
order to communicate the force as well as the sense of this material cultural practice. In
doing so, it exposes the “will to knowledge” as a “will to power.”
It is this genealogical position that grounds Friedrich A. Kittler’s Discourse
Networks, even if the author requires an interlocutor to elucidate the latent sympathies
that motivate his intellectual project. In his disarming foreword to Kittler’s thorny text,
David E. Wellbery explains: “Whoever would look for the bonds of solidarity that orient
Kittler’s investigation will find them here: in its unmistakable compassion for the pathos
of the body in pain” (xv). If Kittler’s affinities are difficult to discern, perhaps this
confusion is owing to his anti-humanist orientation: the fate of the subject is a fairly
indifferent matter to him. Rather, following Nietzsche and Foucault, Kittler attends to the
surface of the body, where the disparate scripts of subjection are inscribed. This body,
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which constitutes the text of genealogy, is “a volume in perpetual disintegration”
(Foucault, “Nietzsche” 375). This is so because the subject’s composition requires the
body’s decomposition.
Even if, as Penelope Deutscher argues, the metaphor of inscription has become a
post-structural “habit,” its emphasis on the material basis of signification registers a tacit
resistance to the ways in which bodies are “incorporated” into systems of meaning.
Indeed, Mary Ann Doane locates the possibility of a “politics of the medium” (146)
through an understanding of the medium as “a material or technical means of aesthetic
expression . . . which harbors both constraints and possibilities, the second arguably
emerging as a consequence of the first ” (130). Recognizing this possibility for resistance
forestalls the deterministic conclusions about the inevitable fate of victimized bodies as
configured within Kittler’s thinking.
In one enduring strain of the Gothic mode, machinery is nearly synonymous with
the violence we find in Kittler’s account of technology. It is an external force, the
crushing weight of which looms over the subject. This gothic vision of the technosphere
is articulated in Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, where Diogenes Teufelsdröckh depicts the
world as “one huge, dead, immeasurable Steam-engine, rolling on, in its dead
indifference, to grind me limb from limb” (127). It is difficult not to be reminded of
Carlyle’s “immeasurable Steam-engine” when Charles Maturin has one of his characters
write, in the midst of an institutional conspiracy against him: “I was like one who sees an
enormous machine (whose operation is to crush him to atoms) put in motion, and,
stupefied with horror, gazes on it with a calmness that might be mistaken for that of one
who was coolly analyzing the complication of its machinery, and calculating the
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resistless crush of its blow” (Melmoth 91). We will find the machine characterized in like
manner within the writings of Karl Marx, perhaps the source that has the most profound
impact on critical theories concerning Victorian attitudes towards technology. It is the
“automatic system of machinery” that effectuates the objectification and alienation of
labour, installing workers as “no more than the conscious limbs of the automaton”
(Grundisse 132). The indifferent machine is cast as “something alien and exterior to” the
workers, threatening to render them “superfluous” (135).
However, Maturin’s Melmoth (along with Shelley’s Frankenstein) helped to
develop a more nuanced and troubling understanding of gothic machinery in 1820s
fiction. Machinery becomes truly uncanny at the moment we recognize that its inorganic
(or unfamiliar) gears and processes are already at work within us. True to the prevailing
emotional tenor of the Gothic mode, each of the fictional texts discussed within this study
are marked by suspicion concerning emergent technologies and techniques of writing and
reading, a distrust that frequently escalates into outright paranoia. But these fears are
tinged with an unmistakable technophilia. These texts betray industrial England’s
distinctive fascination with the awesome spectacle and power of technology, “the
Victorian sense of machine beauty” that Herbert Sussman identifies as “the dominant
energy of the nineteenth century” (198). As Sussman argues, this drive has too often been
eclipsed by negative assessments (whose primary appeal may be that they appear more
closely aligned with the prejudices of modern humanism). At root, this Victorian
fascination was sustained by a deep sense of affinity with machinery. The mechanist
philosophy of the human was being realized through an array of instruments that
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mirrored every organ and function of the human body, suggesting in their analogical
relation kinship as well as compatibility.
If nineteenth-century debate often hinged on the question of whether such
technologies clarified or distorted our vision of the human, recent theories of technology
have highlighted the “posthuman” hybridity of Victorian understandings of the body
(Ketabgian), imagining the self as a site of constant re-invention, rather than gradual
discovery. In this vein, Terry Castle’s designation of the uncanny as an “invention”
(understood in a broad cultural sense that encompasses, but is not limited to, technology)
prompts us to explore the history and conditions of the “uncanny’s” emergence, as well
as imagining the possibility of its eventual disappearance.4 This dissertation makes
another step toward that work. Exploring automatism as a synonym for mechanism, it
aims to situate historically and materially the experience of the uncanny in the nineteenth
century. The analysis of historically-situated technologies allows us to make use of the
valuable insights psychoanalysis has to offer, while resisting the notion that it is capable
of delineating a stable, generalized vision of “the” subject. This kind of approach stresses
the fact that these theoretical concepts emerge out of a shared social reality as well as
individual psychic histories. While I investigate a number of questions typically
understood to be the province of psychoanalysis, references to Freud situate his writing as
a dependent variable rather than an outside authority on the culture it inhabited.
Throughout, I have sought to read the dream-logic of Gothic narrative in the half-light of
a culture that Carlyle felt had been cast into “magnetic sleep” (“Signs” 64) by machinery.
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Apprehending Bodies
Carlyle’s account of the mesmerizing powers of machinery provides an essential critique
of the repetitive choreographies of bodies and minds set in motion by technological
culture. One might reasonably expect a thesis on Victorian automatism to reiterate
Carlyle’s position on the anesthetizing effects of technology. However, one of the most
striking and consistent revelations of my research has been the tendency of technological
innovation to stimulate renewed consciousness of bodies. To say that technology
“awakens” us to a new awareness of ourselves is perhaps insufficiently critical. We can at
least remark that, in their interface with bodies, communications technologies made
visible many aspects of physical existence that had theretofore gone “un-remarked,” if
not entirely unnoticed. Rather than simply suppressing consciousness, automatic writing
technologies were often thought to produce the unconscious graphically.
The Victorians were attuned to many faint tremblings and pulsations that have
long since stopped disturbing our minds and bodies. In Daniel Deronda, George Eliot
describes her cultural moment as “a time when the soul of man was waking to pulses
which had for centuries been beating in him unheard” (124).5 This calibration of the
social nervous system—not necessarily “more precise,” but distinctly different from our
own—allows for divergent qualities of feeling and makes bodies visible in unfamiliar
ways. Sensitivity was as much a culturally constructed value as it was a physical
experience. We can deduce a sense of the high esteem in which Victorians held
sensitivity from the manner in which “insensitivity” served as an all-purpose epithet for
an array of othered bodies, from criminals (Lombroso) to “idiots” (Galton), and
“savages” (Felkin) to women (Ellis).6 In the nineteenth century, one could speak of the
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“nobility” of the nerves (Lombroso, qtd. in Horn 88), as if feeling were a matter of
principle.
The critical commonplace of Victorian cultural “anxiety” toys with a mere
caricature of the extraordinarily acute physical sensitivity cultivated within the Victorian
era. Describing this period as a time of great “apprehension” brings us nearer to the truth
of the matter, as it better communicates the ambivalent responses (excitement and
anticipation mixed with prejudice and dread) of a cultural sensorium opening itself up to
an unknown world. From the séance table to the sanitarium to the laboratory, Victorian
consciousness was tuning in to the subtle influence of other bodies. Sensation fiction,
with its bundle of exposed nerves trembling at the slightest stimulation, might seem the
most obvious expression of this heightened sensibility, but one finds the same
hypersensitivity in a text such as The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, in which Charles
Babbage imagines a phonographic universe where “every atom” has been “impressed
with good and with ill” by even the most seemingly inconsequential of our words and
actions (112).7
The term apprehension also conveys the perceived importance of capturing these
impressions, the faith that the traces of events and emotions grant us some power over
them by transmuting subjective experience into objective evidence. This desire not only
to touch, but to dispassionately understand what one touches, brought about one of the
most striking developments within this widespread attunement: the culture’s systematic
deployment of devices designed to feel and communicate on behalf of bodies. Within a
fledgling medical establishment, graphing instruments such as the sphygmograph (or
pulse-writer) and the cardiograph interrupted the contiguity of bodies in order to correct

16
the vagaries of manual palpation and direct auscultation performed by fallible human
physicians. Telegraphs, phonographs, and other communications media interceded on
behalf of distant correspondents, capturing and transmitting “sounds hitherto fugitive”
(Edison, “Future” 527). In like manner, fugitive bodies were apprehended through
photographic databases and other taxonomical systems that allowed the law to
superimpose categories and composites of distinctive physical traces over an
undifferentiated mass of individuals.8 The criterion of understanding for the Victorians
was empirical and objectively verifiable evidence. Within emergent Victorian discourses
such as medicine, communications, and criminology, this evidence typically took the
form of indexical inscription, the truth-value of which lay in an automatic performance
that deferred mental work to mechanical notation.
In Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal, Vicki Kirby argues that: “we
must theorise the possibility that ‘nature scribbles,’ that ‘flesh reads’” (127). Her thesis,
along with those of Gothic critics such as Kelly Hurley and Anne Williams, provides a
necessary addendum to Sedgwick’s theory of gothic inscription. Both critics explore the
productive capacity of gothic bodies, along with their ability to disturb humanist and
symbolic structures of meaning. For Kelly Hurley, the “gothicity of matter” lies in its
unsettling vitality; when the Gothic lures its reader outside the sterile confines of
humanist discourse, we find that bodies are “not mute and stolid, but rather clamorous
and active” (33). Williams’s Art of Darkness explores the Gothic as a revolutionary
female counter-tradition to Romanticism. The representative figure of this movement is
“a woman speaking to women” (7), and her manifesto could be Julia Kristeva’s
Revolution in Poetic Language. Interrupting symbolic narrative with the “non-expressive
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totality” of the semiotic, gothic figures enact a hysterical “embodiment” of meaning,
where symptoms “literalize” unconscious feelings (Williams 70).
Together, Hurley and Williams lend critical credence to distinctly gothic
premonitions concerning the eloquence and legibility of bodies. Gothic epistemology
upholds the validity of embodied experience and knowledge. Its narratives implore us to
listen to the testimony of our own bodies. When the mere sight of a man makes our skin
crawl, when a child’s touch sends shivers up our spine, when we just have a feeling in
our bones, we must not let an inability to articulate our suspicions prevent us from
following our instincts. The apprehension of this deeply personal, embedded knowledge
accounts only for the milder side of gothic paranoia, however. There is also the more
pressing threat that others are listening to our bodies just as intently, waiting for it to
betray our secrets with the telltale signs of a racing pulse, a blushing cheek, or a
trembling hand.
This dissertation reads such gothic fears in light of the array of graphing machines
that literalize and externalize internal phenomena (whether conceived as physiological,
spiritual, or mental), thereby literally making the body present outside itself. “Reading
flesh” alongside Stevenson, Marsh, Stoker and the other authors addressed within this
dissertation means taking seriously “gothic paranoia,” as well as its twin condition of
“Victorian anxiety,” thereby relinquishing two of the favourite talking points of
modernity, and foils for our own incredulity. The Victorians, we must remember, also
went to great lengths in realizing these theories as a legitimately scientific corporeal
hermeneutic. If machinery served in early Gothic as a poignant and philosophically rich
metaphor for the automatisms of the self, the resurgence of the genre a century later
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would find the Gothic in explicit conversation with new technologies capable of
literalizing and materializing these anxieties.
Richard Menke’s Telegraphic Realism: Victorian Fiction and Other Information
Systems (2008) provides an exceptional model for rethinking the Victorian novel as one
relay point in dynamic exchange with Victorian information networks. Menke
encourages readers to “think of Victorian realism itself as an exploration of the power
and the limits of written textuality in an age busy producing alternatives to it” (11).
Particularly captivating is Menke’s examination of the indexical technologies that compel
the novel to re-imagine itself as “an analog cultural form” (26). At first glance, Menke’s
basic orientation towards realist fiction may not seem particularly radical: “we might
think of realism,” he suggests, “not so much in terms of transparency as of translucence not of a simple desire to disregard mediation but of an emphasis on the way in which
mediations make certain real aspects of represented things shine through” (104). Perhaps,
as Gitelman has written in her response to Menke’s book, “it would be difficult […] to
find readers who do not see literary realism as a sort of mediation” (163). However, it is
equally difficult to think of a reader as keenly perceptive to the material dimension of
this mediation. Menke’s careful textual dissections present us with a visceral experience
of technology that more strictly discursive analyses of linguistic mediation leave largely
untouched. It is not only language, but bodies that interpose themselves between
information and its transmission. In asking: “what was information in an analog epoch?”
(23), Menke communicates what we might call, borrowing from Jonathan Crary, the
“carnal density” (150) of fiction.
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In this respect, Menke’s chapter on Eliot, “Information Unveiled,” resonates most
strongly with the work attempted in these pages. In Menke’s reading, Eliot’s novella
“The Lifted Veil,” which relates the tortured perspective of a man besieged by unaskedfor gifts of premonition and clairvoyance, reflects upon “fiction’s power to capture
something of the complexity of life in alienated, repeatable form” (137), giving voice to
the fear that “fiction may cast our most intimate knowledge—of places, of individuals, of
embodied life—as information” (147). Menke’s text commits itself to a productively
“analogic” (and, I would argue, frequently gothic) perspective on realism, while my study
turns squarely to the Gothic, finding there a uniquely powerful perspective on the fate of
embodied information within the Victorian scriptural economy. The dreadful vision of
“objectified subjectivity” (137) that Menke glimpses in Eliot’s novella and in the cultural
moment that inspired its composition gains fullest figural and critical expression through
the uncanny externalizations of gothic tropology.
In this study, Victorian technology and Gothic literature emerge as twin registers
of the divided self, joined in their shared strategy of externalizing conflicts traditionally
understood as invisible processes, but also in the consequent tendency of each uncanny
text to expose its ghostly remainders and excesses in the process of trying to contain
them. In her reading of James Hogg’s Confessions of a Justified Sinner, Sedgwick makes
the crucial observation that the novel “literalizes and externalizes, for instance as murder
or demonic temptation, conflicts that are usually seen as internal” (BM 96). This
representational strategy is quintessentially Gothic, but in the nineteenth century it was
hardly understood to be the unique prerogative of fiction to invert its subjects in this
manner. We find this logic just as clearly at work in Francis Galton’s “Measurement of
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Character.” Here, Galton imagines a “great ruler” (an unwitting pun that links regal
power with the ability to “measur[e] man in his entirety”) questioning a duplicitous
subject. This wise man “contrives, by a few minutes’ questioning, temptation, and show
of displeasure, to turn his character inside out” (182). With the assistance of graphical
devices for the detection and recording of internal physiological processes, the
hallucinogenic nightmare experienced by Poe’s villain in “The Tell-Tale Heart” becomes
an objective reality. The paranoid fear that private and immaterial emotions such as guilt
could manifest themselves somatically and reverberate outside the confines of the body
finds confirmation in instruments of modern medicine and science that prove capable of
“turn[ing] … character inside out.” Galton delights that, thanks to the cardiograph,
“palpitations of the heart . . . cannot be shunned or repressed, and they are visible”
(“Measurement” 183). It is this paradoxical desire to know subjects by objectifying
them—translating private inner realities as publicly exterior ones—that marks the
Victorian period as a particularly gothic age.
Galton’s irrepressible palpitations echo Sedgwick’s “writing that cannot lie.” This
is human expression stripped bare of its capacity for deferral, prevarication, or outright
deception (or, as Sedgwick has it, writing that is “barely writing” at all). The graphing
instruments that capture and inscribe these involuntary stirrings present us with the
register of a life that writes itself, even against our own wishes. Of course, these devices
were not intended for anything so idiosyncratic as personal expression; they existed to
facilitate a strictly institutional dialogue between examiners and scientific subjects. Every
prosthesis extends a particular thesis about the body, concretizing in its design a specific
idea about what our bodies should or could be made to perform, feel, look, and sound
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like. Automatic technologies of inscription suggested that the body was a volume of
writing that solicited reading and needed only to be properly transcribed in order to make
itself understood.
In its examination of Victorian culture’s rewriting of subjects according to the
principles of a newly automatized scriptural economy, this study takes a page from
Anson Rabinbach’s The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity.
Rabinbach’s expansive analysis of the transformative effects of the industrial
supplementation of manual labour centres on the cultural work performed by the
metaphor of the “human motor.” This comparison helped to reify the labour of human
bodies as “labour power,” and defined that commodity according to “the expenditure and
deployment of energy as opposed to human will, moral purpose, or even technical skill”
(4). It is my contention that the emergent ways of thinking about laboring bodies
described by Rabinbach had a comparable effect upon conceptions of reading and writing
as well. The concepts of “will,” “purpose” and “skill” upon which humanist models of
labour depended prove just as crucial to humanist theories of authorship and reception.
Outside the precincts of the properly literary (a space delimited by genre, gender, and a
host of criteria to be explored in what follows), where writing could still be primarily be
theorized as a conscious act of the will, the emergence of new scientific and
communications media provoked the Victorians to consider writing as an unconscious
process of the body, akin to energy. Victorian bodies came to be understood not just as
sources of labor-power, but of knowledge/power as well; they were not only
industrialized, but informationalized. If the latter term still has an inelegant ring, the
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ungainly approach language makes toward this concept might signify a deficit of thinking
on the matter.
If the modern factory furnishes the stage upon which we witness the conversion
of human labour into mechanical energy, the transcription of bodies into information
transpires within the space of the Victorian archive. It is this codification of human
subjects under the mechanisms of the nineteenth-century state that constitutes Allan
Sekula’s primary concern within “The Body and the Archive.” Interpreting the practice
of archiving and circulating criminal “identification” as a technological extension of
Bentham’s panoptical principle of surveillance, Sekula’s history of photography
reconciles the practice and theory of a positivist agenda to rectify social deviance through
an exhaustive empiricism of criminal bodies. Criminology’s practical aspect required an
intricate indexicality of bodies within the archive. The most punctilious undertaking of
this encyclopedic project was Alphonse Bertillon’s modern system of criminal
identification, a method that found its iconic figure in the “mug shot.” Sekula turns to
Francis Galton’s composite portraits as emblematic of criminological positivism’s
theoretical pole, which attempts, conversely, to discover the archive within the body.
Signaled by the rise of phrenology and physiognomy, this scientific development
intended to render criminality physically legible, accessing the social and genealogical
histories inscribed within particular bodies to identify biologically determined traces of
criminality.
All such identificatory systems depended upon the general acceptance of a
systematic equivalence between bodies and signs, but it is Galton’s proposal that signals
the most audacious assertion of the Victorian archive. For if Bertillon deposited bodies
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into an archive, Galton believed that the body itself was an archive, holding the secret
traces of its bearer’s history as well as the promise of its future. Consequently, the law
had no need to mark (or stigmatize) its subjects into order to catalogue them. Through
databases such as the “British Register of Distinctive Marks” that was included within
1869’s Habitual Criminals Act, the state had merely to recognize and systematize the
inscriptive work (such as scarring and tattooing) already being undertaken by and upon
delinquent bodies (Cole 29).
My use of the term graphomania marks an attempt to isolate a strain of “archive
fever” specific to the Victorians, one driven by this conviction that bodies involuntarily
produced the legible signs of their identity and character (particularly when those bodies
deviated from cultural norms).9 Chapter One explores graphomania as a fundamental
Victorian hypothesis, and provides the historical and theoretical framework for the
project by situating the uncanny phenomenon of automatic writing in the context of the
“scriptural economy” of the late-nineteenth century. This graphical system is remarkable
for its unprecedented expansion of what ought to be considered as “writing.” Brokered by
an arsenal of mechanical recording devices, from the cardiograph, to the telegraph, to the
phonograph, the Victorians discovered that a surprisingly broad range of ephemeral and
invisible phenomena could be apprehended as permanent and visible inscriptions. The
graphical method of scientific inquiry instates a quintessentially Victorian articulation of
automatic writing, one that “recognizes” bodies are always inscribing themselves. Given
the proper receptive devices, these bodies render interior states objectively legible,
conscripting subjects according to the indexical logic that so strongly informs nineteenthcentury discourse.
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The automatic writing machines that underwrite the “graphical method” are
responsible for the discursive production of the “graphomaniac,” a human body that
replicates the automatic production of the machine. Unsurprisingly, the automatic
function considered a virtue in the machine was held to be a grave defect in the human,
whose heedless writing was a pathological disturbance of the general economy of
writing. Max Nordau’s use of the term graphomaniac to describe one who cannot help
but write serves as a point of departure for a broader analysis of the particular
epistemological constructs and institutions responsible for producing this “insatiable
writer” as a subject of knowledge.
Chapter Two nominates Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll as an exemplary specimen of the
graphomaniac, examining Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Hyde—an
autobiography overrun by automatism—as a paranoid critique of the Victorian regime of
self-registration. Autobiography articulates formally each subject’s obligation within an
economy of writing: to render the self as legible to others, and account for one’s life. My
reading centres on the uncanny homophone of the “hand”—signifying both bodily
appendage and manual inscription—as the synecdoche that links Jekyll’s body to the
scriptural economy. In most cultural analyses of writing, the shift from human to
mechanical activity is indicated by the disappearance or dislocation of the hand. Whether
observed nostalgically (as in Heidegger’s “Parmenides”) or dispassionately (Kittler 195),
this rift signals an estrangement between the writer and the written (which can no longer
be read simply as a means of expressive personal communication). Contrary to these
readings, I argue that, far from usurping the role of the hand in inscription, nineteenthcentury technology apprehends the entire body as a writing machine.
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The Victorians codified this physiological hermeneutic through physiognomy and
graphology, two pseudo-sciences that, I argue, reciprocally imagine the body as legible,
and handwriting as an embodied practice. Both attempt to breach the gap between
“impressions” (premonition, intuition, superstition, and other irrational but instinctive
gothic ways of knowing that are “felt in one’s bones” rather than conceived in the mind)
and “expression” as objective, legitimate epistemologies. Within Stevenson’s novel,
disembodiment is the prerequisite of autonomous writing, and is the prerogative of the
healthy, professional males whose writing circulates through the text. By contrast,
Jekyll’s handwriting is encumbered by the residue of his body, which imposes its
addictive needs and involuntary, repetitive gestures.
Developing the Gothic distinction between expression and inexpressible
impressions introduced within the previous chapter, Chapter Three pursues the theme of
embodied communication in Richard Marsh’s The Beetle. This chapter explores tranceliterature through its literalized understanding of the mind’s impressionability, asking
how incipient writing technologies allowed the Victorians to imagine traumatic
experience visually. In Techniques of the Observer, Jonathan Crary argues that the
nineteenth-century study of optics was distinguished by an essential revision in
understandings of human vision. Geometrical theories of the phenomenon (where sight
organized objects in space) gave way to physiological experimentation (where the world
impressed itself upon the retina). I submit the Gothic novel as an ideal site to examine the
psychological implications of this discursive shift. From Nathaniel’s Hawthorne’s
Holgrave to George du Maurier’s Svengali, the Gothic has persistently associated
hypnosis with photography, a pattern that impels us to consider the contemporaneous
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development of “the negative” within photographic and psychoanalytic discourse. In the
“urban legend” of the optogram (the speculation that external objects can be fixed upon
the retina, and even surgically extracted after death) as imagined by Marsh, we find a
particularly rich popular expression of traumatic understandings of visuality. Rather than
consolidating visual mastery (as one might expect technology to do), photography
provides Marsh with a means of conceiving the receptive vulnerability of the perceiving
subject, a thesis that haunts technological realism with the possibility that its “look”
might fail to assure the dominance of the subject thereby enlightened.
My fourth chapter continues with the theme of observer as index through a
reading of Bram Stoker’s Dracula as a “retrofit” of the novelistic technique of “writing to
the moment,” one that mobilizes the arsenal of cutting-edge writing technologies
currently at its disposal in order to present writing that is also unmistakably “of its
moment.” A textbook case of Victorian graphomania, Stoker’s novel is propelled by a
feverish obsession with providing accurate and immediate documentation. “There is
throughout,” Stoker promises us from the outset, “no statement of past things wherein
memory may err, for all the records chosen are exactly contemporary” (29). I consider
this pledge of fidelity to the reader in light of the rampant infidelity between characters in
the novel. Stoker’s concerns, I argue, are at once textual and sexual, and his novel offers
a unique glimpse into the intersections of indexical and sexual reproduction in the Gothic.
Nascent tensions between technological and human models of faithfulness exert a
strain upon Stoker’s subjects, and precipitate the conspicuous infidelity that peppers his
narrative. Kittler’s influential interpretations of the novel in “Dracula’s Legacy” and
Discourse Networks downplay these liaisons, enlisting Mina’s typewriter—the token of
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her chaste commitment to take dictation from her husband—as emblematic of
technology’s tendency to discipline libidinal energies. My reading intends to restore the
vital presence of bodies within Stoker’s text by exploring the desire it betrays for
unmediated, tactile experience of the other, a drive that finds technological expression in
the phonographic register of the text, and gothic embodiment in the figure of the vampire.
Both phonographic and vampiric techniques of inscription correspond to a gothic
conception of immediacy, attained not through the absence of mediation, but the presence
of bodies. The physical intimacy between signifier and signified captured by indexical
recording machines subjects all communication to innuendo; as a result, the scientific
authority of these technologies is subverted by the libidinal undercurrents of immediate
correspondence as play between bodies. The scandal of this physical intimacy is only
intensified by the “indiscriminate recording” of analog technologies. This indexical
correlation between signifier and signified will be reframed as a disquietingly
indeterminate relation between self and other when Mina serves as the instrumental
medium of vampiric communications. Mina’s mediumship indulges an enduring gothic
fascination with the receptive properties and testimonial authority of impressionable
bodies, but it does something more radical as well, by demonstrating how writing
technologies activate and give concrete expression to the productive graphomaniacal
tendencies of the human. If fidelity in Stoker’s text names the mechanical refusal of any
subjective or sentimental view of the subject, it also characterizes Mina’s extraordinary
ability to perceive herself in such a manner, transforming her body into the medium and
objective correlative of the other.
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From Nordau’s diagnosis of “those semi-insane persons who feel a strong impulse
to write” (18), to Milan Kundera’s definition of graphomania as the compulsion “to
impose one's self on […] a public audience of unknown readers” (127), the derogatory
and disciplinary weight of the term interprets this modern phenomenon as a deluge of
unsolicited intimacies forced upon readers by graphically incontinent individuals. In the
Gothic novels examined here, graphomania indexes less the imposing over-extension of
the self than the intensive mark of the other—not only inscribed upon us, but wildly
composing and discomposing from within.
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Graphomania and the Graphical Method
Writing in 1872, Oliver Wendell Holmes quipped: “So many foolish persons are rushing
into print, that it requires a kind of literary police to hold them back and keep them in
order” (Poet 226). Twenty years later, in his book Degeneration, Max Simon Nordau
would warn: “The police cannot aid us. The public prosecutor and criminal judge are not
the proper protectors of society against crime committed with pen and crayon” (557-58).
Each in their own fashion, Holmes and Nordau were responding to an overwhelming
proliferation of writing with the invocation of a specialized branch of “literary policework.” One is mischievously playful and the other deadly serious; together they suggest
both the light-hearted and heavy-handed ways in which nineteenth-century aesthetic
criticism blended rather seamlessly into moral, medical, and criminological discourse.
This chapter traces the emergence of the “graphomaniac,” a figure that bridges
these diverse but—for the Victorians—complementary ways of talking about writing,
asking what its sudden appearance in the nineteenth century reveals about incipient
Victorian rationales of interpretation. Reading the graphomaniac as a broadly
representative rather than culturally marginal figure, I employ this diagnosis to examine a
widespread cultural tendency to imagine “graphically” an expansive spectrum of
phenomena never before considered as writing. Brokered by an arsenal of mechanical
recording devices, from the cardiograph, to the telegraph, to the phonograph, the
Victorians discovered that a surprisingly broad range of invisible and ephemeral
phenomena could be apprehended graphically. This desire to see everything “set down in
writing” gives rise to a surfeit of graphing machines thought capable of grasping the
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world through a diligent recording and deciphering of its traces. It is this fervent
graphological faith that marks the Victorian period as the age of graphomania.
One of the central premises of this dissertation is that every alteration in the
system of signs heralds a corresponding transformation of our understanding of the
subject. Anticipating the three studies that follow, this chapter is particularly concerned
with the interface between these new machines of inscription and human bodies that
cannot help but write. My aim here is to forge links between the distinctly Victorian
pathology of graphomania and the epistemic hope that writing might be capable of
rendering objectively the internal and subjective experiences of individuals. In so doing,
I identify nineteenth-century graphical technologies as part of a rethinking of how
subjects and characters are made anew in the Victorian scriptural economy, the rhetoric
of which is expressive rather than repressive. Foregoing the marking of deviant and
criminal bodies, as delineated within most recent theories of cultural inscription, the law
“merely” attends to the identifying marks that different bodies carry upon themselves,
betraying their own histories. It is in the context of this new scriptural economy with its
fantasies of comprehensive legibility that Nordau’s graphomaniac appears, conscripted as
representative of a world that, beyond merely submitting to interpretation, automatically
offers itself up as a text that silently solicits our reading.
The late nineteenth century’s fascination with the symptomatic value of automatic
writing corresponds closely to Sedgwick’s theory of Gothic inscription. This essentially
indexical writing of flesh and blood, revered for its “special access to the authoritative,
inalienable, and immediate” (Coherence 154), is considered within Sedgwick’s study as a
generic rather than historical phenomenon. Conversely, the preliminary sketch of the
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graphomaniac that follows proceeds largely outside the generic bounds of the Gothic. It
explores the broader cultural power and legitimacy held by this fantasy of unmediated or
“bare” writing, primarily through examining the range of nineteenth-century graphical
machines that dramatically altered the discursive production of the subject in vaunting the
truth-value of indexical inscription.

“The irresistible itch to write”
Nordau’s most audacious contribution to Darwinian discourse, outlined in his
Degeneration (1892), was his extension of evolutionary theory’s scope beyond the
boundaries of the evolving body and into the field of culture.1 Responding to those who
understood evolution as synonymous with the progress of the human species, Nordau
maintained, following men such as British zoologist Edwin Ray Lankester, that being
subject to “the general laws of evolution” made humankind “as likely to degenerate as to
progress” (60).2 For Nordau, adaptation to one’s environment—particularly when those
surroundings resembled those of modern urban life—was just as likely to produce
“regressive” traits and behavior.3 These traits Nordau found in abundance within the
modern artist. Nearly every tendency in modern art and thought, from the Pre-Raphaelites
to the decadents, from Nietzsche to Zola, exhibited signs “of more or less pronounced
moral insanity, imbecility, and dementia” (viii). “High culture,” for Nordau, was a polite
circumlocution for describing the scum that had risen to the surface of a society. These
works held a symptomatic correspondence with society; they were exemplary without
being exceptional.
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Nordau’s Degeneration begins with a number of questions concerning method,
addressing in particular the difficulty of obtaining direct access to the artist’s body, in
order to properly determine the “anatomical phenomena of degeneracy” (17). For
Nordau, however, it is hardly “necessary to measure the cranium of an author, or to see
the lobe of a painter’s ear, in order to recognize the fact that he belongs to the class of
degenerates” (17). This obstacle could be circumvented by the anatomical inspection of
aesthetic objects. Nordau characterized the cultural productions of the vast majority of
modern artists as “intellectual stigmata” (19). Reversing the trajectory of cultural
dissemination, this rhetorical move returns aesthetic “markings” to recoil upon their
putative source, repositioning them upon the surface of the body. The term “stigmata”
frames such markings as signs of disease and disgrace, but the analogy also has the effect
of translating culture into biology. If writing is an exteriorized part of the body, aesthetics
falls under the jurisdiction of science. Accordingly, a new criterion must replace the
conventional means of reading artistic productions. These were no longer to be
understood as free gestures of the mind, but as instinctive and involuntary discharges or
secretions of the body. Nordau’s project amounts to a systematic denial of culture
through deposition of the artist’s autonomy.
The surface of the body was a site heavily contested between nineteenth-century
science and aesthetics, a point upon which the practices, discourses, and lines of
interpretation of each camp regularly made their violent convergence. Situated at the
physical threshold of the divide between self and other, between biological function and
symbolic activity, this exterior, yet liminal space was typically understood as a presymbolic facade. For instance, Nordau’s rhetorical deployment of stigmata draws upon
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precedents set by anthropological consideration of the tattoo as a marker of natural
difference. Darwin himself had blurred the line between bodies and material culture in his
consideration of the savage’s “notorious” “passion for ornament” (DM 574). Determining
certain affinities between “the lower and barbarous races” and the “higher animals”
regarding “their taste for the beautiful” (211), Darwin proposes a rather skewed analogy
between the two: “as negroes and savages in many parts of the world paint their faces
with red, blue, white, or black bars, — so the male mandrill of Africa appears to have
acquired his deeply-furrowed and gaudily-coloured face from having been thus rendered
attractive to the female” (DM 541). This rather superficial appraisal of surfaces seizes
upon a relation of appearance while neglecting the process of these distinct phenomena of
bodily decoration. Most significantly, Darwin’s comparison depends upon the leveling of
any distinction between biological function and symbolic activity. Natural pigmentation,
it should perhaps go without saying, is not the same as the deliberate application of
pigment. The latter is a performance, a reflexive and deliberate operation upon the self
that incorporates the body into culture (if not as a ‘work of art,’ at least more generally or
as symbolic marker). Darwin’s work reverses this trajectory to rewrite culture under the
sign of the body. This organicist conception of society apprehends culture as the exterior
index of the body’s internal workings. Nordau’s stigmata participate in this practice by
translating cultural expressions as symptomatic marks that index the artist’s interior state:
‘vital signs’ that bind body and text in an uncomfortably intimate manner.
This denial of culture’s relative autonomy from nature finds one of its clearest
expressions in Nordau’s conception of “graphomania.” Diagnoses and discussions of the
“condition” throughout the fin-de-siecle tended to defer to Nordau’s definition of
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graphomaniacs as “those semi-insane persons who feel a strong impulse to write” (18).4
Nordau saw these tireless and tiresome scribblers, along with their “critical body-guard,”
as “dominat[ing] nearly the entire press” (vii). They poured out upon the page a style of
“pure literary insanity” (136) characterized by “incoherence, fugitive ideation, and a
tendency to idiotic punning” (171). Attributing the term to the Italian criminologist
Cesare Lombroso (18), Nordau defines this type of degenerate as a being “with an
insatiable desire to write, though he has nothing to write about except his own mental and
moral ailments” (qtd. in “Melancholy” 765). Two aspects of this description strike me as
worthy of note here. First, in his characterization of the graphomaniac’s desire to write as
“insatiable,” Nordau recasts production as consumption. This species of writing cannot
“feed” or edify the culture at large; its growth is cancerous, and threatens the general
economy of writing. At the level of the individual, the incontinence of graphomania
disintegrates the author’s “body of work,” insofar as this figure is intended to
communicate a gestalt of the corpus as a unified whole. Charcot gave the name “les
hommes de petit papier” to patients who would compulsively come to him with
symptoms written on little scraps of paper.5 This is what the graphomaniac presents us
with: scraps and fragments, a scattered puzzle of writing that frustrates the sublimated
“idea” of the body. The study of graphomania turns our attention to more deeply
ambivalent experiences of Victorian self-writing that serve as “graphic” depictions of an
internal struggle between autonomy and automatism. The previous century’s “Man of
Letters” was now being crowded out by Charcot’s “hommes de petit papier,” a
designation that seemed at once to literalize the graphic composition of the writing
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subject, and to suggest that these inscriptions provided legible evidence of an internal
character hidden even to its writer.
The term “mania,” like hysteria, tended to function more broadly as metaphor for
the uncanny aspects of culture—namely, its contagious and compulsive nature. Many
exploited the elasticity of the term “mania” to diagnose widespread cultural phenomena
in an attempt to come to terms with, and discipline, the century’s unprecedented
proliferation of writing. At the level of culture, then, this mania produces writing that is
nothing more than books. It brings about the decadence of print culture: a kind of archive
fever, where evolution doubles back on itself. Emblems of enlightenment such as the
library—once thought of as sites for the ordered structuring of knowledge—collapse
under the exhausting weight of the expansion, production, and commodification of texts.
George Gissing’s New Grub Street (1891) anticipates the bibliophobia of Borges’
“Library of Babel” when the author has his alienated publishing employee Marian Yule
describe the British Library as: “growing into unwieldiness, threatening to become a
trackless desert of print – how intolerably it weighed upon the spirit!” (138). This
exhaustive and exhausting production and consumption of writing, an “obsessive circle”
that Lennard J. Davis has recently traced back to nineteenth-century print culture (106),
was diagnosed in the correlative disorders of graphomania and bibliomania. We find the
rapid increase in print consumption described as “mania” in Isaac Disraeli’s Curiosities
of Literature, which devotes a chapter to the recent phenomenon of “Bibliomania.” Those
afflicted with this condition obsessively collect the forms of knowledge (in particular,
books) without grasping, or even concerning themselves with, matters of substance. 6
Disraeli imagines the public library as a madhouse, institutionalizing both text and reader
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by contending that this meaningless accumulation of “enormous heap[s] of books” has
infected weak minds, who imagine that they acquire knowledge when they keep it on
their shelves” (9).
Disraeli’s particular concern over public libraries suggests the epidemic
dimension of the problem. Graphomania is not merely a personal pathology, suffered by
the few. One would almost have to extend this diagnosis to the whole of modern culture
to account for the century’s unprecedented proliferation of writing. Indeed, this is
precisely what Davis has done in his recent history of obsessive-compulsive disorders
(2008). Davis characterizes nineteenth-century novelists as “obsessives in the cause of
letters” (105), attributing their extraordinary output to a “graphomania[cal]” (107) drive
that was for novelists, journalists, and critics alike a professional obligation. “The great
novelists of that century,” he tells us, ”were engaged in a single-minded work project that
had no precedent—the continuous, cumulative production of words” (105).
Writing from America in 1890, Oliver Wendell Holmes’ satirical poem
“Cacoethes Scribendi” (the irresistible urge to write) imagines this proliferation of
writing as a global and ecological concern:
If all the trees in all the woods were men;
And each and every blade of grass a pen;
If every leaf on every shrub and tree
Turned to a sheet of foolscap; every sea
Were changed to ink, and all earth's living tribes
Had nothing else to do but act as scribes,
And for ten thousand ages, day and night,
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The human race should write, and write, and write,
Till all the pens and paper were used up,
And the huge inkstand was an empty cup,
Still would the scribblers clustered round its brink
Call for more pens, more paper, and more ink.7
Though he casts the ecological question as a purely hypothetical one (the trees are not
pulped for paper, but magically transform into men), Holmes characterizes writing as a
form of expenditure by imagining the world’s materials translated textually. The earth is
a dwindling resource, pillaged by “scribblers” who have failed to count the material costs
of writing not worth the paper it has been written upon. A critique of writing as
informational “pollution” would have to remain similarly metaphorical, as this ecological
scenario is primarily concerned with granting figural expression to a criticism of readerly
exhaustion. More than the deterioration of the earth, it was the erosion of the human body
under flows of information that seemed the most pressing for critics of the excesses of
nineteenth-century print culture. Questioning the necessity of this superfluous and
wearying expenditure, Holmes’s poem anticipates the bleak milieu inhabited by Gissing’s
Marian, who “exhaust[s]” herself “in the manufacture of printed stuff which no one even
pretended to be more than a commodity for the day's market” (137). Thourougly
dispirited and dehumanized by this process, Marian comes to see herself “not [as] a
woman, but a mere machine for reading and writing” (137). Through the stifling
monotony of her working hours, “she [does] her best […] to convert herself into the
literary machine which it was her hope would some day be invented for construction in a
less sensitive material than human tissue” (505). Nordau is similarly concerned with the
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effects of printed matter on sensitive human tissue; he suggests that graphomania might
be the result of print over-saturation, connecting this graphic incontinence to radical
increases in the consumption of writing. He charges the increased circulation of letters
and newspapers in the nineteenth century with the deterioration of the modern
individual’s physical constitution: writing and reading are activities that “involve an
effort of the nervous system and a wearing of tissue. Every time we read or write, every
human face we see, every conversation we carry on, every scene we perceive through the
window of the flying express, sets in activity our sensory nerves and our brain centres”
(39). Though most possess the resilience necessary to weather this barrage of modern
urban experience, abnormal types such as the “hysteric” and “degenerate” exhibit a
“disproportionate impressionability of their psychic centres” (25). This impressionable,
susceptible nature leads to “irresistible passion for imitation,” and eager submission “to
all the suggestions of writers and artists” (26). Such impressionable minds find
themselves locked in a vicious cycle, where immoderate reading leads to overindulgent
writing, which in turn perpetuates this problem of excess for other readers.
Though it eventually came to be codified within degenerative theories of
criminality and pathology, these earliest usages of graphomania found the term only
facetiously employed as a specialized medical classification, employed in ironic styles
that recognized the audacity of imagining literary critique as medical diagnosis. Often, it
seems to have been adopted as a self-deprecating term by those who recognized in
themselves a tendency towards the loquacious. For example, the subtitle of Edinburgh’s
1827 journal of medical satire, The Cheilead, or University Coterie; being violent
ebullitions of graphomaniacs, affected by cacoethes scirbendi, and famæ sacra fames,
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suggests an ironic self-awareness seldom displayed by Nordau within his own work.8
Medical discourse, we find in this self-diagnosis, is a form of writing prone to its own
obsessive tendencies. George Bernard Shaw’s dispassionate critique of Nordau in The
Sanity of Art argues for a similarly reflexive reading of Nordau’s Degeneration:
If you want an example of echolalia [symptomatic of degeneration, according to
Nordau], can you find a more shocking one than this gentleman who, when you
say “mania,” immediately begins to gabble Egomania, Graphomania,
Megalomania, Onomatomania, Pyromania, Kleptomania, Dipsomania,
Erotomania, Arithmomania, Oniomania, and is started off by the termination
“phobia” with a string of Agoraphobia, Claustrophobia, Rupophobia, Iophobia,
Nosophobia, Aichmophobia, Belenophobia, Cremnophobia, and Trichophobia?
(80).
Critiques such as Shaw’s suggest that, while the term “graphomania” purports to tell us
something about aberrant practices of writing, its sudden appearance in the nineteenth
century reveals more to us today about newly emergent rationales of reading.9 The most
significant changes in the nineteenth century had less to do with the sheer quantities of
writing produced and consumed than the extraordinary expansion of what counted as
writing in the first place. The crucial distinction between these two modern developments
can be illuminated with reference to Heidegger’s “Age of the World Picture.” This
“world picture” names something more than a visual representation of the world; it refers
to a distinctly modern understanding of our world as essentially pictorial—as something
that can be adequately enframed and expressed as an image. Heidegger is concerned less
with pictures than with the primary tendency to visualize; it is this mentality that explains
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how it is “that the world becomes a picture at all” (129). Analogously, nineteenth-century
inscription technologies seek not to expand an already-existing archive of writing, but to
fundamentally alter the ontological relation between writing and the phenomenal world.
These technologies signaled not that the world was a surface and a subject upon and
about which one might write, but that its nature was innately graphic.
This distinction can be further clarified through a comparison of Holmes’
“Cacoethes Scribendi” with an extraordinary passage from the father of modern
computing, Charles Babbage, in his Ninth Bridgewater Treatise (1838). Speculating upon
“The Permanent Impression of Our Words and Actions on the Globe We Inhabit,”
Babbage provides us with an alternate vision of global inscription. Reasoning that “the
pulsations of the air, once set in motion by the human voice, cease not to exist with the
sounds to which they gave rise” (109), Babbage envisions the boundless spatial and
temporal ramifications of these atmospheric undulations:
Thus considered, what a strange chaos is this wide atmosphere we breathe! Every
atom, impressed with good and with ill, retains at once the motions which
philosophers and sages have imparted to it, mixed and combined in ten thousand
ways with all that is worthless and base. The air itself is one vast library, on
whose pages are for ever written all that man has ever said or woman whispered.
There, in their mutable but unerring characters, mixed with the earliest, as well as
with the latest sighs of mortality, stand for ever recorded, vows unredeemed,
promises unfulfilled, perpetuating in the united movements of each particle, the
testimony of man's changeful will. But if the air we breathe is the never-failing
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historian of the sentiments we have uttered, earth, air, and ocean, are the eternal
witnesses of the acts we have done. (111-112, emphasis added)
The contrast here with Holmes’ “Cacoethes Scribendi” is striking: rather than a “natural
world” that has been pulped for the writing materials required to satisfy an excessive
human desire to write, Babbage’s world is itself tirelessly engaged in interminable acts of
composition (the majority of these unfolding beneath the threshold of our perception).
The globe is not a blank surface placed, to its detriment, under the knife of inscription.
Instead, this world is endlessly expressive, always writing and being written. The sea
would hardly need to be “changed to ink,” as Holmes imagines, once one realizes that
“the ripple on the ocean's surface caused by a gentle breeze, or the still water which
marks the more immediate track of a ponderous vessel gliding with scarcely expanded
sails over its bosom, are equally indelible” (Babbage 114). Water, the image of traceless
writing in the Phaedrus and in Derrida’s model of dissemination, is here recognized as an
exemplary inscriptive surface, one that visually exhibits the invisible processes of action
and reaction within our atmosphere. The air as well is thick with writing: a “vast library”
that recalls Borges’ dizzying archival fantasy. The density of this ethereal registry
accumulates constantly because everything we do is a form of writing. Careless words
and fleeting gestures are no less “indelible” than our most deliberate attempts at selfexpression; the earth bears “enduring testimony” (115) to both with equal diligence.
Doubtless some forms of inscription are more readily accessible to our understanding
than others, but it was the task of nineteenth-century science to radically expand the
margins of the legible world.

43
It is this discursive revolution, I argue, that brought about a new indexical
understanding of the relations between subjects and writing. Commenting on Renfield’s
graphomania in his reading of Stoker’s Dracula, Mark Seltzer argues that: “maladies of
energy, motive and agency were in effect understood, around 1900, as maladies of
mimesis, representation, and writing” (Serial 74). In what follows, I explore the machines
responsible for facilitating such improbable conversions of physiological and psychical
activity into graphical information.

Étienne-Jules Marey and the Language of Phenomena Themselves
The Victorian period’s shifting discursive paradigm was signaled by the arrival of a “new
species” of scientific measuring and recording instruments that, beginning around 1800,
found their way into “the cabinets of natural philosophers, betokened by a new semantic
marker” (Brain, 159). Designated as writing or drawing instruments by the suffix “graph,” these machines elevated writing as the privileged means of collecting objective
information about the natural world, and they were intended to produce that writing
automatically. Because they were neither apprehended “by eye,” nor inscribed “by hand,”
these mechanically produced transcriptions possessed the sheen of objectivity.10
Ironically, we could trust them chiefly because we had no hand in them.
We find the clearest expression of the association between mechanical process
and the emergent epistemological ideal of scientific objectivity in Étienne-Jules Marey’s
La méthode graphique (1874). Marey’s studies of animal movement led to his
development of a wide array of physiographic instruments capable of recording minute
measurements of delicate and complex physical gestures. The “graphical method”
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required a host of different technologies (many of them invented by Marey himself), but
each technique was premised upon the replacement of human perception with mechanical
observation, and consequently upon the substitution of human notation systems with
“unmediated” transcription. Marey identified two principal hindrances to the
development of the empirical sciences: “first, the defectiveness of our senses for
discovering the truth, and, second, the inadequacy of language to express and transmit
those truths that we have acquired” (i, all translations by the author). As machines for
both input and output, bodies were not only inadequate (malfunctioning after a certain
threshold of speed or volume had been crossed), but fundamentally untrustworthy
(tending to distort results with their own inclinations and idiosyncrasies). For these
reasons, Marey was fervently confident about the possibilities of this supersession of the
observer’s responsibilities, marveling that: “When the eye can no longer see, the ear
cannot hear, and touch cannot feel, or even when our senses deceive us, these machines
perform like new senses with astonishing precision” (108). In Marey’s technological
vision, the body is overridden rather than upgraded. Imaginatively disabled, its senses are
switched off one by one as they are pressed to their limits. The role of these machines, for
Marey, appears to be less supplementary than substitutive. It is better that the eye cannot
see and the ear cannot hear, for this blind and deaf subject does less to interpose its own
habits of perception.
Marey advises scientists to “keep for other needs the insinuations of eloquence
and the flowers of language” (vi). For the purposes of scientific observation, only a hard
and unflinching mechanical fidelity will serve, one that strips away the conventions of
language and its symbolic embellishments. Marey’s machines translate “with a clarity
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that language does not possess” (i) because their inscriptions exchange literary figures for
those of the human body; they “trace the curves of phenomena” alone (vi). This assertion
underwrites one of the nineteenth century’s most beguiling fantasies of communication:
that the turn to graphical notation charted an escape from the artificial and arbitrary
nature of human language and brokered direct commerce, through an unerring fidelity to
bodies, with the world it described. Specifically, we find in Marey’s disavowal of “the
flowers of language” a desire to institute a new species of writing, one through which it
finally becomes possible to distinguish the literal from the literary, or figurative.
Other physiologists proposed that the language of science, rather than standing in
opposition to figural expression, promised its sublation. It occurred to Francis Galton that
“poetical metaphors of ordinary language suggest many possibilities of measurement”
(“Measurement” 184). Noting that two people who have “an ‘inclination’ to one another”
tend to physically “incline or slope together when sitting side by side,” he imagines
hosting a dinner party where his guests’ chairs have been rigged with hidden weights and
pressure gauges that would determine the exact degrees of their preferences regarding
each other (184). Popular expression is littered with dead metaphors that Galton was
convinced science could revive. Through careful empirical study, he believed, the
intuitive but indistinct truths encoded within language could be translated into genuinely
useful information. Nineteenth-century physiology was driven by this desire to
systematically dislodge the “scare quotes” that blocked language’s access to the
phenomena it struggled to describe. This distance was bridged through writing that was
not linguistic in nature, but graphically replicated the body’s own idiom.
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For many of the inventors and proponents of these machines, it would seem, these
inscriptions did not constitute a language at all. For instance, in “Some Account of the
Art of Photogenic Drawing,” presented to the Royal Society in 1839, William H. Fox
Talbot describes his photograph of Lacock Abbey in such terms: “this building I believe
to be the first that was ever yet known to have drawn its own picture” (46). Similarly, in
Edison’s comparison of his phonograph’s wax cylinders with the cuneiform characters of
Babylonian cylinders, he marks “the great and progressive difference that our wax
cylinders speak for themselves, and will not have to wait centuries to be deciphered”
(“Perfected Phonograph” 645). Of interest here is Edison’s trust that the machine will
keep running and be conversant with future machines and parts, but more fundamentally,
this confidence that such writings “speak for themselves.” Edison imagines these signs as
transculturally and transhistorically legible, demonstrating his inability to recognize these
markings as cultural. These cylinders will not fall prey to a future of mistranslation,
because the universal orality to which they grant expression circumvents interpretation
and translation (whether on the linguistic register or the conceptual).
We recognize in Marey’s writings as well this faith in the machine’s ability to
transcribe “natural graphics” (Méthode iv), markings that would serve as a lingua franca
of science. These machines underpin the conviction, identified by Foucault as a
quintessentially nineteenth-century belief, “that mute gestures, that illnesses, that all the
tumult around us can also speak” (“Nietzsche, Freud, Marx” 270). “More than ever,”
Foucault argues, “we are listening in on all this possible language, trying to intercept,
beneath the words, a discourse that would be more essential” (270). For Marey, the key to
unlocking this essential discourse lies in apprehending “the language of the phenomena
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themselves” (Méthode iii). Drawing their focus upon the langue inconnue of involuntarily
expressive human bodies, Marey’s machines show us for the first time “languages issuing
from matter, automatized bodies writing themselves” (Seltzer 74). The remarkably
sympathetic ear of the machine does not presume to speak on behalf of bodies, but simply
channels the langue inconnue, or ‘unknown language’ of the body (Mouvement 24).
These bodies had been communicating with us all along, but it took the correct machine
to recognize this fact.
Aided by their new amanuenses, a host of phenomena acquired a surprising
coherence. If the phonograph suggested speech was merely a name for writing yet to find
a properly receptive surface, photography would imply that light had simply to fall upon
the correct materials to be recognized as writing. With the aid of these instruments, it was
as if the sensual world had come suddenly into focus. In this graphomaniacal view, the
world was always and everywhere inscribing itself upon itself. And writing-instruments
provided the lens that gathered these disparate phenomena, the pinhole through which
each had to pass in order to gain definition (that is, both ‘focus’ and ‘meaning’). In turn,
the “graph” metamorphosed and expanded the capacities of writing, attuning it to the
spectrum of what François Dagognet, in his superb study of Marey’s life-work, refers to
as “nature’s own expression” (63).
This attribution of ownership—and even the agency of authorship—to the closed
conversation between nature and machine was a crucial step in establishing the
authenticity and objectivity of these writings. The evidential and forensic values of such
inscriptions hinged upon the eradication of human interference. Laying out his principles
of experimental procedure, Marey insists that: “it is of immense importance that graphic
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records should be automatically registered, in order that the phenomenon should give on
paper its own record of duration, and of the moment of production” (Mouvement 3,
emphasis added).
The familiar proposition that graphing instruments “spoke for themselves”
appealed to a culture already saturated with writing by reasoning that the proliferation of
signs need not be accompanied by the burden of interpretation. This “writing that reads
itself” presents us with an intriguing paradox: media that aspire to immediacy. If this is a
contradiction in terms, it is one that names an enduring modern dilemma. How does one
exercise the deliberate and conscious act of writing in service of spontaneous and unselfconscious expression? Most broadly, the question has to do with how is it that we might
recuperate a lost immediacy by bypassing the conventions of representation. The
graphical method stands as one of the most sophisticated attempts to grapple with this
quandary, attempting to short-circuit the conventions of representation, to silence
language with writing, to transliterate figures of speech into those of the body.
The rhetoric of automaticity always promises that complexity must be borne in
the ultimate service of simplicity. It frames technology not as the proliferation of
machines, but the subtraction of the inessential (whether this be achieved by means of
delegation or eradication of function). The suspension of mental faculties in particular
promises to bring about a reconciliation: the creation of a mirror that allows for reflection
without prompting self-consciousness and the consequent doubling effect or splitting of
this awareness. This is possible only when it is the mirror that looks at you, not the other
way around. Such a machine eliminates the feedback of self-consciousness by
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circumventing the self, demoting the agent of self-inspection to a passive operator of
machinery.
Sorting through the automatic recording instruments employed by “mechanically
objective” scientific inquiry in the nineteenth century, Daston and Galison argue that
“these new methods aimed at automatism” (42). The fallible examiner’s deference to the
automatic functioning of machinery was an essential step in the renunciation and
“policing of subjectivity” (Daston 161, 147) demanded within properly objective science.
However, if the rhetoric of the graphical method espoused a (highly paradoxical)
“disciplined automaticity” (Daston 185) in the body of the examiner, it also incited and
gave explicit representation to the automatic behaviours of bodies under examination. On
the side of the examiner, then, these machines embodied a “passionate commitment to
suppress the will” (Daston 143). On that of the examined, they offered a rather different
picture of the subject’s “freedom from will” (Daston 123), one characterized by maniacal
bodily excess rather than methodical mental discipline.
The graphical method advocates the benign abdication of human judgment to
mechanical registration. Guided by the “negative ideal” (Daston 123) of nonintervention,
this mechanical practice is intended to subtract the distorting lens of subjective reality
from the hard kernel of objective truth. The Victorian graphomaniac complicates the
conservative logic of this negative ideal, asserting the productive capacity of automatic
writing. The methodical examiner exemplifies the neutralization of subjectivity under the
conditions of machinery, while the graphomaniac embodies the production of a new
subject. One figure employs machinery to grapple with the persistent problems of
“subjectified” objectivity; the other grants involuntary expression to what Richard Menke
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has named “objectified subjectivity” (137). Automatic writing machines that incite and
cite the automatic operations of the body broker this exposure and estrangement of the
self from itself.
The semiotic register of this automatic writing is the index, with its promise of
perfect fidelity resulting from direct commerce with natural phenomena. Charles Sanders
Peirce contends that indices “direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion,” a
phrase that captures the subtle, yet insistent theme of his index: that of force without
understanding. In fact, it is difficult to find instances where Peirce’s consideration of
indices does not prompt him to use the term “force.”11 Acting under this influence, the
index exhibits a kind of involuntary fidelity, “forced by blind fact to correspond to its
object” (“Telepathy” 373). These indexical signs are not expressive, but impressive. That
is, their communicative power is derived from their susceptibility to impressions. The
footprint endows the ground with no special powers of eloquence. The object has
stomped on our representamen, and this surface’s legibility is the direct result of its
vulnerability. Or, if that is too leading, its malleability—the capacity “of being really
affected by that Object” (“Nomenclature” 291). Crucially, for Peirce, “it is not the mere
resemblance of its Object, even in these respects which makes it a sign, but it is the actual
modification of it by the Object” (“Valencies” 143). The index is vulnerable to the object,
and yields involuntarily to its whim. It is this vulnerability that will be exploited by a
Victorian scriptural economy that recruits the human body as the involuntary index of the
individual hidden within.

The Victorian Scriptural Economy: Subjects and Characters
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Operating under the logic of the index’s neutral receptivity, these mechanisms of
transcription and conscription underwrite a new scriptural economy. Its central rhetorical
or ideological innovation is the reasoning that the stigmata they “register” are not
imposed upon the subject from outside, but expressed from within. These inscriptions,
apprehended by graphological techniques and technologies, were understood to express
an indexical and transparent relation between objective, written characters and the
internal “character” of subjects. This understanding of the Victorian “scriptural
economy” is adapted from The Practice of Everyday Life, wherein Michel de Certeau
provides an account of the intersection between bodies and the Law in modern Western
culture that in turn recalls Nietzsche’s mnemotechnics.12 From Nietzsche, de Certeau also
inherits his empathy for the flesh that has been tortured into conformity with the Law,
and it is this concern that prompts his (speculative) act of remembrance. Nietzsche’s
Genealogy of Morals anticipates the eradication of “bad conscience” cultivated through
suffering, but glances over its shoulder with a shudder. How is it that this forgetful beast
was brought to account, reformed as a responsible individual? Nietzsche assures us: “the
answers and methods for solving this primeval problem were not precisely gentle;
perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of
man than his mnemotechnics” (61, emphasis original). If this statement seems to possess
a hyperbolic ring to it, this sense is no doubt owing to the assumption that devices to aid
the memory are benign. We do not flinch at the string tied round an index finger, failing
to recall the long history of this binding of the body. We have long since forgotten what it
means to remember.
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This “fearful and uncanny” aspect of remembering, as evoked by Nietzsche, is the
toll it has taken upon the bodies that have borne, or buckled under, its weight:
Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to
create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices
of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for
example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the
deepest level systems of cruelties)—all this has its origin in the instinct that
realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. (Genealogy 61)
It is this archaic—and largely forgotten—primal textuality, where wounds upon the
surface of the body were the seal of sovereign violence carved into the parchment, that is
unearthed within de Certeau’s analysis. “Every power,” he insists, “including the power
of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects” (140). At present there may seem
to be nothing but a neutral, white, unresisting space, devoid of history; de Certeau
provides a palimpsest of the law, the translucence of which brings to light the force that
underwrites written law. Modern states have replaced wounding with writing, markings
that encourage us to imagine ourselves as subjects of the law, not just subject to its
dictates. But these books, de Certeau reminds us, “are only metaphors of the body” (140).
Their ‘civility’ is a provisional luxury. The human parchment we find beneath this
screen, or ‘cover-story,’ is not only the embodiment of textual history, but also its
present-day basis. Times of crisis tend very quickly to convince the law of the
fundamental inadequacy of rules made of paper, and so “it writes itself again on the
bodies themselves” (140). Of course, it is only in extraordinary cases that modern society
permits the law to assert itself through explicit marking of bodies.
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In the “practice of everyday life,” then, what is it that renders this wounding
painless and unrecognizable, thus making necessary de Certeau’s critical act of
transliteration? To begin with (invoking Marx and Althusser), we have been numbed.
These markings are administered with the “anesthetic” of an ideological “significance”
that dulls the pain by offering the consolation of meaning. “From birth to mourning after
death,” bodies are never subjected to senseless suffering. “Through all sorts of initiations
(in rituals, at school, etc.), it [the law] transforms them into tables of the law, into living
tableaux of rules and customs, into actors in the drama organized by a social order” (de
Certeau 139). De Certeau’s schema emphasizes the multiplicity of forms and rhetorics
employed in everyday acts of cultural inscription. “The law” is not a monolithic,
oppressive inscriptive device, imposing foreign names from outside and above and
issuing directives that one can either obey or ignore at one’s peril. Rather, it writes a
language we participate within, our flesh giving substance to the law, as the law in turn
grants significance to our newly constituted “bodies.”
Readings of cultural inscription that ignore this complicity advance “repressive
hypotheses” concerning the Victorian state, an approach that finds its most incisive
critique in Lauren M. E. Goodlad’s Victorian Literature and the Victorian State (2003).
Goodlad marks a distinction between the genealogical project undertaken in Foucault’s
early work on disciplinary institutions and the concept of “governmentality”—or the
organized production of governable subjects—that organizes later texts. It is Goodlad’s
contention that Foucault’s latter, relatively unexplored notion is pertinent to the
Victorianist, while the former only interposes a “distorting lens through which to peer at
the modernization of Britain’s idiosyncratic, self-consciously liberal, decentralized, and
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‘self-governing’ society” (7-8). These distinctively British traits ought to complicate any
attempt to directly transpose Foucault’s insights into the context of nineteenth-century
Victorian culture. In Goodlad’s estimation, “we have yet to fully document the
differences between the disciplinary subject of Foucault’s Franco-oriented and presentist
genealogy, and the modes of character idealized by and produced in Britain’s selfconsciously liberal society over the course of the nineteenth century” (x).
Goodlad’s designation of Victorian Britain as a “liberal society” is chiefly
intended to communicate the culture’s general “antipathy toward statist interference”
(viii). The reach of centralized government, many prominent Victorians believed, must be
curtailed if England was “to preserve the ‘self-governing’ liberties of individuals and
local communities” (vii-viii). Alongside this negative conception of freedom, however,
Goodlad asserts that Victorian liberalism was driven by a “positive” (and in many ways
contradictory) “impulse to build character and promote social betterment by collective
means” (viii). Goodlad’s book provides one of the most comprehensive critical studies of
this uniquely Victorian concern with the formation of “character,” a term that enframes
individuation within a distinctly moral understanding. The prescriptive value of
Goodlad’s opening chapter, “Beyond the Panopticon”—particularly its call for a more
careful historicizing of Victorian criticism’s longstanding dialogue with Foucault—is
attested to by the exemplary demonstration of method that follows: a critical reading of
Victorian “pastorship” as a political configuration of governmentality.13
Along with Andrea Henderson’s Romantic Identities (1996) and, in an earlier
historical context, Diedre Shauna Lynch’s The Economy of Character (1998), Goodlad’s
study has emerged as one of the most discerning recent historical analyses of character,
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though I would temper her contention that “in its liberal meanings character was the
antithesis of Foucault’s disciplinary individual” (24). Rather than substituting one critical
term for another, I would argue, the concept of character affords us an opportunity to
rethink discipline in light of Foucault’s later work on governmentality. Governmentality
eschews centralized regimes of discipline, favouring instead personal techniques of selfdiscipline. This strategic relocation of the ostensible locus of control corresponds to what
David Wayne Thomas has identified as Victorian “liberalism’s distinctive commitment to
rational autonomy” (ix). The Victorian pursuit of character formation was typically
couched in terms of self-governance and self-improvement, strategies that Foucault
would come to name “technologies of the self” in his later work.14 In a 1982 seminar that
borrows its title from this concept, Foucault identifies the “meticulous concern” of selfwriting as a new experience of the self, wherein “introspection becomes more and more
detailed” (28). Through this activity, a “relation developed between writing and
vigilance. Attention was paid to nuances of life, mood, and reading, and the experience of
oneself was intensified and widened by virtue of this act of writing” (28). This dutiful
recording of the self makes the journal a model of self-surveillance; governmental
structures delegate to their subjects the tasks of observation and discipline, closing down
the impersonal panopticon and opening up the personal diary.
Insofar as it orients itself towards the ideal of the autonomous individual, the
Victorian scriptural economy rejects the overtly oppressive connotations of the Old
French “caractere” (derived from the Greek word for ‘stamping tool’). This stamping tool
is the heraldic device of Foucault’s earlier genealogical project, the task of which is: “to
expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the
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body” (“Nietzsche” 367). Foucault’s turn to individual (and individualizing) practices of
self-writing complicates this central preoccupation with inscription, signaling a deeper
recognition of the reflexive and ambivalent relations between writing, subjectivity and
power.
A key figure in the history of this convergence, the graphomaniac pinpoints two
basic premises of the Victorian rhetoric concerning “character.” The first of these arises
from the conviction that not all individuals possess character. The pursuit of this elusive
and distinctive mark of “rational autonomy” required subjects to first identify and
apprehend the irrational automatisms of the self. For many, it seemed the forces of
culture were diametrically opposed to this project of independent character-building.
John Stuart Mill’s enduring preoccupation with character throughout On Liberty affords a
representative Victorian articulation of the selective nature of this coveted designation:
“A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own
nature—is said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has
no character, no more than a steam-engine has a character” (77).15 The mechanical nature
of Mill’s “steam-engine” image is typical of a period wherein machinery served as a
compelling metaphor for the cultural forces that compromised the individual’s selfassertion.
The second, and more peculiar premise of Victorian character follows from the
widespread belief that, not only is there “character—or the want of it—in everything,
animate or inanimate” (Weston 64), but that this character takes on literal and legible
forms that render as external, objective signs the private truths of the individual. The
conjectural correspondences between graphological and moral character that are the focus
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of this study find expression in texts such as Curiosities of Literature, where Isaac
Disraeli decries the plight of handwriting instruction within Victorian schools,
complaining that the pen is “regulated […] now too often by a mechanical process, which
the present race of writing-masters seem to have contrived for their own convenience.”
Students “are forced in their automatic motions, as if acted on by the pressure of a steamengine,” a process that quashes the distinctive personality of signatures, so that they “all
[appear] to have come from the same rolling-press” (207). Such studies of manifest
character present the signature as a conflicted sign of enculturation, indexing the
automatisms of culture as well as the autonomous gestures of the individual. Moreover,
the belief that this struggle could be objectively rendered on the surface of the page
through the involuntary but indelible traces of bodily gesture, meant individual
“character” was outwardly legible, and thus accountable, to others. If the Victorians
understood character to be a personal quality, it was also a publicly visible trait that
indexed one’s interior for any who could read the signs.
In an 1884 article on the “Measurement of Character” written for the Fortnightly
Review, Francis Galton explores the epistemological consequences of this emergent
belief in the objective reality of character: “the character which shapes our conduct is a
definite and durable ‘something,’” he argues, “and therefore […] it is reasonable to
attempt to measure it” (181). The range of characterological projects inspired by the
premise of manifest character were dependent not upon programmes of repressive
inscription, but on physiologically-directed incitements to discourse. Provoking the
langue inconnue of individuals, they sought to instigate the automatic reflexes of the
body, rather than initiate conversations with subjects.
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The late Victorian scriptural economy ventures the wholesale registration of
bodies (from Galton’s composite photography to the Society for Psychical Research’s
experiments with weighing and measuring spiritual manifestations), but does so under the
aegis of a widespread technological “discovery” that writing emanates from things
themselves (and constitutes a solicitation to be read). By contrast with the intrusive model
of inscription outlined with social construction, this law depends fundamentally upon the
activity of bodies: the subject spells out her own sentence, and the law merely takes
dictation. Proper interpretation is no longer the responsibility of a subject who must learn
the letter of the law. Nature, we now realize, has been writing all along, and it is the duty
of the law (or culture) simply to passively record, listen, and strive to faithfully interpret
what has been laid down.
In this manner, the madness of graphical method is displaced onto its necessary
corollary—the figure of the graphomaniac, whose body cannot help but write. We find a
striking representation of this logic of self-registration in The Criminal, Havelock Ellis’
1890 study of criminal anthropology and physiognomy.16 Ellis was responsible for
introducing the work of Lombroso to a wider English audience through his translation of

L'uomo di genio in rapporto alla psichiatria (1889; Eng. Trans. The Man of
Genius, 1891), and the content of The Criminal borrows much from Lombroso’s L'uomo

delinquente (1876) and Palimsesti del Carcere (1888). The work devotes a handful of
chapters to the semiotic and aesthetic productions of criminal culture: specimens of
criminal slang, philosophy, literature, and pictorial art are examined for their
psychological and forensic significance. Ellis’ chapter on prison inscriptions benefits
from the specimens compiled within Lombroso’s study, as well as British research
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documented within Michael Davitt’s Leaves From a Prison Diary (1885), and John
William Horsley’s Jottings From Jail: Notes and Papers on Prison Matters (1886). In
each of these sources, criminal “character” consistently finds objective reality through
impulsive graphical expression.
Ellis’ own examination of prison inscriptions does not set out to mark certain
bodies as different, but merely to remark upon how they inscribe themselves into the
system. It is the subject and not the law that has revived primitive techniques of writing
on the body. Observing that the “child loves to speak to himself,” Ellis notes that “the
negro, and especially the negress, think aloud; and if from restraint or distrust the
criminal keeps silent his most private thoughts, he feels himself compelled to fix them
wherever he may find himself, on the walls of his prison, or on the books that are lent to
him” (Criminal 212). A thoroughly familiar Victorian condensation of various
unresolved bodies, this amalgam combines child, negro, and criminal together in their
shared tendency to automatically submit themselves for inspection. Ellis recognizes that
the impulse to write in experiences of extended seclusion “is an instinct from which no
individual, no matter what his degree of culture, is exempt” (211), but proposes as a
general rule that “the lower the order of culture the more complete and trustworthy is the
inscription as an expression of individual peculiarities” (212).
Along these lines, Lombroso discovers an atavistic throwback to the tribal
warrior’s hieroglyphic tradition in the modern criminal’s tendency to commemorate his
crimes through bodily adornment. Observing that the “tattooing on pederasts usually
consists of portraits of those with whom they have had unnatural commerce, or phrases of
an affectionate nature addressed to them,” Lombroso notes as well a man convicted of
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rape who “was covered with pictorial representations of his obscene adventures”
(Criminal 232). Of course, such fortuitous discoveries were dependent upon the
criminal’s decision to represent the scene of the crime through declarations and
portraiture engraved upon his body. Text and image render the body a cryptic, yet
decipherable site of confession. These tales of criminal transparency, more anecdotal than
statistical, represent a relatively small number of cases. Their mention within Criminal
Man evinces a desire on the part of the examiner that the criminal’s own body would bear
witness to the crime, an early apprehension of the body as a textual archive of traumatic
events. For Ellis, tattooing was an innately “impulsive” act; even the painful nature of
these inscriptions was not enough to bring the criminal to his senses (Criminal 200).
Lombroso as well would have us believe this was a natural tendency: those who commit
the vilest of crimes must also commit them to writing.
The uncultured hold nothing back: the repression of instinct is a special
prerogative of properly socialized persons. The fact that Ellis and Lombroso pinpoint
members of their society with the least agency impels us to note the way in which the
statement pathologizes expression, while normalizing silence for these bodies. This
essential context of disenfranchisement is significantly absent from the scope of The
Criminal’s analysis; in Ellis’ narrative, the prison cell is considered less as a site of
repression than one of expression.17 In the seclusion of this room, the criminal “writes
what he cannot or dare not say” (120).
In the criminal’s makeshift “studio,” where he suddenly finds the time and space
to communicate his true self, everything comes to the surface: “His desires and lusts, his
aspirations, his coarse satires and imprecations, his bitter reflections, his judgments of
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life, are all recorded in these prison inscriptions on whitewashed walls, cell doors,
margins of books, tin knives, and the bottoms of skilly cans and dinner tins” (213).
Through his incessant writing, the prisoner collaborates in his own surveillance. The
carceral gaze extends to incorporate the practice of reading, exploiting not only the
enforced physical visibility of the cell, but an interior gaze that accesses truths of the
subject, beyond apprehending any explicitly criminal action. Ellis’ inventory of writing
surfaces displays the increasing ingenuity (framed as perversity) in the criminal’s
understanding of what can be modified as text when one lacks any proper avenue for
expression. Horsley reports that cacoethes scribendi is thankfully rare among artisans,
labourers, and women, but “the males of the lower middle class who are unfortunately (in
this respect, at any rate) a very numerous, ubiquitous, and irrepressible body” (Jottings
20). The dissemination of these criminal inscriptions demonstrate the impossibility of
ever truly confining the criminal, who remains heedless of the state’s benevolent attempts
to inculcate restraint, the civilized art of keeping things bottled up.18
Of course, one could answer that the criminologist displays a similar ingenuity in
interpreting these acts, upturning dinner plates and poring over walls, assigning value to
them as texts worthy of study. This expansion of the scope of culturally significant
writing pushes inscription beyond the bounds of “authorized” works (where
consciousness, mastery, order, and deliberation are defining characteristics), into
unauthorized texts (unconscious and graphomaniacal). Graphomania named writing that
could not be counted as ‘culture’ in the most exclusive sense of the term. It instead called
for different criteria, new methodologies of reading, and innovative techniques of literary
police-work.
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Perhaps the most charged site of graphic ingenuity and perversity was the body
itself, and though Ellis’ commentary concerning the encounter between the ethnographer
and his tattooed subjects is brief, it is highly suggestive. “The men,” he tells us, “always
seemed rather ashamed of being tattooed, and wondered why the professor wished to
study ‘these stupidities’” (Criminal 200). This snapshot captures, without quite
deciphering, the enigmatic and disconcerting force of the examiner’s desire. Confronted
with this unsolicited and unaccountable enthusiasm and attention their bodies have
attracted, these men suddenly find themselves embarrassed by their own skin. To what
can we ascribe the surprising modesty of these sailors and prison inmates?
What is it that has been laid bare here? If the tattooed subject suddenly finds
himself searching about for a fig leaf, it is not his body that he seeks to conceal. In the
professor’s attentive gaze, we find a desire for “naked” writing, caught unawares. A
voyeur at the periphery of the scene of writing, she steals a glance at writing that does not
know it is being read. (The professor, outside the criminal networks or heterosexual
exchanges for which these signs were the intended audience, intercepts the signal.) The
dismissal of these markings as “stupidities” signals an attempt to render these bodily
inscriptions insignificant, to resist the sense of the examiner. But these marks are
indelible, and there is no possibility of retraction or revision. The sailor’s anchor has been
anchored in his flesh; writing and the body are bound to each other. And this is what
excites the professor: neither writing nor flesh in themselves, but the scene of their
entanglement—a zone of indistinction between flesh and writing, nature and culture. The
professor is interested in something more than writing, though to the subject under
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examination it feels like something less: writing that he cannot help, and that cannot help
him.
“Graphomania” characterizes the exhaustive project of the Victorian scriptural
economy to render all surfaces legible. The central proposition of this epistemological
fantasy is the concept of “bare writing,” produced by the irrepressible signifying practices
of the body. The lure of Marey’s langue inconnue, it would seem, was not simply the
promise of a language that had heretofore eluded our attention, but a language that
remained fundamentally unknown to itself. The thought of such guileless and unequivocal
writing would have been irresistible to a culture at once enthralled by the expanding
empire of signs, yet daunted by the operations of deliberation, distance, and deferral that
threatened an endless proliferation of writing.
Over the course of the next three chapters, I turn to the Gothic as an exceptional
archive of deviant and criminal subjects whose difference is increasingly understood in
graphical terms. If the graphical method normalizes the process of the subject’s
objectification and entrusts the law to economize the erratic expressions of bodies, gothic
fiction observes such operations from a distinctly paranoid and resistant position.

1

The second edition of Nordau’s German text was translated into English by D. Appleton
of New York in 1895.
2

After reading Darwin, Bénédict Augustine Morel formulates the theory of
“degeneration” in his second edition of Traité des maladies mentales (1860), though his
ideas are equally dependent on pre-Darwinian theories of evolution such as Lamarck’s.
3

This argument had been proposed in Henry Maudsley’s Body and Will (1883), where he
cautioned: “Survival of the fittest does not mean always survival of the best in the sense
of the highest organism; it means only the survival of that which is best suited to the
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circumstances […] in which it is placed – the survival of a savage in a savage social
medium, of a rogue among rogues, of a parasite where only a parasite can live” (237).
4

See, for instance, Hutton 2.

5

Clyde Partin notes that while “no specific reference to petit papier can be found in
Charcot’s works,” the diagnosis “was probably transmitted via an oral tradition in his
famous Tuesday Lessons.” Partin traces the idea to Charcot’s student Henry Meige, who
describes a patient in his Le Juif Errant a la Salpetriere (1893) thusly: “In a voluminous
batch of filthy scraps of papers that never leaves him, he shows us prescriptions from all
the universities of Europe and signed by the most illustrious names.”
6

On the dilation and escalation of reading practices, and the “democracy of print” that
followed a widespread growth in literacy within Victorian culture, see Altick. On the
early nineteenth-century construction of “bibliomania,” see Connell.
7

Holmes’s title references the seventh of Juvenal’s Satires: “An incurable itch for
scribbling [cacoethes scribendi] takes possession of many, and grows inveterate in their
insane breast.” In 1932, W.H. Auden’s peculiar essay “Writing” would borrow Holmes’
imagery to complain that, “More and more books are written by more and more people,
most of them with little or no talent. Forests are cut down, rivers of ink absorbed, but the
lust to write is still unsatisfied . . . If it were only a question of writing it wouldn't matter;
but it is an index of our health. It's not only books, but our lives, that are going to pot”
(Auden 312).
8

For a similarly self-deprecating work from the field of literature, see Ireland’s
Scribbleomania; or, The Printer’s Devil’s Polichronicon, A Sublime Poem (1815).
9

For an earlier critique of Nordau proceeding along the same lines as Shaw’s, see George
Saintsbury’s 1895 review of Degeneration’s English translation in The Bookman.
10

On the rise of mechanical objectivity as a scientific virtue, see Daston and Galison.

11

Indices also communicate their message with the qualities of a physical force. Often,
bodies are called in to demonstrate the way in which this sign finds its strength not in the
nuances of speech but the power of bodies—the pointing finger, the stomping foot, the
exclamatory human figure.
12

“The Scriptural Economy,” 131-153.

13

For Foucault’s reading of “pastoral power,” see “The Subject and Power” 332-336.

14

For a recent critical account of the Victorian project of self-improvement, see Miller,
The Burdens of Perfection.
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15

For a broader consideration of the significance of character for Mill and his
contemporaries, see Collini.
16

The Criminal was featured in an extremely successful Contemporary Science Series.
Edited by Ellis, these books were “intended principally for the intelligent layman”
(Grosskurth 114). Ellis also contributed Man and Woman to the series in 1894.
17

Structural causes are not wholly absent from Ellis’ study. Ellis cites Quetelet’s quip
that “society prepares criminals,” while “the criminal is the instrument that executes
them” (24). However, as his title suggests, Ellis looks first to the individual, and the chief
interest of his research is the “anatomical, physiological, and psychological nature” of the
criminal type (25).
18

On the problem of discursive restraint and containment, see Stewart’s Crimes of
Writing.
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2
Unauthorized Autobiographies:
Reading and Writing by Hand in Stevenson’s Strange Case
“Nothing now is done directly, or by hand.”
(Carlyle, “Signs of the Times” 64)
“la main se mène”1
(Nordau, Degeneration 65)
“my heart sinks and my hand trembles”
(Stevenson, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 70)
In his first installment on automatic writing for 1884’s Proceedings of the Society for
Psychical Research, Frederic W.H. Myers pointed to handwriting as “a kind of summary
expression of man’s being” (“Telepathic” 222). This information was never Myers’
primary interest; his experiments with automatic writing were chiefly intended to uncover
evidence of the survival of consciousness after death. But while the spiritualist mediums
he examined were reaching outward, straining to capture transmissions from beyond the
grave, Myers detected their bodies were drawing upon something else, gathered from
deep within. Their distracted handwriting provided an involuntary subtext that disclosed
the subterranean struggles of the writer. Myers believed that the act of handwriting was
“one of the best instances of an aptitude at once acquired and hereditary: of a manual
dexterity which obeys limitations of idiosyncrasy as well as of will” (222). Writing gave
objective expression to such internal conflicts among the individual, her ingrained habits
and inherited tendencies. Laid open and exposed on the surface of the page, handwriting
was nonetheless “a deep-seated thing,” and thus “likely to have secrets to tell us” (222).
Myers’ letters to Robert Louis Stevenson following the publication of The
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde reveal that the two had differing opinions on the
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strict mechanics of such correspondences between self and script, but the plotting of
Stevenson’s romance makes it abundantly clear that he too felt handwriting had “secrets
to tell.” If Jekyll’s astonishing metamorphosis from staid gentleman to monstrous fiend
provides the central attraction of Stevenson’s narrative, this chapter addresses the one
fixed and abiding trait that yokes the two together: their handwriting. Jekyll’s
experiments transform him so completely that his closest acquaintances can no longer
recognize him. And yet, Hyde finds “that of my original character, one part remained to
me: I could write my own hand” (87). After every other vestige of Jekyll has been either
effaced or disfigured beyond recognition, this indelible trace of his individuality endures.
This chapter investigates what sort of currency such holographic fantasies of the
individual—dependent on transparent analogies between orthographic and moral
“character”—held for the Victorians, asking how Stevenson’s tale explores, exploits and
troubles such associations. To this end, I situate Jekyll and Hyde within the broader
context of late-Victorian tales of crime and detection that stage the apprehension of
criminal bodies through a meticulous deciphering of their legibility. In such narratives,
the authorities compulsively return to a “scene of the crime” that is suggestively rendered
as a “scene of writing.”
In Stevenson’s romance, Jekyll’s “Hyde” (i.e., both his new skin and his new
signature) is apprehended by the pseudo-sciences of physiognomy and graphology,
speculative modes of reading that present two reciprocal theses: one contends that the
body is a kind of writing, while the other claims that writing is a kind of body. These
intertwined registers form a mobius script, signified emphatically by the homologous
(and ubiquitous) reference to Hyde’s “hand” as both appendage and inscription. The
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duplicity of this hand engenders a confusion that suggests writing has yet to properly
dissociate itself from the body’s clutches. In tracing the involuntary drift of this unruly
member, this chapter does not limit itself to a rhetorical analysis of Jekyll and Hyde (a
cabinet of curious hands), but employs the figure to facilitate a more general study of the
body in its apprehension as the material support of writing.
A number of critics have touched upon the questions of textuality provoked by
Stevenson’s narrative as an invitation to reconsider the formative role of the writing-act
in the construction of the subject. In these largely poststructuralist interpretations,
Jekyll’s character runs no deeper than the letters on the surface of the page. Drawing
upon Barthes’ claim concerning autobiography, that “the I which writes the text, it too, is
never more than a paper-I” (161), Ronald R. Thomas relieves much of the tragedy of
Hyde’s demise by interpreting it as an allegory of the “death or disappearance of the
author” (“Strange Voices” 75). Conversely, Jodey Castricano understands the text as an
allegory of reading. Her interest lies in how the text resists appropriation through the
staging of an “uncanny scene of transference and mutual resistance” (4). To this end,
Castricano applies the Derridean trope of reading as “counter-signing . . . as one might
validate a check or document” (6) to illustrate how Stevenson’s text folds the reader into
its pages, “put[ting her] in place of the other as a reading-effect” (4).
My sense is that the kind of sophisticated theoretical analysis offered by
Castricano in particular can only be further enriched through consideration of
historically-situated theories of writing, and not only those latently present in literature,
but those explicitly circulating through culture. In what follows, I hope to provide a more
precise estimation of the importance of writing to Stevenson’s novella, chiefly by paying
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particular attention to handwriting as an embodied practice of expression. Hands (and, by
extension, bodies) tend to disappear in the many of the most compelling analyses of
writing in Jekyll and Hyde. Even Castricano’s “Much Ado About Handwriting” turns out
to have surprisingly little to do with writing by hand, per se. The insistent and troubling
presence of this inscribing and inscribed body frustrates incorporeal theorizations of
inscription that prescribe writing as a means of emancipation from the body and the self.
For instance, though Thomas has argued that Jekyll and Hyde “enacts the withdrawal of
the articulating self from the text” (75), I maintain that Stevenson’s text narrates a
process not of “withdrawal” but of addiction.2 That is to say, it is not a fantasy of
dissociation and dissemination, but a nightmare brought on by the violent collision of
contradictory positions and identities, each forced to inhabit a body contaminated by the
other. In this sense, my argument affirms G.K. Chesterton’s assertion that: “The real stab
of the story is not in the discovery that the one man is two men; but in the discovery that
the two men are one man” (“RLS” 67). Within Gothic narrative, estrangement is only
ever the exhilarating prelude to the uncanny return of disavowed and abjected bits of the
self.
Stevenson imagines the hand as the linchpin of this disagreeable union. The initial
significance of this shared trait is that it allows a social deviant to exploit the cultural
capital encoded within the male professional’s signature. Hyde’s observation that “I
could write my own hand” (87), written from an estranged perspective that seems to
hover just outside the bounds of a body it inhabits and impersonates, advances a radically
impersonal mode of self-understanding. The subversive social mobility made possible by
this counterfeit writing is represented as a kind of graphic violence, prompting Patrick
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Brantlinger to contend that: “Hyde’s ability to write in Jekyll’s ‘hand’ renders him
dangerous in a more insidious way than his violence” (179). As his self-alienation
deepens into antagonism, however, Jekyll finds himself increasingly at the mercy of this
manual, yet automatic action. As the narrrative’s many scenes of physiognomic and
graphological interpretation suggest, the crucial revelation is that Hyde cannot help but
write in his own hand. His attempts at communication are bound to, and disturbed by, his
wildly expressive body: its habitual and tempestuous gestures continually disrupt his
sense of autonomy.
It is this cramped and contradictory contiguity between self and signature that
prompts the central irony hinted at within this chapter’s title. Though the critical
treatment of Stevenson’s Strange Case as fictional autobiography is not without critical
precedent, the novella is not an autobiography in any straightforward sense of the term.3
Indeed, one of the more salient points of resemblance among the three novels that anchor
this dissertation is that—in a representational strategy that David Punter has identified as
quintessentially gothic—none offer their titular character much of an opportunity to air
their case (5). If, however, these monsters never participate willingly in their
narrativization, they cannot help but communicate, and gothic narrative is uniquely
devoted to training its readers to recognize and decipher signs that lie outside the margins
of conventional language. Neither Hyde, the Beetle, nor the Count contribute to the
collaborative narratives they inhabit, but in each case their stories are transmitted by their
own “telling bodies.” Reading alongside Gothic detectives such as Stevenson’s Utterson,
Marsh’s Atherton, and Stoker’s Van Helsing, we find the monster’s narrative spelled out
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in tracks and traces of the body, accidental markings that betray what the subject would
never willingly divulge.
This chapter examines Stevenson’s Jekyll and Hyde as a paranoid critique of
modern regimes of self-registration. Autobiography articulates formally the subject’s
obligation within an economy of writing: to render the self as legible to others, and
account for one’s life. Hyde is torn by a deep-seated ambivalence towards this gesture,
one hand submitting its confession while the other scratches and scrawls from the
margins to which it has been exiled. Ironically, it is Hyde’s very resistance to the dictates
of legibility that produces his “unauthorized autobiography” and subjects him to the law.
Hyde’s “odd hand” (53), like and yet unlike that of Jekyll’s, involuntarily produces an
uncanny autobiography—an automatic movement of the body that undermines the
evenhanded and autonomous gestures of the subject. Rather than the self-conscious selfrepresentation one normally associates with the form, this “auto-bio-graph” submits to
various representatives of the law writings performed automatically by the body.
If, as Jerome Hamilton Buckley claims in The Turning Key: Autobiography and
the Subjective Impulse Since 1800, autobiography was “a comparatively new word in the
1830s” (18), by the time of Jekyll and Hyde’s publication the autobiographical impulse
had become a significant cultural force within Victorian Britain’s scriptural economy. A
pervasive Victorian form, it surfaced in popular autobiographies of John Henry Newman
(1864), John Stuart Mill (1873), Harriet Martineau (1877) and other prominent
Victorians, but also within hybrid forms such as the fictional autobiography (Carlyle’s
Sartor Resartus) and the autobiographical novel (Dickens’ David Copperfield). Indeed, it
would be difficult to overestimate the extent to which the historically coincident and
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extremely popular form of the nineteenth-century bildungsroman—typically structured
around the development of an exemplary individual within society—benefited from
widespread interest in the project of autobiography.4
Critical response to Victorian autobiography has tended to expend much of its
energies exploring this hybridity of autobiographical form—the ways in which it borrows
from other genres, while troubling most generic attempts to delimit its own boundaries
(Spengemann 1980, Fleischman 1983, Peterson 1986). Beginning in the late 1970s, a
wave of autobiographical studies turned critical attention to the hybridity of the
autobiographer herself, probing the fissures and duplicities that open up as soon as the
author-subject sets pen to paper.5 In Sidonie Smith’s reading of autobiography studies’
linguistic turn, “the autobiographical text becomes a narrative artifice, privileging a
presence, or identity, that does not exist outside language. Given the very nature of
language, embedded in the text lie alternative or deferred identities that constantly
subvert any pretensions of truthfulness” (5). Paul de Man’s “Autobiography as Defacement” (1979) stands as the definitive statement on the constitutive role of language in
the construction of the autobiographical subject. He maintains the “specular moment”
proffered within autobiography “is not primarily a situation or an event that can be
located in a history, but that it is the manifestation, on the level of the referent, of a
linguistic structure” (922).
The paradoxical nature of the phrase “unauthorized autobiography” signals my
shared interest in the de-centred agency made so readily apparent in the act of selfwriting. It does so in part by unfolding the ambivalence of the concept of autobiography,
a form devoted to the articulation of the self, and the identity of the individual (Danahay).

73
Auto-bio-graphy names the convergence of mechanisms of selfhood, biology and writing.
How then does each of these components relate to the others? The Victorian genre of
self-writing tended to imagine the first of these mechanisms as the determinant factor,
subordinating body and writing to the expression of its will. For their part, recent critics
of Victorian autobiography have tended to foreground writing as the primary variable in
the composition of the “literary self.” This chapter isolates autobiography’s indeterminate
medial term, exploring the role bios plays in the inscription of Jekyll’s life-narrative. If
autobiography imagines an autonomous ego at the wheel (or the stylus), and the canon of
autobiographical theory grants linguistic structures precedence, Gothic narrative hands
the reins to the erratic and ungovernable body. This latter genre examines all that
emerges from the individual, but cannot be reduced to that singularity. How does the act
of writing de-compose this individual, it asks, producing something that ‘I’ could never
grasp?
What if, for instance, the body came before the self, and it called the shots?
Darwinian evolutionary theory gave scientific validity to this theory of uncanny
precedence, suggesting that the body and the self did not enter the world together. Our
bodies had a history; they were not our own, but the inheritance of something
incalculably older and radically other, under which humankind must struggle. Maudsley’s
contention that post-Darwinian “man . . . is living his forefathers essentially all over
again” presents us with an unmistakably Gothic vision of the subject who knows “that the
vicious or virtuous ancestral quality, imbued as silent memory in his nature may leap to
light on the occasion of fit stimulus” (Organic 267).6
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The pseudo-science of physiognomy, which exerts such a profound fascination
over the gothic imagination, offered a corporeal hermeneutic for the deciphering of
legible markings of this inheritance. The “will” of our ancestors, in proper gothic fashion,
has been inscribed upon our bodies. In Walpole’s Castle of Otranto, Theodore’s tattoo is
revealed as the meaningful sign that returns law to the castle by proving filiation beyond
doubt. Here the bodily sign is presented as legible and indisputable evidence capable of
rendering unnecessary other, potentially duplicitous forms of writing. These inscriptions
are aligned with a higher law, and “corroborate [Theodore’s] evidence beyond a thousand
parchments” (164). Physiognomy imagines this bodily marking as a natural law rather
than a paternal prerogative; hence, the trace it leaves behind is just as likely to be borne
as a stigma of shame as a badge of honour.
One of the first texts to offer a wide-ranging critical consideration of the
conversation between Victorian literature and the cultural discourse of physiognomy was
Daniel Pick’s Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder (1993). Pick’s reading of
Jekyll and Hyde remarks that, although the latter has “no narrative of his own,” he
“continually erupts in the body of the doctor” (166). This “eruption” names the focus of
my inquiry in this chapter, though in my characterization of the automatic nature of
autobiography I intend to shift the emphasis from corporeal inscription to the ways in
which the body erupts through the various acts of writing into which Hyde is conscripted.
Because the concerns I have for these processes of conscription, or bodily
registration, belong to a specific history of writing (as opposed to being intrinsic to all
forms of writing), I have attempted to immerse my interpretation of Stevenson’s
romance within the particular understandings of writing and reading at hand within
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Victorian culture, while holding in check appeals to the authority of “outside” texts of
theory. It is not only that Victorian graphology is less familiar to most Victorianists than
the version of “psychoanalytic graphology” introduced by Derrida in “Freud and the
Scene of Writing.”7 My goal is not to arrive at the kind of interpretation of history that
the latter methodology tends to provide, but to sketch out a “history of interpretation.”
This reversal of the common critical trajectory of reading takes its cue from
Foucault’s genealogical project, as articulated within “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”
Another strength of the genealogical approach is its implicit critique of the tendency for
theoretical discussions of writing to paper over concerns about the fate of the body.
Stevenson’s text is interested in the various ways in which, within the form of
autobiography, subjects, bodies and texts are incorporated into each other. He presents
Jekyll and Hyde’s story as a species of “bio-text,” interleaving flesh and paper, mingling
blood and ink, and carefully calibrating the novella’s conclusion so as to synchronize the
act of putting down the pen and “pulling the plug,” thereby bringing Jekyll’s life and
writing to an end in one gesture.
This unconscious insinuation of the body within writing—imparted here through
the hand of Hyde—prompts consideration of automatic writing as a significant recurrent
trope within the gothic, one that gives voice to the genre’s paranoia at the level of
language (that is, the fear that signs actually “follow” their referents, and that writing is a
motivated, rather than arbitrary, system of signification). The intent here is not, as is
usually the case with studies of graphology, to assess the validity of the method as a
science.8 I would prefer to consider its cultural significance as a hypothesis, asking what
its currency within nineteenth-century popular thinking reveals about perceived
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relationships between bodies and writing, particularly in light of a modern scriptural
economy founded on the notion of self-registration, and the insistence that bodies write
themselves through forms of “unauthorized autobiography.”
Gothic characterization depends essentially upon the reading of external stigmata
as reliable indices of internal qualities and tendencies, from the tattoo that reveals
Theodore’s true parentage in The Castle of Otranto (136), to the much more
comprehensive legibility of the body deduced by Wilde’s Basil Hallward when he states
that: “Sin is a thing that writes itself across a man's face. It cannot be concealed. People
talk sometimes of secret vices. There are no such things. If a wretched man has a vice, it
shows itself in the lines of his mouth, the droop of his eyelids, the moulding of his hands
even” (Dorian 181). Honouring this Gothic convention, the descriptions we receive of
Hyde—for instance, that he moves “like a monkey” (64), and tends to “cry out like a rat”
(62)—are clearly conversant with the animalistic associations of degeneration theory.
Physiognomic readings inform many of the scenes of textual and bodily interpretation
that compose the novella. While Hyde’s “imprint of deformity” (79) renders his debased
morality superficially evident to all, it is Utterson who recites physiognomic rhetoric to
the letter, remarking of Hyde: “if I ever read Satan’s signature upon a face, it is on that of
your new friend” (42). Moreover, when Utterson recalls Lanyon “had his death-warrant
written legibly upon his face” (55), we find that the lawyer’s abilities allow him to read
physical as well as spiritual health. Each is plainly legible on the body’s surfaces.
According to a code of reading that is distinctly Gothic, every body is visibly and
determinably branded by its essential character, as well as affiliations of class, sexuality,
and race.
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But physiognomy presented a corporeal hermeneutic the bold promise of which
was in many ways a rather conflicted one. “Close readings” of bodily fragments might
yield satisfyingly unequivocal correlations between trait and tendency, but actual
application of these principles to real bodies tended to reveal only the radical
overdetermination of the body’s semiotic productivity. The simplicity of the sign is
perpetually undone by the complexity of the body. This troublesome tendency of the
body disrupts the analyses of Swiss physiognomist Johann Caspar Lavater, whose
Physiognomy was one of the most influential texts on the subject in England. Published
in German in 1775, this study had gone through fifty-five editions by 1810, at least
twenty of which were available in England.9 Lavater’s exhaustive work postulates a
comprehensive expressivity of the body, outlining the “variety of expression [by which
man] makes himself known to his fellow creatures” (Whole Works, 4:170). In relating his
hope that “man” would some day come to realize “how many languages he speaks at
once, in how many forms he exhibits himself at the same instant” (170), Lavater calls
attention to the uncharted range of the body’s expressive qualities. Between promise and
practice, however, most examiners could discern only the cacophony of the body.
Speaking “many languages . . . at once,” the body stands, like the tower of Babel, as both
a monument to the advancement of human knowledge, and the ruin of this pursuit. This
polysemic communications machine can only produce so much weighty noise before
meaning begins to collapse in upon itself.
Addressing this perplexing overdetermination of the body, Stephen Arata has
written: “Degeneration touched the body, saturated and transfigured it, but the thing itself
could be located nowhere” (21). Borrowing from physiognomy as degeneration theories
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would, Gothic characterization is similarly troubled by this paradoxical admixture of
unequivocal certainty and disconcerting ambiguity. As Anne Radcliffe remarks of the
nefarious but discreet Schedoni: “There was something in his physiognomy extremely
singular, and that cannot easily be defined” (Italian 34). Similarly, upon first meeting
Count Dracula, Jonathan Harker might claim his host has “a very marked physiognomy”
(48), but if we want to know what exactly these marks signify, we have another two
hundred pages of reading to mull over. All is laid open to view, and yet this body’s
“truth” remains fundamentally unintelligible. For Henry Maudsley, one of England’s
foremost alienists, there was no doubt that “the character of every mind is written in the
features, gestures, gait, and carriage of the body.” Each of these signs, he pledged, would
be translated “when, if ever, the extremely fine and difficult language is fully and
accurately learnt” (LMC 54).
The law as well held a tenuous grasp on this nebulous science of bodies. In his
1890 study The Criminal, Havelock Ellis acknowledges the inexact nature of the science
of “modern criminal anthropology,” averring that: “the more criminal amongst us may
still find consolation in the reflection that there are no unfailing criteria by which our
crimes may be read upon our faces” (94). For Victorians, the “body-language” of others
communicated itself forcefully, but enigmatically. Physiognomy makes of these bodies
strange hieroglyphs inscribed in a foreign language. The writing is on the wall; like
Belshazzar, we have only to find someone to interpret for us.10
Stevenson’s characters are thrown back upon such indirect strategies of
interpretation because of the peculiar and oblique ways in which Hyde’s perversity
communicates itself to them. Hyde’s body incites sensations that are cryptically referred
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to within Gothic literature and criticism as “unspeakable.” All who encounter him are
marked deeply by an experience that they cannot articulate or give vent to. One of
Stevenson’s characters, struggling vainly to describe Mr. Hyde, speaks of “the haunting
sense of unexpressed deformity with which the fugitive impressed his beholders” (49).
The encounter with Hyde’s body is one of unidirectional transmission: the knowledge of
his strangeness creeps under our skin, but cannot find its back way out. Hyde makes a
singular impression, peculiar in that it paralyzes one’s capacity to express his deformity.
Derrida’s characteristic attunement to the many valences of the “impression”
leads us to the consideration of writing as something that is already upon us, rather than
merely yet to come (as it is characteristically understood in Derrida’s thought). These are
the impressions we bear upon us without comprehension, a sense Derrida describes as
“having been marked in advance” by an “unknowable weight that imprints itself” (30). It
is this marking that Utterson grants oblique expression to when he remarks that Hyde’s
body gives the “impression of deformity without any nameable malformation” (41).
Similarly, Jekyll’s friend Richard Enfield marvels that he “can’t describe” Hyde, and
insists: “it’s not want of memory; for I declare I can see him this moment” (36). This
indelible after-image haunts the mind, a living memory buried within the viewer. Like the
vampire at the mirror, Hyde has an uncanny ability to evade the traps of representation.
Stevenson tells us that Hyde “had never been photographed, and the few who could
describe him differed widely” (49). His body surfaces in radically subjective accounts
alone, skewed testimonies provided by witnesses who bear the weight of their experience
without knowing how to relieve themselves of a burden they cannot name. Though a
number of critics have delineated the underlying conversations between Stevenson’s text
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and the physiognomic, phrenological and degeneration theories of its time, we ought to
consider the novella’s more radical intimations concerning bodily inscription. We might
begin to account for the “unspeakable” nature of physiological signs by tracing this
strange and dimly understood migration of signs from one body to another.
Jekyll’s butler Poole conveys the power of this inexpressible apprehension when
he attempts to substantiate his conviction that there is “something queer” about Hyde: “I
don’t know rightly how to say it, sir, beyond this: that you felt it in your marrow kind of
cold and thin” (64). Though Arata finds the trace can be “located nowhere,” Poole’s
testimony suggests we may have been searching the wrong body all along. The mark is
already lodged within ourselves, more in us than the other who “incites” us. If the verb
“to express” suggests a mode of direct conveyance (whether the content be thought or
some other freight), the “impress” is its opposite—backwards, belated, indirect, these
encrypted inscriptions are found upon ourselves in a mirror, and can only be read in
reverse.
As his name suggests, Utterson will be the character that works most
industriously to give “utterance” to Hyde’s indefinably abhorrent nature. If gothic
narrative is propelled and pressured by its encounter with “the unspeakable,” this
inexpressible kernel is given oblique form through such counter-agents (doctors,
detectives, lawyers, etc.). As a lawyer, Utterson is responsible for ushering his clients into
the contractual and unequivocal terms of discourse. He translates fugitive impulses into a
sanctioned and binding will, codifying and giving legal force to his client’s
unaccountable desires. Utterson is one of the key figures responsible for the discursive
work explored in Marie-Christine Leps’ Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of
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Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse (1992). Her fine analysis of Jekyll and Hyde
catches on a particularly revealing assertion of the lawyer’s. Clutching at, but not quite
grasping Hyde’s enigma, Utterson avows: “There is something more, if I could find a
name for it” (41). Leps develops an extraordinarily close reading of this statement that
pays scrupulous (one could say lawyerly) attention to the conditions and dependencies of
Utterson’s statement and diligently illuminates the labour involved in the discursive
production of truth.
My own attunement to the equivocal significance of the term “apprehension”
owes a debt to Leps’ book, primarily for the means by which her Foucauldian analysis
traces the subtle links between power and knowledge in the nineteenth century’s
discursive construction of the criminal. In Leps’ text, to apprehend is not merely to
comprehend: her methodical deployment of the former verb calls attention to the vested
interests in any purportedly benign act of “understanding” deviance, and underlines the
arresting tendency of categorical legal distinctions derived from this enterprise. My use
of the term “apprehension” further complicates this dynamic between power and
knowledge by bringing anxiety to the fore. In many ways a commonplace of Victorian
criticism, anxiety nonetheless takes on a special resonance within the Gothic. If
comprehension describes mental understanding, apprehension suggests the indefinite and
intractable embodied awareness cultivated within Gothic narrative.
In neglecting to account for the irresolvable gap between impression and
expression, Leps exaggerates the efficacy of the law within the gothic imagination. She
encourages us to read the unspeakable as merely a categorical term for that which
commonly “goes without saying,” a variety of discursive a priori (220). In Stevenson’s
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text, this includes the tacit negotiations through which professional men operate,
voluntarily submitting to various (self-serving) bonds of secrecy entrenched as discursive
laws of professional practice and social etiquette (Leps 209). This silence permeates the
confidential discussions between client and barrister, but also the unsavory financial
agreement struck, in the story’s opening pages, between Hyde and the parents of a young
girl he has assaulted (34). Listening for silence as the sound of power attunes readers to
the implicit significance of such charged moments. And yet, a reading of the deliberate
manipulation of silence cannot neglect the more fundamental, helpless struggle with the
unspeakable that is compulsively staged within Gothic narrative. Stevenson’s text
vacillates between confidence and despair concerning the challenge of putting bodies into
discourse, troubled by how silence distorts the said, and how the involuntary and
inarticulate actions of bodies erupt within and disfigure expression. While in Leps’
reading, the law “apprehends the criminal” by utilizing language to grasp the body, I have
to this point concerned myself with how Stevenson’s engagement with physiognomy
unfurls the essential contradictions of any such bodily hermeneutic. In what follows, I
will explore the correlative possibility of apprehension, considering the ways in which
language finds itself in the clutches of the body. Beginning with the strangely palpable
presence of the body manifest within Stevenson’s “figures of speech,” and turning to the
animate holographic “figures of writing” that emerge in what Isaac Disraeli has named
the “physiognomy of writing,” I read Stevenson’s text as a critically resistant statement
on the conscription of bodies into language within nineteenth-century discourse.
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Hyde’s Hand: The Undead Metaphor
The body of Hyde presents a troubling enigma to all who behold it, and none can
approach the man without betraying “a visible misgiving of the flesh” (79). The body has
its doubts, then, but none can put a finger on precisely what disturbs. Jekyll’s old friend
Enfield is certain that Hyde “must be deformed somewhere,” insisting “he gives a strong
feeling of deformity, although I couldn’t specify the point . . . No, sir; I can make no hand
of it; I can’t describe him” (36, emphasis mine). Enfield’s indistinct apprehension has
him reaching for description, but grasping only the figure of the hand. In doing so, he
unwittingly chances upon the central motif of Stevenson’s text. Hands, appearing
everywhere in Stevenson’s novella, subtly disturb the text’s diegesis. By Richard Dury’s
count, the noun ‘hand’ occurs sixty-six times in Stevenson’s slim volume; after ‘lawyer’
(regularly used to identify Jekyll’s friend Utterson), hands are the most frequently evoked
common nouns in the text (Dury 113). Like Hyde’s foreign body, which flourishes as its
host atrophies, this supplementary figure gets out of hand—the perversely
disproportionate growth of one element threatens to take over the whole. Under the
influence of much exercise and nourishment, the body of Hyde, at first underdeveloped
(79), seems to Jekyll to have “grown in stature, as though (when I wore that form) I were
conscious of a more generous tide of blood” (83). At the textual level, we might suggest
that the blood-flow is channeled toward the appendage of the hand, and the effect is a
kind of “hypertrophying” of the member, the excessive and disproportionate growth of
the figure.
The result of this unchecked growth is the erratic proliferation of catachreses,
forced figures such as the one that opens Jekyll’s narrative. Here, Jekyll’s description of
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“the days of childhood, when I had walked with my father’s hand” (85) infuses his
nostalgic sentiment with a touch of the macabre. The industrious reader quickly
straightens out this odd turn of phrase, reasoning that the author intends to say he walked
hand-in-hand with his father, or, more figuratively, that his father’s hand guided him
through his youth. Perhaps it is only for a moment that one glimpses here the
disembodied hand so prominently featured within gothic horror, from the disjecta
membra of Walpole’s Castle of Otranto to “the Thing” that acts as hand-servant to The
Addams Family.11 Of course, Stevenson does not send Hyde’s hand creeping about in the
moonlight along the outsides of windowsills. It does, however, enjoy an uncanny
mobility within the text. The figure is unconstrained by any proper body. It goes
everywhere, prying its way in and out of conventional, or anatomically “correct,”
contexts. An insistent figure of speech, the hand begins to take on a life of its own: not, in
the most straightforward Gothic convention, as an emblem or prop within the narrative,
but at the level of writing or representation. It is never properly sublimated by language,
withering away into the placid legibility of a dead metaphor. Rather, it haunts the text as
an “undead metaphor,” warping figures of speech through a compulsive return that
signals an insistent preoccupation with the body.
In light of this obsessive quality of the text, Lanyon’s curious admission that he
has “often remarked” on Jekyll’s “large, firm, white and comely” hands (82) takes on the
quality of a fetish. Careful readers cannot nod assent when, in dismissing the significance
of the discomposure evident in Jekyll’s handwritten note, Jekyll’s servant asks: “But
what matters hand of write?” (62). Needless to say, it matters much within this text. The
mobility and malleability of the ambiguous term “hand” emerges from its homologous
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denotation as appendage and inscription. When Jekyll, stranded in Soho—and, what is
more troubling, stranded inside Hyde’s body—panics over how Lanyon is “to be
reached,” he sees that he “must employ another hand” (87). Jekyll finds his solution when
he remembers that “of my original character, one part remained to me: I could write my
own hand” (87). In passages such as this, Stevenson’s text is concerned not only with the
metamorphosis, but the extension of the human body, and he imagines the hand as its
principal emissary, its characters corroborating Jekyll’s character. The hand is the
distinguishing mark of individual identity, its seal and synecdoche. The end of
Stevenson’s narrative sees this principle realized absolutely, replacing Jekyll’s body with
“nothing but papers, and a closed door” (61). Extended and disincarnated through
writing, the hand promises to facilitate discreet communication, keeping correspondents
“in touch” without any touching per se.
From the very first page, which presents us with the dreary spectacle of Enfield
and Utterson’s silent “Sunday walks” (31), Jekyll and Hyde furnishes a poignant
depiction, if not an outright indictment, of the meager pleasures of culturally sanctioned
male intimacy. Its palpable anxiety about physical contact (centering on, but hardly
limited to, the perplexing and unsavory congress between Jekyll and his young friend)
inspires Elaine Showalter’s queer reading of the novella, which designates homosexuality
as the spectre that haunts the homosocial world, disciplining straight behaviour and
determining the bounds of its relations. Jekyll’s employment of “another hand” invites us
to consider how these limits are textually managed within the novella. Throughout the
history of the novel, the epistolary genre has provided the most direct opportunity to
analyze the formative role of writing in inter-subjective relations. By contrast with this
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mode, Stevenson’s exclusively male novel of correspondence eschews the prevailing tone
of intimacy and sentiment normally associated with epistolary fiction, delimiting
communications with a professional rhetoric characterized by discretion and
detachment.12 The story places a premium on silence (literally in the actual and suspected
cases of blackmail). The first case of blackmail, which sets Stevenson’s narrative in
motion, demonstrates the chilling potential for writing to obscure male violence. The
private exchange of Jekyll’s name, and the capital it stands as security for, sidesteps the
threat of putting it in general circulation by its scandalous publication. That letters are
referred to throughout the narrative as “enclosures” (68) and not disclosures suggests, in
keeping with the standard rhetoric of business, the defensive and secretive tendency of
writing.
Professional and authorized acts of writing serve to encrypt the secrets of
Stevenson’s network of male professionals; in their hands, writing is “not a guise for
language but a disguise” (Saussure 30). The cultural practice of writing, as it is bound
neither to spontaneity nor fidelity, allows for the sort of dissimulation required to
synchronize idiosyncratic individuals within civilized society. The ambiguity of writing
diffuses otherwise intolerably stark contradictions of living, while its arbitrary nature
stifles or sublimates visceral, impulsive or unconscious response.
It is this alignment of writing with silence and secrecy that Martin Danahay’s A
Community of One: Masculine Autobiography and Autonomy in Nineteenth-Century
Britain critiques, interpreting Stevenson’s tale as an allegory of autobiographical method
that provides a stark portrayal of the practice’s “antisocial potential” (138). This selfcentred writing requires of one “to exclude a wider social horizon and thus to evade one’s
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social responsibility” (138). In Danahay’s view, Hyde personifies this autobiographical
gesture, an intense reminiscence indulged in to the point of total immersion, where one’s
past overtakes life and its responsibilities. Jekyll’s transformation represents the
supernatural realization of the autobiographer’s desire to withdraw into “his past and the
freedom and exuberance of his youth” (138). However, Danahay maintains, this freedom
“is not entirely innocent” (138). Hyde is one of civilization’s discontents, and his
intemperate pleasures are incompatible with Jekyll’s world. For Danahay, autobiography
is an assertion of autonomy, a socially disruptive force hedonistic in nature and
monologic in form.
Victorian autobiography, according to Danahay’s reading, is a text of composure
and a means of concealing the self. This strategy of concealment is most explicit in his
consideration of Edmund Gosse’s Father and Son, where the autobiographical impulse is
imagined as a sanctuary from the father’s gaze, and associated with a calculated duplicity
of the subject. “I had found a companion and a confidant in myself,” writes Gosse’s
persona. “There was a secret in this world and it belonged to me and to a somebody who
lived in the same body with me. There were two of us, and we could talk with one
another” (30). Ostensibly the transcription of a life, autobiography is also the means of its
encryption, a defensive act that preserves one’s secrets by deepening “the inward space of
the writing subject” (Danahay 145). And yet, Gosse’s exposure of this encryption reveals
monologism to be nothing more than the mask of a more essential duplicity between
“me” and this “somebody who lived in the same body.” Stevenson’s dialogism tears the
mask away entirely.
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While I find Danahay’s allegorical reading persuasive, I prefer to see the story as
a tragedy in which Hyde, rather than Jekyll’s circle of bachelor-friends (or even the wider
society they selectively represent), is the victim. Stevenson’s text is a dramatization of
Jekyll’s autobiography, staging its coercion and eventual, fatal emergence. To my mind,
autobiography’s tendency is centrifugal, not centripetal; though anchored in the self, its
orientation and movement pulls the subject towards the outside. The genre is a formalized
articulation of one’s primary social obligations: those of rendering oneself legible to
others and accounting for one’s life. The act of reflection, as Jekyll describes it, requires
of him that he “look around me and take stock of my progress and position in the world”
(76). Autobiography is the demand of the other, calling individuals to account and
conscripting bodies into the subjection of subjecthood.
Everywhere in Stevenson’s novella is the problem of accountability, and most
especially, the subject’s relations and responsibilities to discourse. Jekyll, “wrestling
against the approaches of hysteria,” is ordered by his friend Lanyon (whose tone can
barely disguise his disgust over the appetites of his repulsive guest) to “compose” himself
(73). Perhaps Lanyon employs this word innocently, but Hyde’s response, a “dreadful
smile,” suggests a grimly ironic appreciation of the work involved in constructing the
self. As for Stevenson’s readers, we have already seen this strategy of concealment fail
Hyde, in the discomposure that flares up within his letter to the chemist. Against the
“composure” reading (the text requested by Lanyon), I am interested in how Hyde’s
writing betrays his discomposure, the telling passages in which writing breaks down, decomposes, and fails to secure the distance that Stevenson’s professional male friends
expect it to.
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Stevenson’s resistance to this lure of the autonomous subject is total. In the
chaotic power of Hyde’s body, we find something more anarchical than the “sovereign
subject,” an individual’s secession from the bonds of civilization. Indeed, we might turn
to any one of the text’s bachelors as an illustration of “the individualizing influence of
modern democracy” (Wedgewood 595) that The Contemporary Review understood
Stevenson to be commenting on. Freed from romantic attachments, unencumbered by
parental obligations, and abstaining from addictive diversions, these sober-minded, single
male members of the Victorian professional class share the “heartless independence”
(James 170) of their author.13 Even allegiances between members of Jekyll’s fraternity
are distinctly chilled by Utterson’s avowed “inclination to Cain’s heresy” (31).
Remarkably, Utterson reads the biblical story as a paean to the virtues of discretion, of
letting one’s “brother go to the devil in his own way” (31). In fact, it is the second act of
humanity’s fall, the violent severance of the fraternal bond. Cain’s plea was negligence,
but his sin was murder.
By contrast with his associates, Jekyll finds himself subject first to “the perennial
war among [his] members” (76). Preoccupied with the mutiny on his own hands, he
cannot obtain the internal consensus that would make any coherent resistance against the
outside world possible. Stevenson’s tale deepens and radically de-territorializes the
fantasy of autonomy beyond the prerogatives and the jurisdiction of the self-determining
individual. Though its actions are typically represented as malicious, the double is not the
antithesis of the individual, but merely its prosthesis, demonstrating the ease with which
the drives can be dislodged from the agency of the subject.
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This dis-organization of the body’s independence realizes Derrida’s contention
that “autonomy is no more than the mask of automatism” (Spectres 153). Autonomy is a
logic that attempts to recuperate the volatility of the drives by incorporating and
domesticating these forces within the confines of the individual. It is a performance in
front of the mirror, a studied rehearsal that is intended to discipline a thoroughly
fragmented collection of partial objects and contradictory impulses. Hyde scandalizes the
humanist fantasy of the free individual by presenting autonomy as a prerogative of the id,
not the ego. Life goes on, unaccountably, without the subject’s authority or consent. If
autobiography generically inscribes the sovereignty of its subject, the sinister “other
hand” of Hyde defaces this text, rending the mask of autonomy.
Returning to Saussure’s critique of writing as “not a garment, but a disguise” of
language (29), we might say that Stevenson’s novella is centrally concerned with the
failure of this disguise, as signaled incisively by the name of its protagonist. In a text
renowned for its trenchant power, Jekyll’s pseudonym functions as a pithy condensation
of gothic paranoia, the panic brought on by the uncontrollable reversal of interior and
exterior realities. This irony haunts fin-de-siècle gothic characters such as H.G. Wells’
Invisible Man (1897). The success of his experiments only renders him more visible,
bringing to light as surfaces deeper interiors, and making his churning insides
increasingly more difficult to conceal. The attempt to free oneself from the body only
brings about its uncanny, and grotesque return. A powerful personification of this
paradox, Hyde’s name suggests the inherent futility of concealment, threatening that
every attempt to “hide” merely submits another sign or surface “hide” to be investigated.
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Every concoction of a lie erects its own truth, and indeed the peculiar deformation
one chooses is often judged to be that truth. Psychoanalysis, realizing this gothic fear as a
science, mobilizes this principle in its analysis of the “dream-work,” where distortion is
seized upon as the key to the dreamer’s desire. As Zizek explains, when subjects “seek to
find the essence of dreams in their latent content … they overlook the distinction between
the latent dream-thoughts and the dream work” (SO 14). We are looking not for “the
secret behind the form but the secret of this form itself” (15). Repression, read correctly,
becomes in itself a confession.
Utterson, Jekyll’s friend and Hyde’s nemesis, is no psychoanalyst, but his
instincts regarding the cryptic signifier exploit a similar wordplay. In what is surely
Utterson’s most quoted line, the lawyer declares: “If he be Mr. Hyde . . . I shall be Mr.
Seek” (39).14 Utterson’s pun serves to reify the “proper” name (one that, especially as a
forged pseudonym without a family history, is intended to function without connotation
or reference) as a verb. This deliberate and playful misunderstanding of the word refuses
to grant arbitrary status to the proper name. Objectifying the name, the pun burdens the
abstract “sense” or conception of the word with meaning. The static name is placed in
general circulation, set into play in an unintended direction (which Utterson then intends
to pursue). In both senses of the term, the name becomes a “motivated” sign: that is, set
in motion, and no longer arbitrary. Utterson’s operation on language engineers a chase
scenario, expressing the aggressive, and even predatory aspect of the practice of reading.
Jekyll’s pseudonym is intended as a free gesture of writing, autonomous and
anonymous. We find a less “composed” variation of this gesture in Jekyll’s exquisitely
confused denial of Hyde: “He, I say—I cannot say I” (88). This phrase’s hopeless tangle
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of pronouns (a more basic displacement of the proper name) thrusts outside the self the
intolerable dialogism that lies within. The name of Hyde represents a more sophisticated,
composed dissociation, and the initiation of this pseudonym into the public circulation of
writing convinces Jekyll of his alibi’s perfect soundness: “when, by sloping my hand
backward, I had supplied my double with a signature, I thought I sat beyond the reach of
fate” (82). Though Utterson refers to Jekyll’s act of signing for Hyde as a “forgery” (54),
the hoax reverses the operation one typically associates with this crime of writing.
Ordinarily, forgery impersonates an already extent sign, profiting from the unauthorized
simulation of an established name. Conversely, the creation of Jekyll’s pseudonym is an
un-naming, a divergent rather than imitative gesture. His desire is to forge a new,
uncharted name, one that lies outside any archive of public reference. To possess
“character” is also to be a sign belonging to a system, and made intelligible by the other
signs that compose that system.15 Having constructed this outside term, Jekyll is no
longer to be constrained as “the slave . . . of a discourse . . . in which his place is already
inscribed at birth, if only by virtue of his proper name” (Lacan, “Agency” 148).
Forfeiting his moral and graphological character in one stroke, Jekyll’s hand strays
outside the bounds of legible society.
At the same time, however, Hyde must pay his rent and perform other practical
matters that require of him to deliver up an identifiable and iterable signature. How to
fashion a legible sign that others may comprehend without apprehending, a “handle” that
will not be mishandled? In Mary Elizabeth Braddon’s Lady Audley’s Secret (1862), our
heroine Helen Talboys (a.k.a. Lucy Graham) finds to her dismay that there are no
vacancies within a vigilantly guarded symbolic realm. Her attempts to dissociate herself
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from her past through the adoption of a pseudonym are denied by her relentlessly
inquisitive brother-in-law, a man committed to the “old worldly wisdom” that “[t]here are
some things which . . . cannot be hidden” (197)—a statement that echoes Schelling’s
definition of the uncanny. Robert Audley is a modern skeptic; he will not be taken in by
superstitious belief “in mandrake, or in blood stains that no time can efface” (170). It is
not that Robert has lost the faith entirely; his belief has merely been transposed to the
discourse of forensics, a science that legitimates this abiding desire for unequivocal
symbols and unanswerable judgments. If these irrefutable signs were once required to
take the form of supernatural omens of guilt, modern secular faith preferred that they be
termed within the thoroughly natural register of indexical traces, tracks, and prints. This
is how forensic science replaces the reverent fear of an all-seeing God with the awesome
power of the law’s omniscience.
Directly after hearing of Robert’s avowed skepticism, we find that Lady Audley’s
“uncommon hand” (171), which “present[s] marked peculiarities” (286) is, for Robert’s
purposes, as good as a signed confession. The identical hand binds together the identities
of the two, refusing Lucy her death and Helen her new life by means of the graphical
evidence of their sham suicide note.16 In Stevenson’s text it is Utterson who reprises
Robert’s role, presiding over the legal documents and financial transactions that bear
Hyde’s name and signature, and finding there a new name written, but with the same
hand. Adapting epistolary form to the plot of a thriller, Stevenson’s “case” binds together
correspondence between characters. But it is concerned at heart with an interior
correspondence: not communications between correspondents, but the correlation
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between inside and out as manifest through handwriting, and grasped through
graphological analysis.

Jekyll’s “Guest”: Handwriting Analysis in Victorian England
If the mysterious “transcendental medicine” (74) that brings about Jekyll’s fantastical
transformation remains, as far as hard science is concerned, a rather vague sketch (hence
tending to be transplanted to a metaphorical register), the pseudoscience of graphology
would have been much more familiar to Victorian readers. The first expert testimony on
handwriting analysis in the British courts was recorded in 1849, in the case of the
physician and philanthropist Dr. George Parkman’s disappearance. Consulted everywhere
from the courthouse to the séance (where the Society for Psychical Research employed
handwriting analysts to determine the origin of Madame Blavatsky’s written messages),
the practice was intended to measure the claims of suspicious subjects against the silent
testimony of their bodies. Perhaps the most culturally significant case involving
handwriting analysis—that of Captain Alfred Dreyfus—occurred a few years after Jekyll
and Hyde’s publication. In this trial, Alphonse Bertillon, Parisian records clerk and father
of biometrics, had provided his infamous testimony as a self-described “handwriting
expert” (entirely without credentials).17 Two years after the publication of Stevenson’s
crime narrative, Hyde’s pseudonymous strategy was mimicked in the correspondence of
Jack the Ripper. The killer’s desire to “make a name for himself” had to be tempered by
obvious concerns about self-exposure, leading him to adopt the pseudonyms "Mr.
Nobody" and "Mr. Nemo” in communications with the police and the public. Sir Arthur
Conan Doyle, donning Sherlock’s deerhunter hat not for the first time in his career,
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suggested to police that they publish the killer’s letters in the major papers. By placing
“Jack’s” writing in circulation, the police would recruit the general public as deputy
officers of the law—a mass mobilization of “Baker Street Irregulars” that made the
populace responsible for their own surveillance.
In a text featuring a number of allegorical surnames, Stevenson’s choice to
christen Utterson’s head clerk (and chief confidante) Mr. Guest seems a curious one.
Though his title confers an established place within the household, Guest’s name
suggests his contribution to the narrative will introduce an unfamiliar or even foreign
logic to the text. Stevenson’s plot confirms the latter reading, as the character is ushered
in midway through the narrative in order to perform a specialized function. Once his role
as “a great student and critic of handwriting” (53) has been served, the character
disappears altogether. Charles Reade’s Foul Play, a theatrical production staged at
Holborn in 1869, includes a similar cameo performance of the graphologist as “external
examiner.” The play features a minor, yet pivotal character by the name of Edward
Undercliff. Three of the four times which this character is introduced, his appended
title—“Undercliff, the expert”—emphasizes his role as the bearer of a specialized
knowledge that is foreign to the other characters in the play.
This marginal but significant positioning of handwriting experts within literature
mirrors the historical development of graphological practice in nineteenth-century
Britain, a foreign speculative science developed primarily through theories and
experiments imported from the rest of Europe. The first book-length study of handwriting
analysis was published in 1622 by Camillo Baldi, an Italian doctor of medicine and
philosophy.18 However, the most broadly read text within England upon the subject was
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most likely Lavater’s Physiognomy. Lavater’s analysis is understood to be a primary
source for two of the earliest English texts on the subject, penned by Thomas Byerley and
Isaac Disraeli.
In 1823, Byerley (writing under the pseudonym of Stephen Collett) had made his
contribution to the topic with his “Characteristic Signatures.” Here he claimed that: “[i]n
using his pen, a man acts unconsciously, as the current of his blood impels him; and
there, at all times, nature flows unrestricted and free” (370). A year later, Disraeli had
devoted a chapter of the second volume of his Curiosities of Literature to the topic of
“Autographs,” arguing therein that “Nature” has prompted “every individual to have a
distinct sort of writing, as she has given a countenance—a voice—and a manner. The
flexibility of the muscles differs with every individual, and the hand will follow the
direction of the thoughts, and the emotions and the habits of the writers” (208).
Disraeli’s curiosity is not an idle one. His commentary is prompted by the
recognition of a cultural transformation that signals a crisis of identity. Copybooks and
other restrictive, standardized pedagogical methods of “character” formation have
reduced penmanship to a “mechanical process” of anonymous reproduction: “the pupils
are forced in their automatic motions, as if acted on by the pressure of a steam-engine.”
Stamped by an impersonal machine, individuals are rendered unrecognizable, “all
appearing to have come from the same rolling-press” (207).
To his dismay, Disraeli finds the institutionally reconfigured “muscular” practice
of writing has been reduced to a simulation of industrial activity. The transformation calls
to mind Carlyle’s analysis of the wholesale deposition within modern culture of dynamic
energies by mechanical force (“Signs of the Times”), but it also suggests that one of the
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most disconcerting “signs of the times” was the inability of the body to serve as a reliable
cornerstone of identity and authenticity. In a period where Carlyle lamented that:
“Nothing now is done directly, or by hand” (“Signs” 64), a hand capable of replicating a
machine meant that even those actions performed manually were not unequivocal
evidence of self-directed and autonomous activity.
In this milieu of industrialized handwriting, the hand takes on an uncertain status,
positioned at the physical juncture of culture and nature. When properly trained, the hand
is capable of disguising its true character, and churning out the standardized script of a
writing machine. Under such conditions, manuscripture is not something that emerges
from the subject in an expression of pure inwardness.19 The body is written, then writes.
Francis Galton recognizes this cultural negotiation, arguing that: “handwriting is by no
means solely dependent on the balance of the muscles of the hand, causing such and such
strokes to be made with greater facility than others. Handwriting is greatly modified by
the fashion of the time” (Inquiries 88). The equivocal nature of the term ‘manual’
(denoting work “done by hand,” but also a book of instructions—especially for operating
a machine) expresses laconically this understanding of manuscript as the conflicted token
of one’s socialization, a mark co-signed by the self and the other. If the “manual”
suggests a disciplinary mechanism behind the development of one’s character(s), this
fundamental education of bodies prompts a reappraisal of phenomenological models of
authenticity that take the hand as their emblem.
Handwriting instruction requires the choreography of the entire body, which
pivots upon the point of the stylus. In Foucault’s analysis of the micro-physics of power
we find this scrupulous attention to the intricacies of bodily gesture expressed in the bio-
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political maxim: a “well-disciplined body forms the operational context of the slightest
gesture” (DP 152). Proper penmanship involves “a whole routine whose rigorous code
invests the body in its entirety, from the points of the feet to the tip of the index finger”
(152). Foucault cites J.B. La Salle’s Conduite des écoles chrétiennes (1783), where pupils
are instructed to always “hold their bodies erect, somewhat turned and free on the left
side, slightly inclined, so that, with the elbow placed on the table, the chin can be rested
upon the hand, unless this were to interfere with the view; the left leg must be somewhat
more forward under the table than the right” (152). The body is whittled down to this
graphic extremity, a needle capable of registering the slightest disturbance or
misalignment in one’s fine psychomotor functions. For the discerning critic of
handwriting, the entire body is laid bare in these telling gestures.
Foucault’s portrait of the docile student at work provides a significant point of
contrast to the spectacle of the Gothic body in the act writing, the contortions of which
testify to an essential duplicity to be found within the act. The Castle of Otranto’s
counterfeit “found manuscript” and “fictitious will” (164) establish the Gothic genre as a
compendium of forgeries, one which consistently blurs the lines between production and
reproduction in a manner neatly encapsulated in the polysemy of the verb “to forge.”20
Perhaps more significant, however, are instances where the victim of these forgeries is
not only (falsely) implicated through simulation, but directly (and physically) entangled
through anxiety, distraction, possession, addiction, and a range of other altered states. For
though Walpole’s second preface publicly exposes the hoax behind Otranto’s “editor’s
narrative,” his private correspondence depicts another “gigantic hand in armour”: one
which appears to the author in dreams, and from whose dictation Walpole composes
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Otranto as if in a trance. In such predicaments, the Gothic subject perpetrates upon
herself a kind of sleight of hand that invalidates any simple alibi. Though Hogg’s
“justified sinner,” Colwan, may denounce his will as a “false, and forged grant” (181),
the case is not so simple. The document has been signed with his own hand (179), a fact
that admits no denial. Such Gothic doppeltexts, or double writings, serve as astonishingly
sensitive registers of irreconcilable tendencies and personalities warring within the
subject. In Dracula, agitation or outright possession disfigures the character of Jonathan’s
correspondence with his fiancée. Mina finds his letters have been written one way, but
read quite another, insisting: “It does not read like him, and yet it is his writing” (106).
Similarly, in the context of Victorian spiritualism, mirrored writing suggests the contrary
nature of alternate personalities; the contrary “inclination” of script that leans in the
opposite direction is understood to express orthographically a more abstract sense of this
other’s divergent tendencies.
Finding Jekyll’s signature attached to Hyde’s cheque, Enfield is struck by the
same impression of alterity. Rather than the effortless fluidity one expects in such a
gesture, Jekyll’s signature reveals signs of labour and artifice. As Enfield tells us, “[t]he
figure was stiff” (34); the hand unwittingly communicates the body’s resistance to this
conventional sign of identity. Returning to Lanyon’s injunction, we might say that the
signature’s rigidity bears witness to Hyde’s struggle to “compose himself.” In stating that
“the whole business looked apocryphal” (34), Enfield divulges his theory that Hyde has
simply forged the cheque. But the fiend’s duplicity is already too essential and
internalized to exculpate Jekyll from wrongdoing. His body cannot manage to return to
its equilibrium, and in doing so outstretch the steady and assured hand capable of signing
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a convincing pledge of identity.
Though Victorian critics of handwriting tended not to depict the body’s reversion
to habitual practices as addiction (they typically traced out resistances to culture along
more noble lines), the pseudoscience sensitized Victorian readers to dialectical conflicts
embedded within handwriting by expropriating the peculiarities of an individual’s
spontaneous style as a resistance to the conformity of cultural conventions. Where before
there had been only writing upon a blank page, many Victorian thinkers now recognized
the staging of a contest between bodies and institutions. We find this sense of conflict
expressed by Henry Maudsley in a letter to handwriting expert Richard Dimsdale
Stocker:
There is one lesson which my handwriting teaches, namely, that Nature is
stronger than art, heredity than acquisition. When I was at school it was resolutely
and systematically changed. But this conquest of culture (if conquest it was) has
been gradually effaced, until now, in age, my handwriting has reverted to the
stock form, and might almost be mistaken for that of my father. If my present
handwriting then reveal character, it will be a revelation of the character of my
forefathers. (Stocker 8)
It is not difficult to detect a note of pride in Maudsley’s self-examination. Handwriting is
denounced as a lesson in subjection—one at which he has happily failed. Pedagogy has
been overthrown by pedigree, and the anonymous, conventional sign has been
overwritten by the family trait. Nature has triumphed over the “conquest of culture,” and
the hand reverts to its old alliances and affinities.
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Among those who considered the subject, however, the consensus was that
modern society exhibited in its script a monotonous regularity of character. Disraeli’s
entry on autographs traces not the vanishing of a specific individual into the throng (as
Poe’s unnamed narrator had in “The Man of the Crowd”), but the general disappearance
of the quality of individuality from British culture.21 Disraeli predicted that the “true
physiognomy of writing will be lost among our rising generation,” complaining that “it is
no longer a face that we are looking on, but a beautiful mask of a single pattern” (208). In
like manner, Byerley laments the rarity of truly unique, or “characteristic signatures”
(374). For him, the “great mass of people in the world may be said to consist of mere
negatives; of persons who act as they are desired, think as they are taught, and write after
copies set before them; and the utmost that you can expect to discover from the
handwriting of such persons is, that they have no individual character at all” (370-371,
italics original). This inundation of scriptural production—the corollary of a widespread
increase in literacy during the nineteenth century—can remain undifferentiated because it
is understood as a collection of “mere negatives.” All of this is only the noise and rattle of
everyday, anonymous culture—reproduction rather than production.
Byerley’s comment signals not just a reluctance to sort through this mass of
writing, but also to wade through the “mass of people” responsible for its generation. His
discussion of handwriting submits an exacting criterion of “individuality.” This is not a
designation to be indiscriminately conferred upon every person; the onus is on the subject
to earn this title of distinction. In a society increasingly driven by mechanical
reproduction, “the individual” becomes aligned with singularity, marked by an instinctive
failure to reproduce the customary signs of culture.
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Consequently, at the close of the eighteenth century, the “signature” accrues a
surplus value that inspires the specialized circulation of handwriting for its own sake.
Fostering reverence for the autograph as an index “of the movements of the mind as well
as the pen” (Turner 47), autograph hounds such as William Upcott and Dawson Turner
encouraged the collection, circulation and sale of signatures as commodities.22 This
market depended upon a distinction between two classes of writing – the stereotype of the
masses, and the (rarified) autograph of the individual. Founded on this distinction that
privileged the particular over and against the general, autograph collecting entailed a
relatively limited conscription of names. The value of a specimen of writing was
dependent upon its perceived rarity. Few truly “wrote their own hand,” and hence only
exceptional signs were solicited. The signatures of the great majority only confirm their
anonymity. Exemplary writers are endowed with autographs; the rest merely transmit
facsimiles. The term autograph names at once the body of the manuscript and the sign of
authorship. Once a writer’s “signature” style has been established, every pen stroke
becomes a forceful assertion of his selfhood; the true individual is always writing his
name, no matter what the content. (The individual is, at all times, identical only to
himself.) Thus, ironically, the cult of the individual pitted one automatism against
another. “Autograph-hunters” sought the autonomous gesture of one who had risen above
the automatisms of culture, but also the spontaneous display of an irrepressible
individuality detectable in automatic, unselfconscious gestures.23
Turner’s autographic individual was an exemplary figure because s/he employed
handwriting in a manner that muted the anonymous noise of enculturation typically
produced by this standard writing prosthesis, performing gestures that registered
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“movements of the mind as well as the pen.” By contrast with Turner’s rather cerebral
vision of exemplary handwriting, the monstrous singularity of Hyde’s hand resists
cultivation because it exhibits the peculiarities of his body within the text. Increasing
fascination with this de-sublimated understanding of handwriting would crucially alter
the direction of graphological analysis towards the latter end of century. The hand, it
occurred to prominent psychologists and physicians such as Havelock Ellis and Max
Nordau, betrayed not only the exceptional tendencies of those who transcended the norms
of society, but also those who fell below its standards of respectability and morality.
Cesare Lombroso’s “autograph collection,” submitted by a motley crew of thieves,
swindlers, and murderers, stands in stark contrast with that of William Upcott, Dawson
Turner, or Poe, whose compilations were more likely to include specimens of royalty and
literati. Turning their attention to “bad subjects” as well as good, graphologists analyzed
and described handwriting with the aim of determining the “character, disposition, and
aptitudes” (OED) of individuals through their orthographic tendencies and peculiarities.
In this sense, graphology is a study of the ways in which the body can be incarnated in
the text, incorporated into writing, and reflexively inscribed by this text (through the
conviction that characters inscribed upon the page illuminate the writer’s own character).
The forensic study of handwriting heightens the intrigue of Disraeli’s curiosities
by tracing the link between a hand and its writing, and the apprehension of this particular
individual is always a demonstration of the ways in which identity can be detected within
the folds of each and every subject, an inner quality testified to by subtle but unequivocal
external markings. Sherlock Holmes, who advises his partner Watson to “Always look at
the hands first” (“Creeping” 612) provides us with Victorian fiction’s most
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comprehensive fantasy concerning the “transparency” of handwriting. In “The Reigate
Puzzle,” Sherlock authoritatively informs those who “may not be aware . . . that the
deduction of a man’s age from his writing is one which has been brought to considerable
accuracy by experts” (488). The detective pores over the torn corner of an incriminating
handwritten note, somehow determining from this scrap not only the respective ages of
the culprits, but their identities, health, disposition, and familial relation to each other.
Doyle’s fiction instills a paranoid relation to the law that plays upon the notion of a
perfect “correspondence” between the body and the subject to produce an entirely legible
criminal. One is bound to the other by way of the hand; in this member’s inadvertent
gestures are encoded everything short of one’s DNA.
It is precisely this sort of information that Utterson expects from his “student of
handwriting” when he solicits Guest’s opinion on a sample of Hyde’s “odd hand” (53).
While the banker in Enfield’s “Story of the Door” verifies only the identity of the
cheque’s signatory, Utterson expects Guest to assess his sanity. Presented with the rare
specimen of a “murderer’s autograph,” Guest’s grim enthusiasm for deviant writings
aligns his interests with those of Lombroso and Nordau: his “eyes brightened, and he sat
down at once and studied it with passion” (53). Both presuppose the man to be mad, but
upon inspection of Hyde’s handwriting, Guest definitively determines this not to be the
case. The criminal’s sanity is to be measured by his actions, though not by the ones
readers might expect. It is not how Hyde brandishes Utterson’s cane that concerns Guest,
but how he wields Jekyll’s pen.24 Hyde’s most emphatically violent conduct offers only
the coarsest index of his inner state; it is through the slightest, unconscious motor activity
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involved in handwriting that we find a more exact exterior correspondence with Hyde’s
intimate secrets.
George Mackenzie Bacon’s On the Writing of the Insane (1870), a book-length
study that followed an 1869 article for The Lancet, evinces a keen attunement to this
complex embodied gesture: “The act of writing, when once the habit has been acquired,
seems so easy as to be almost intuitive, and we are apt to forget what combinations are
necessary to set in motion the pen which runs so glibly over the paper, and what
complicated processes are involved in so simple an act” (5). For Bacon, the Medical
Superintendent of the Cambridgeshire County Asylum, these unconscious processes of
the body rendered “the letters of the insane [worthy of] study—as the most reliable
evidence of the state of the patient’s mind” (15). Graphological analysis imagines the
hand operating as a variety of organic polygraph—or, as Bacon would put it, “a sort of
involuntary photograph” (9)—its automatic movements providing unmediated
correspondence with hidden truths of the subject’s interior life. “On ordinary cases of
mania,” Bacon argues, “the patients’ letters are odd and grotesque, exhibiting the same
want of balance that their actions do” (17). Though Saussure may have understood
writing as a mode of deliberation and disguise, many Victorians saw things differently. In
The Art of Judging the Character of Individuals from Their Handwriting and Style
(1875), for instance, Edward Lumley argues that: “When we speak, it is almost always
under the influence of volition. It is not the same with gestures, which are frequently
involuntary. It is for this reason easier to deceive by speech; while the gesture which
escapes us bears the impress of truth” (2). The graphologist’s true object is that of direct
commerce with the body and its expressive gestures. Handwriting preserves for its reader
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an archive of these movements. Graphology recognizes these traces that the body leaves
in space as a material practice which implicates the body and identifies the subject:
“unlike the fleeting patterns of speech, voice, and gesture, handwriting has the peculiar
advantage of fossilizing that expression, leaving a visible record for leisurely, minute
analysis” (Roman 172).25 This “fossilized expression” is not merely a translation of text
into image, such as a static series of hieroglyphs, but an animism of the text—the
characters are alive, imbued with movement captured on the page. They form a
pictography that is also a physiognomy.
Bodies are a kind of writing and writings are a kind of body. Each trace their way
into each other, woven into the sort of “mobius script” depicted within Escher’s
“Drawing Hands.” In handwriting, representation and expression constitute two sides of
the same surface, and we traverse along one face of the plane only to find ourselves
imperceptibly transported to the other side. In the frontispiece to Lavater’s Physiognomy,
for instance, we find the titular practice described as “reading the handwriting of nature
upon the human countenance.”
At the same time, we are prevented from understanding Lavater’s handwriting
analogy as endorsing the emaciation of the body through a theory of constitutive
representation. If every text constitutes an allegory of reading, the effects of interpretive
practices certainly extend beyond the written page. Furthermore, writing itself presents
Lavater with a kind of body: “the form and exterior of a letter frequently enable us to
judge whether it was written in a calm or uneasy situation, in haste or at leisure” (201).
And so, in reading manuscript, the physiognomist must observe “the substance and the
body of the letters” (202) as an index of the writer’s own mind and body. There is no
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mark that is not an imprint of the writer’s self, a tracing of his character.26 As God
created “man” in His likeness, so man cannot help but create after his own image (202). It
is this apprehension of the scriptive body of writing that leads Isaac Disraeli, in his
Curiosities of Literature, to speak of “the art of judging of the characters of persons by
their writing” as a “physiognomy of writing” (208). H.E. Weston, writing for Borderland
in 1895, discusses the popular pseudo-sciences of phrenology, physiognomy and
graphology as united by the overarching theory that “there is character—or the want of
it—in everything, animate or inanimate” (64). Thus, it comes as no surprise that Cesare
Lombroso, in his study on the handwriting of criminals, should find fingers and figures
interlocked with each other upon the page. Along with a “slight tremble,” “the writing of
a certain type of thief—such as Cartouche—has a sort of hook and curvature to
practically every letter, which reminds us of the particular configuration of their fingers”
(Criminal 113). Hook and crook are bound together in writing—act, body, and trace. The
twisted nature of crime, Lombroso insists, is more than just a moralizing figure of speech.
It is a metaphor that seeps into the body, and its traces can be found in the physical
“residue” of writing.
Criminal diagnostics customarily included an analysis of handwriting, ideally
performed by the subject under some duress. Deviancy disguised by speech would often
be brought to light through writing; subjects could be trusted to “pour out all their
insanity on paper” (229). For Lombroso, a few lines of script rarely provided satisfactory
results, since the criminal could “easily concentrate his attention on them, but he should
be requested to write a page or two and be exhorted to make haste” (229). The criminal
might write, but he was careful not to express anything. Given the correct duration and
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pace, however, an “automatic” writing—unfettered by conscious reservations—would
emerge. Without the self-censoring defences of conscious interference handwriting
reveals a spectrum of abnormalities, from the swindler who emblematizes his trade with a
screed that is “usually indecipherable and enveloped in an infinite number of
arabesques,” to the murderers who give themselves away with “clumsy but energetic”
handwriting, as well as their vicious tendency to “cross their t’s with dashing strokes”
(230). For Lombroso’s subjects, writing can only be a sublimation of deviant desire. The
dizzying textual performance of the swindler is itself intended to swindle the reader.
Equally incapable of forbearing his vice, the murderer submits writing marred by
“graphic” violence. The content of these enforced writings, never commented upon by
Lombroso, was, in both senses of the word, immaterial. Rather, the legibility of the
criminal was precisely para-doxical: a writing that was opposed to sense. His script was
conspicuous—and therefore intelligible—because of its orthographic and morphological
errancy, its tendency to stray towards illegibility. Writing itself was delinquent, failing to
assume its proper denotative status. In cases of mania, Bacon suggests that the analyst’s
attention be guided by a similar indifference to content: “the change in the handwriting
may be of great value in diagnosis, even without reference to the subject matter” (Lancet
117). In “the letters of the insane,” manuscript becomes a symptom, “betray[ing] their
mental condition when they may succeed in concealing it in conversation” (117).
Forgetting what it ought to say, such writing drifts into a sick, or ill-literacy that
unintentionally expresses what should have remained hidden.
Commenting on the rise of studies such as R. Forrer’s “Handwriting of the
Insane” (1888) within the discourse network of 1900, Friedrich Kittler remarks on the
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graphological division of literate people into two camps: “on the one hand, those whose
handwriting was a direct reflection of their unconscious and so could be evaluated
physiologically or criminologically; on the other, the professional writers, who were
writing machines, without handwriting” (262).27 Properly considered and “professional”
writing unswervingly finds its way to its referent. In this way it attains the status of pure
content, allowing the materiality of the inscription machine to disappear into its own
equipmentality. The mediality of inscription is once again brought to the fore when
representation breaks down; the mark of illegibility carried by the spontaneous writing of
the criminal is a pure sign without referent.
In like manner, whenever Jekyll writes under duress his hand inevitably serves as
an uncannily transparent register of his interior state. Confiding in a letter written to
Lanyon that, at the mere thought of the abject desperation of his situation, “my heart
sinks and my hand trembles” (70), his aside serves as comment on the correlative
movements of physiological and graphical agitation. The handwritten letter Jekyll
addresses to his chemist is similarly marred by the body’s intrusion, a rupture that
suddenly derails his formal tone of placid indifference:
Dr. Jekyll presents his compliments to Messrs. Maw. He assures them that their
last sample is impure and quite useless for his present purpose. In the year 18--,
Dr. J purchased a somewhat large quantity from Messrs. M. He now begs them to
search with most sedulous care, and should any of the same quality be left, to
forward it to him at once. Expense is no consideration. The importance of this to
Dr. J. can hardly be exaggerated.” So far the letter had run composedly enough;
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but here with a certain splutter of the pen, the writer’s emotion had broken loose.
“For God’s sake,” he added, “find me some of the old.” (62, emphasis mine)
The requirement of self-composure makes possible a self-composition: a performance
that buries the self within itself. Jekyll’s formal tone briefly allows him to mask his
appalling appetites, but his deepening sense of urgency overwhelms his composure as
well as his pen, whose spasms give witness to his internal disorder. The pangs of
addiction force Jekyll’s hand, as the “certain splutter of the pen” reveals that the stylus is
just as incapable as the body of sustaining the imposture of these hollow formalities.
Polite conventions of correspondence are sideswiped by the sudden intrusion of the body
and the interjection of its needs.28
Apprehending the deviant signs produced by these bodily needs, graphology
emerges as a physiognomy of the letter. Thus, when Foucault speaks of the “turning of
real lives into writing” (DP 192) under the procedure of the examination, we ought to
recognize the simultaneous passage of the reverse operation that endows writing with
life. Letters become ideograms: restless, unsteady, slouching on the page. Writing comes
to be read as an extension of the self, the writer’s physicality permeating and inhabiting
the text it writes, so that each alphabetic character assumes the character of its author. In
this reflexive turn, we find the writer incorporated into his own text; this writing now
signifies indexically, as the imprint of the body, the history of its charged interactions
with the medium.
The interleaving of physiognomy and graphology is particularly seamless in John
Holt-Schooling’s thought. Writing for Nineteenth Century in 1895, three years after his
translation of Jules Crepieux-Jamin’s L’Ecriture at le Caractere (as Handwriting and
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Expression), Schooling explains his ontogenetic theory of physiognomy. Under
Schooling’s reading, bodily hermeneutics consults not the ancient palimpsest we find in
Lombroso’s theories (where traces of the subject’s ancestry are the typical “subtext” of
the criminal body), but proceeds through the “delineation of character through a reading
of the body’s own history” (478). Physiognomy, for Schooling, is the study of the
accumulated habitual gestures which have, over time, left their imprint upon the body:
“those which have been the most frequent have left their mark, it may be in definitely
trained lines of thought, it may be in the deep chisel-scores of unrestrained passion”
(478). The body displays an “increasing tendency towards repetition of this or that nervemuscular contraction, or gesture, which in time cuts its mark upon the very externals of
the human body” (478).
For Schooling, the “delineation” (478) of character entails tracing the history of a
body that is written upon the flesh (which bears old traces beneath each new one, much
like the history in wax of Freud’s “Mystic Writing Pad”). In this way, one’s handwritten
correspondence always refers back to a prior writing, one that has been engraved inside
the body through ingrained habits of movement (themselves the ripples of emotion and
mentation that provoke these gestures). Handwriting inscribes in one stroke (upon the
page) that which may take years to impress itself upon the body, which is a relatively less
ductile surface of inscription. It provides an exteriorized trace of what is happening
within the subterranean depths of the body, habits that have yet to manifest themselves as
“telling” scars upon the surface of the body. The figural relation between rut and routine
becomes something more than an abstract metaphor in Schooling’s text: each gesture
“produces a score that is constantly adding up to make a record” (478). The
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physiognomist will have to wait for these furrows and creases to eventually emerge upon
the surface of the body, but the advantage of the graphological method is its immediate
apprehension of internal stigmata. For a reader informed by this arcane bodily literacy,
writing provides at once the snapshot of a momentary gesture and the deep history of the
subject imagined by Myers. A very peculiar sort of bodily movement, writing is the “only
form of gesture which is permanently self-registering at the moment of its expression”
(479). This act’s permanence makes graphology a prosthetic corrective to vagaries of
physiognomic interpretation, translating the mutability of bodies into ossified traces of
legible movement. Writing, a spontaneous and “free gesture” (483), nonetheless turns
itself in, so to speak, voluntarily bearing “silent witness” (487) against even the most
recalcitrant of subjects. Whatever you might have to say through writing is undermined
by all that your writing has to say about you.
It is this threat of betrayal at one’s own hand that engenders the ambivalent
relation between writing and the subject within Stevenson’s novella. Writing both
inscribes the ‘I’ and delimits it, conscripting the body into subjecthood, but also into
subjection. Just as the Imago beckons to the subject from the other side of the mirror, the
Ideal I is to be found in one’s copy-book, its perfected character an image that testifies to
one’s coordination, composure, and control. But both of these images, the mirrored and
the scriptural, are received by the gothic subject with the same ambivalence, the same
imperfect recognition tinged with the conviction of an insurmountable asymmetry
between ideality and reality.
For all of his atavistic, “savage” (41), and “troglodytic” (41) traits, his
handwriting is the one aspect of Hyde’s “original character” that refuses to let go (87). In
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his personal correspondence with Stevenson, Myers had made a series of friendly
suggestions concerning the narrative, among them the warning that this detail was not
exactly in keeping with the latest research concerning multiple personalities. “Here,”
Myers writes, “I think you miss a point for want of familiarity of recent psycho-physical
discussions. Handwriting in cases of double personality (spontaneous . . . or induced, as
in hypnotic cases) is not and cannot be the same in two personalities” (qtd. in Maixner
215). Regardless of what Stevenson might have known about the studies Myers and other
were performing with the SPR, his choice of “the hand” as the sole vestige of Jekyll’s
“character” suggests it is a deliberate and significant choice. Jekyll’s discovery that he
can “write [his] own hand” initiates a strange inversion of the self. The odd way in which
this sinister other hand dislocates the subject from the body (i.e., the I from the hand),
proudly presents the signature as a counterfeit, and the self as a forgery. This dislocation
promises to secure Hyde’s autonomy, but also threatens to betray his secret. From its
opening pages, where Hyde presents Enfield with a cheque he is certain bears a forgery
of Jekyll’s hand (34), Stevenson’s tale presents us with a series of scenes of reading, each
centering on the problem of the written word and question of the I: who can sign it,
authorize it, and bank on it.
Though it is centrally concerned with this act of “character building” (i.e.,
inscribing the ‘I’) Jekyll and Hyde is the work of too many hands to be considered a
proper autobiography. There are, of course, those at the periphery who coax the story into
being, the lines of interpretation that make their violent convergence on Hyde’s body. But
our concern here is the duality lodged at the reeling centre of this novella—the “white
and comely” hand of the professional Jekyll, struggling against the “corded, knuckly” and
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hairy member that attempts to write against its grain. This duplicitous hand marks the
unstable alliance between subject and body. As the first sign of involuntary
transformation (82), it is the earliest suggestion that the subject cannot control the body,
that Hyde has “gained the upper hand.”29
The page is the plane on which these two hands touch, their conflict played out
graphically. The close of Stevenson’s Strange Case finds the good doctor hastily penning
his suicide note, writing to put an end to all writing. Hyde has been defacing his alter
ego’s books by “scrawling blasphemies” in Jekyll’s “own hand” (90) and, should he
awaken to find this writing in process, will most certainly destroy it. Corrupting the
singularity of Jekyll’s signature, the “proper” sign that functions as a guarantor of
authenticity, Stevenson interrupts the organic relation between the self and its material
extension in writing with the sinister introduction of Hyde’s destructive hand, which
scrawls its panicked opposition against Jekyll’s call to accountability.
In Stevenson’s novella, Jekyll will be reduced to “nothing but letters and a closed
door” (70). A decade later, Stoker’s Dracula will have Jonathan Harker dismiss the text
he produces and inhabits as “nothing but a mass of typewriting” (419). This wholesale
liquidation of narrative and character into writing is viewed by gothic villains such as
Hyde with abject dread, a horror evoked by the intuition that the construction of the text
is intimately tied to the destruction of his body. For this reason, Count Dracula will
attempt to destroy the Crew of Light’s vampire “dossier.” Hyde’s own violent antipathy
to Jekyll’s text signals the same sense of foreboding. The confession Jekyll’s equanimity
generates, so hateful to Hyde that he would “tear it in pieces” if he could (90), brings the
lives of both to an end, with the termination of Jekyll’s narrative and of Hyde’s life
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perfectly synchronized. Jekyll’s description of these final moments grants a ceremonial
quality to the scene, where pen and envelope come to resemble body and coffin: “Here
then, as I lay down the pen and proceed to seal up my confession, I bring the life of that
unhappy Henry Jekyll to an end” (91). Gazing on the fiend’s body, Utterson verbalizes
the significance of Hyde’s death, knowing “Hyde is gone to his account” (66). The fatal
directive of truth – that the self must be accounted for – brings about the death of the
author in only the most literal sense, as Jekyll signs his own death sentence. This lethal
equivalence of body and text fervidly resists the benign conscription imagined within
physiognomic, graphological and criminological discourses of the nineteenth century.
The knotted relation between flesh and writing envisioned within Stevenson’s novella
demonstrates that neither substance can be sublimed into the other without resorting to
graphic, and graphical, violence.
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“The hand guides itself”: a sampling of the homophonic play littered throughout the
writings of Jasno, one of Lombroso’s “graphomaniacs.” Nordau cites this phrase from
Lombroso’s Genie ind Irsinn 264.
2

Thomas’ reading could be said to invoke what Judith Butler has characterized as the
“linguistic idealism of poststructuralism,” a mode of critique that [immerses] itself in the
sort of “textual play” that (falsely, in Butler’s estimation and in mine) “marks the
dissolution of matter as a contemporary category” (Bodies 27).
3

See Thomas, 239; Danahay, 135-146.

4

See Buckton, who reads autobiography as “a manifestation of the nineteenth-century
culture of individualism as well as the literary that most directly influences the Victorian
novel in its exploration of individual origins, identity, experience, and development” (23).
5

See Modern Language Notes’ 1978 special issue, edited by Rodolphe Gasché, on
“Autobiography and the Problem of the Subject.” Also, see Olney 1980 and Jay 1984.
More recently, see Folkenflik 1993.
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6

See also Maudsley’s Body and Will 34.

7

Derrida’s essay closes with an appeal for “what might be called a new psychoanalytic
graphology.” This chapter does not answer that call. Derrida appropriates graphology as a
term seemingly without history. Is this merely the bricoleur at work, placing graphology
under erasure in order “to preserve as an instrument that whose truth-value he criticizes”
(WD 284)? The “Scene of Writing” finds Derrida inscribing “graphology” upon his own
Mystic Writing Pad, simply lifting the “thin transparent sheet” and beginning anew with a
clean slate. But certain questions remain embedded within the history of graphology,
regardless of whether or not they surface within Derrida’s text. It is not only that the
application of the graphological method has a history; its fundamental object of study—
that is, script produced by hand as opposed to any other means—is a historically
contingent technology of writing.
8

One recent example of this tendency would be Driver, et. al. “Should We Write Off
Graphology?”
9

See Stafford 91; Stemmler 151.
Daniel 5: 5-28.

10
11

Freud’s study of “The ‘Uncanny’” identifies this trope of dismemberment as one of the
recurrent conventions of the uncanny: “Dismembered limbs, a severed head, a hand cut
off at the wrist, as in a fairy tale of Hauff’s feet which dance by themselves […] all of
them have something peculiarly uncanny about them, especially when, as in the last
instance, they prove capable of independent activity in addition” (144-45). Freud
attributes this to a castration complex—all appendages of the body become one.
12

For further discussion of the role silence plays within professional male friendships,
see Arata, 40-41. Also significant in this regard is Enfield’s “Don’t ask, Don’t tell”
policy, as explained to Utterson: “the more it looks like Queer Street, the less I ask” (35).
13

To borrow from Henry James, who provides a most insightful contemporary
assessment of Stevenson’s uncommon abilities, these men “[achieve their] best effects
without the aid of the ladies” (170).
14

Considering the “id” encrypted within the “He” of Hyde’s name, Utterson’s stated
objective betrays a strange resemblance to the Freudian maxim: “Where id was, there the
ego shall be” (Freud, “Dissection” 71).
15

See The Psychic Life of Power, where Butler argues that individuals “enjoy
intelligibility only to the extent that they are, as it were, first established in language. The
subject is the linguistic occasion for the individual to achieve and reproduce
intelligibility, the linguistic condition of its existence and agency” (10–11).
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This method of reading receives an ambivalent introduction into Braddon’s Lady
Audley’s Secret as well (though it will serve as lynchpin of Robert’s case against his
antagonist). Here, Robert Audley, the amateur detective, remarks to his cousin upon
spying Lady Audley’s letter that: “I never believed in those fellows who ask you for
thirteen postage stamps, and offer to tell you what you have never been able to find out
for yourself; but upon my word I think that if I had never seen your aunt, I should know
what she was like by this slip of paper. Yes, here it all is—the feathery, gold-shot, flaxen
curls, the penciled eyebrows, the tiny straight nose, the winning childish smile, all to be
guessed in these few graceful up-strokes and down-strokes” (101). The graphological
depth of Robert’s interpretation transforms the letter into a living portrait, and reading
into a voyeuristic act.
17

In the Dreyfus case, Bertillon advanced a theory concerning the Dreyfus documents
that rivaled Gosse’s Omphalos hypothesis for sheer incontestable ingenuity. Bertillon
accused Dreyfus of “self-forgery,” testifying that Dreyfus had written in a style that
would resemble another writer’s forgery of his handwriting, retreating to the “citadel of
graphic rebuses” (Bredin 74) to which spies commonly fled.
18

Graphologists have often made the claim that the consideration of handwriting as
dating back as far as Aristotle, who notes the individuality of signs as shaped by their
particular signers in his “On Interpretation”: “Spoken words are the symbols of mental
experience, and written words the symbol of spoken words. Just as all men have not the
same speech sounds, so all men have not the same writing.” However, the quotation is a
fragment, and the remainder of Aristotle’s sentence clarifies the centripetal force of
Aristotle’s argument here, towards the universality of mental experience: “but the mental
experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things
of which our experiences are the images.” Aristotle does not go on to discuss the
significance of handwriting, choosing instead to move “inward” to the medium of
thought.
19

Phenomenology has manifest a persistent concern with the hand as the sign of
internality, individuality and authenticity. In Hegel’s Phenomenology, the idiosyncrasies
made manifest in one’s “particular style of ‘handwriting’” are seized upon as “an
expression of the inner.” Set “against the multifarious externality of action and fate, this
expression again stands in the position of simple externality, plays the part of an inner in
relation to the externality of action and fate.” (189). For Heidegger, “the typewriter veils
the essence of writing and of the script. It withdraws from man the essential rank of the
hand, without man’s experiencing this withdrawal appropriately and recognizing that it
has transformed the relation of Bring to his essence” (85).
20
21

On the significance of the counterfeit within the Gothic, see Hogle, “Frankenstein.”

Braddon acknowledges this challenge to the handwriting expert in Lady Audley’s
Secret. Helen tries to hide behind this fact: “A resemblance between the handwriting of
two women is no very uncommon circumstance now-a-days . . . I could show you the
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calligraphies of half-a-dozen of my female correspondents, and defy you to discover any
great differences in them” (286). Unfortunately for Helen, she does not fit this mold.
Neither seems to write “the usual womanly scrawl” (171).
22

Munby identifies John Thane’s British autography: a collection of fac-similes of the
handwriting of royal and illustrious personages, with their authentic portraits” of 1788
as the “first English book in which autographs were a major feature” (12). The book
featured 269 portraits, with each subject’s signature engraved at bottom. Munby notes
that Thane’s book “was much sought after and changed hands for as much as twenty-five
pounds” (12).
23

I borrow the term “Autograph-hunters” from Charles Robinson’s “Confessions of an
Autograph-Hunter.”
24

Upon arriving at the scene of the Carew murder, Utterson finds that his gift to Jekyll,
“a heavy cane” (46), has been used in the fatal assault (47).
25

This opportunity for “minute analysis” accounts for much of Walter Benjamin’s
fascination with graphology. Reading Benjamin’s “On the Mimetic Faculty” in the light
of his essay on the work of art, graphology emerges as a kind of proto-cinema. Just as
cinema examines a dimension of commonplace human movement and expression that is
entirely familiar to us, and yet essentially invisible to the naked eye (the camera
“introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses”
(237), graphology’s study of the body’s unconscious movements teaches us “to recognize
in handwriting images that the unconscious of the writer conceals in it” (335).
26

“Every designer and every painter reproduces himself, more or less, in his works; you
discover in them either something of his exterior or of his mind, as we shall presently
show…” (Lavater, v.4, 198).
27

For a comparable British example, see George Fielding Blandford’s Lectures on the
Treatment, Medical and Legal, of Insane Patients, delivered at the schools of St. George’s
Hospital and collected within Insanity and its Treatment (1886). See 351-356. See also:
Holt-Schooling, “The Handwriting of Mad People” (1896).
28

Melanie Klein’s “The Role of the School in the Libidinal Development of the Child”
(1923) examines this tendency for the body to insert itself into the handwriting of
schoolchildren. Klein’s particular interest has to do with the libidinal investment in
writing, how the act functions as a substitute for the act of coitus, and principally how the
‘I’ stands for the erect penis and the self-sufficient individual. Freud as well intuited the
libidinal charge of writing, an association that had to be repressed in order for writing to
proceed: “As soon as writing, which entails making a liquid flow out of a tube onto a
piece of white paper, assumes the significance of copulation, or as soon as walking
becomes a symbolic substitute for treading upon the body of mother earth, both writing
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and walking are stopped because they represent the performance of a forbidden sexual
act” (Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety 90).
29

Consulting the mirror, Jekyll finds that his entire body has been transformed overnight,
but his reference to the “Babylonian finger on the wall” at Belshazzar’s feast emphasizes
the disembodied hand while ushering readers into another scene of interpretation,
featuring writing that must be deciphered before the passing of judgment.
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Entranced:
Richard Marsh’s The Beetle and Literature of the Impressionable Mind
Published in 1897 and immediately enjoying a popularity that not even Bram Stoker’s
Dracula could rival, Richard Marsh’s The Beetle takes place in contemporary London,
where a hideous creature has arrived from Egypt to exact vengeance upon Paul
Lessingham, a respected British politician with whom the fiend shares a scandalous
history.1 Though our narrator innocently notes that Lessingham’s portfolio has never
included “Foreign Affairs,” the politician has found himself entangled in some
mysterious indiscretion, one of those “pages in the book of every man’s life […] which
he would wish to keep turned down” (121), to borrow Marsh’s turn of phrase. While
traveling in Egypt, Lessingham is lured into the Cult of Isis by the siren-song of a
beautiful woman. Drugged, seduced, and held captive in a “mesmeric stupor,” he is
forced to witness “orgies of nameless horrors” and sacrificial rites “too bizarre, too
hideous to be true.” Months pass before this dark cloud lifts, but at the first lapse of his
persecutor’s captivating influence, Lessingham breaks free of her clutches and flees to
England. However, what happens in Cairo does not stay in Cairo, and the scorned Beetle
descends upon London, exercising its hypnotic powers over each of our protagonists in
turn. These acts of possession carry a charge that is as much physically and sexually
invasive as it is psychic.
The Beetle’s erotic association with Lessingham is the inaugural event of Marsh’s
narrative, but long before we learn of this tryst, our first glimpse of the Beetle establishes
the polymorphous nature of its threat. This is how Robert Holt, the tale’s first victim,
describes his succumbing to the Beetle: “Fingers were pressed into my cheeks, they were
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thrust into my mouth, they touched my staring eyes, shut my eyelids, then opened them
again, and--horror of horrors!—the blubber lips were pressed to mine—the soul of
something evil entered into me in the guise of a kiss” (57, emphasis added). The horror of
the creature’s “kiss” has everything to do with surfaces yielding to pressure, the subject
giving in and giving way, its submission expressed through the continual “into” that
becomes the refrain of Holt’s account. Holt’s enthralling description of the assault is
characteristic of the novel in that it invites us to consider the homographic valences of
becoming “entranced.” The word is itself a double entrance, a single passage leading now
into one chamber and then into another. Perhaps these two destinations are so similar in
appearance that to distinguish between them—to insist, as our first narrator does, that
things are “the same, yet not the same” (60)—amounts to a kind of paranoia.2 Everything
seems to be in its proper place, and yet I falter under this slight vertigo of meaning. Such
reading betrays an excessive sensitivity resonating most sympathetically with the tightly
wound nerves of the novel’s most helpless victims. Our straining eyes begin to “see
double,” discerning difference where others observe only the placid consistency of an
unchanging world. The representational torsion generated by these two divergent
perspectives within “paranoid” gothic literature produces the doppelganger.
Within The Beetle, one could remark simply that the hypnotist entrances his
victim by finding an entrance where none was found before. The framework of the novel
could not highlight these concerns more explicitly. Its first two chapters, simply entitled
“Inside” and “Outside,” announce the passage from outside in as a crucial thematic
concern of the text’s troubled topography. Accordingly, Book One’s title, “The House
With the Open Window,” names the breach through which we follow Robert Holt, our
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first narrator, into the Beetle’s world. Holt considers the door, but decides instead upon
the “aperture” of a window, bypassing the accepted path, breaking and entering. This
unlawful trespass emblematizes Marsh’s narrative technique and prefigures his concern
with the permeability of private spaces and bodies. Exploiting the eye as the central locus
of his concern with the penetrability of bodies and the dissolution of subjects, Marsh
vividly imagines what Jonathan Crary has described as the “carnal density of vision.”3
We find in his novel a compelling depiction of the eye as an organ of exposed
vulnerability rather than veiled power. The baleful Beetle unleashes a range of menacing
trompe l’oeil techniques (from mesmeric trance to optical illusions to cross-dressing) that
form the novel’s central tableaux. If the objective reality of these spectacles is
questionable, their subjective and intensive power is unmistakable. In Marsh’s novel,
visual apprehension occurs not as the benign reception of information, but as a visceral
threat that jeopardizes the coherence and autonomy of the subject.
For its thematic exploitation of such indeterminacy between the self and its
others, the Gothic has often been acknowledged as a paradox of genre, the category of the
uncategorizable. Kelly Hurley’s The Gothic Body: Sexuality, Materialism, and
Degeneration at the Fin-de-Siècle understands as the fundamental spectacle of Gothic
narrative this representation “of the human subject undergoing dissolution,” a prospect
that triggers hysterical anxiety in Sartre’s analysis, repression and denial in Freud’s, and
abjection in Kristeva’s. Hurley’s work aligns itself most closely with Kristeva, exploring
the jouissance provoked by these “abhuman” bodies, and anticipating the promise they
hold “of a monstrous becoming” (4). The abject threatens to break down the constitutive
boundaries of the subject, and this dizzying indeterminacy of one’s selfhood plunges the
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“I,” the pillar of the symbolic, “toward the place where meaning collapses” (Powers 2).
Gothic literature conventionally induces this collapse through creatures such as the
Beetle; figures too unstable to explicitly “symbolize” any one threat in particular, these
monstrous demonstrations disrupt economies of representation. Marsh’s characterization
of this extraordinary being—an insect-humanoid, neither male nor female—has prompted
critics to read the novel as a perpetually anxious text, the portentous symptom of a
blighted cultural uncanny. Judith Halberstam’s Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the
Technology of Monsters explores how the Gothic grants thought (for Halberstam,
principally anxious thought) a body, making it multiple, visceral, and hideous. Figures
such as Frankenstein’s monster and Dracula’s vampire are overdetermined signifiers of
abjection, Gordian knots tied so that they cannot be undone through any particular
reading. Halberstam contends that in “any attempt to fix monstrosity, some aspect of it
escapes unread” (29).
It is this ambivalence of the text that allows Hurley to attribute the Beetle’s
origins in the Egyptian Cult of Isis to the repressed materials of an imperial unconscious,
remarking that The Beetle “serves to reflect and feed into British suspicion of and
contempt for Egyptians during a period of heightened British military activity in Egypt”
(127). The creature accommodates as well Roger Luckhurst’s understanding of the novel
as “a somewhat normative allegory of the fantastic dangers of miscegenation and prenuptial sex, exploiting the syphilitic dangers broadcast by social purity campaigners”
(162). In his introduction to The Beetle (2004), Julian Wolfreys provides a thorough
review of the text’s surprisingly modest critical reception, giving a general account of the
confusions of race, species, gender, and sexuality roused by the monster and claiming
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that, in the end, its “body is grotesque because it is unstable, excessive, ambiguously
traced by so many fragments of identity” (19).4 Wolfreys’ survey exhibits a number of
these very compelling cases made for the Beetle as an embodiment of the Freudian
“return of the repressed.” Incorporating as it does so many abjected materials, the
abhorrent body of the Beetle becomes legible as a material index of fin-de-siècle cultural
concerns. Understandably, critical response has been singularly drawn to this captivating
figure. However, my own analysis departs from this approach in turning to the other
(perhaps initially less conspicuous) bodies that populate the text. These permeable bodies
and “impressionable minds” bear the physical imprint of the text upon themselves, and
struggle to transmit the import and impact of their experience.
This chapter explores trance-literature through its persistent evocation of the
“impressionable mind,” a trope that submits writing as a privileged figure for the
subject's permeability. Marsh’s association of hypnosis with photography impels us to
consider the contemporaneous development of “the negative” within photographic and
psychoanalytic discourse. The traffic between these two registers allows Freud to remark
that the unconscious resembles “a photographic apparatus” (Interpretation 574), while
Oliver Wendell Holmes speaks of the camera as a “mirror with memory” and a
“conscience” (“Stereoscope” 741). Freud’s analogy recognizes the inscribed character of
the subject, while Holmes’ imagines the subjective nature of the scriptural. Within The
Beetle, this chiasmus is mapped out along the lines of optical relations. The mechanics of
photography allow for a reflexive understanding of the gaze that engenders the
subjectivity of objects and the objectification of viewing subjects. This inverted gaze
accentuates the vulnerability of perception as permeability, and haunts realism with the
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intimation that its “look” may fail to guarantee the dominance of the subject thereby
enlightened.

Vital Signs: Photography and the Gothic
The fundamental challenge posed by the Gothic to modern understandings of inscription
derives from the genre’s uncanny belief in the transubstantiation of signs and bodies,
whereby the word is made flesh, and the flesh is “made word.” We will address each of
these conversions in turn. The first, and more familiarly gothic trajectory is manifest
within Marsh’s novel through the monster itself, whose affiliation with the idolatrous cult
of Isis endows her with the power to animate signs. The superstitious veneration of
symbols displayed by the Egyptian cult amounts to a colonialist update of the threat of
Catholic iconophilia, a further disavowal of “the darkest age of Christianity” referenced
within Horace Walpole’s preface to his seminal gothic novel The Castle of Otranto (59).
The larval process of metamorphosis undergone by Beetles emblematizes the fluid
transformation of substances just as ably as the liquid process of photography.5 Notably,
much of the creature’s horror derives from its uncanny aesthetic productions. From
weaving to photogravure, the Beetle produces living texts that trigger a distressing
ontological confusion by exhibiting the same fluid relation between signs and things
themselves.
Marsh’s novel presents us with a familiar instance of this gothic confusion when,
investigating the Beetle’s residence, Lessingham’s fiancée Marjorie Lindon realizes the
carpet upon which she is standing is either embroidered or infested with insects: “The
artist had woven his undesirable subject into the warp and woof of the material with such
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cunning skill that, as one continued to gaze, one began to wonder if by any possibility the
creatures could be alive.” Marjorie’s attention is drawn next to a bundle of carpets, one of
which has been adorned with the representation of a human sacrifice. Of the “naked
white woman being burned” upon the altar, she remarks, “[t]here could be no doubt as to
her being alive” (230). This body contorts itself “into shapes which were horribly
suggestive of the agony which she was enduring,” convincing Marjorie that “the artist . . .
seemed to have exhausted his powers in his efforts to convey a vivid impression of the
pains which were tormenting her.” For Marjorie, the scene presents “as ghastly a piece of
realism as one could see” (230). Though the content of the image depicted in such an
unflinching manner may be upsetting in itself, it is something else that makes the realism
of this scene so haunting. A revival of the living tapestry convention we find in Otranto
and other early Gothic novels, the image is beyond lifelike; impossibly, it is itself
animate, literally swarming with life. Such “ghastly” representations stage the collapse of
realism by pushing it beyond the limits of resemblance, thereby refusing the abdication of
realism to the ever-receding horizon of the real. When representation fails to keep its
respectful distance through the disclaimers of fiction and the restraint of figure, it
becomes gothic.
What is perhaps more surprising is the way in which modern technologies push
Marsh’s narrative in this gothic direction as well; through indexical replication, the
“exact reproduction” becomes too real. Walter Benjamin touches upon this
technologically-induced enchantment in his “Short History of Photography,” where he
remarks: “the most precise technology can give its products a magical value” (243). The
monster’s calling card, which features an image of an uncommon species of Beetle
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“produced apparently by some process of photogravure,” is so startlingly vibrant that a
mere “glance” sends Paul Lessingham into fits: “As he did so, something surprising
occurred. On the instant a look came on to his face which, literally, transfigured him”
(114). Even Atherton, the novel’s most resolutely skeptical character, finds that “the
whole thing was so dexterously done that the creature seemed alive. The semblance of
reality was, indeed, so vivid that it needed a second glance to be assured that it was a
mere trick of the reproducer” (115). Such nervous fascination with contemporary
technology reminds us that the untimeliness of gothic poesis cannot be restricted to
antiquated techniques and archaic understandings of signification. Furthermore, Marsh’s
enlistment of this contemporary technology not only “updates” the gothic trope of the
living sign, but suggests a reversal of its orientation, towards realism rather than romance.
This reorientation allows the “techno-gothic” mode to address the idolatry of modern
visual culture. Lessingham’s “transfiguration” suggests that the modern subject is
transformed in the act of looking. His body is drawn into a field of vision where signs are
imbued with life, and living bodies are apprehended as signs.
The occult powers of photography are broadly attested to within nineteenthcentury literature. Indeed, in Alison Chapman’s reading, “early photography was often
seen not as analogous to mesmerism, but one and the same operation” (“Ghost” 67). The
crucial difference to be marked with Marsh’s text, however, is that it disturbs the
common alignment of mesmerist with photographer to be found within texts such as
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House of Seven Gables (in the character of Holgrave), Robert
Browning’s “Mesmerism,” and George du Maurier’s Trilby. In each of these texts, the
intensity of concentration involved in “fixing” the photograph’s subject is imagined as a
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sadistic procedure, while Marsh depicts the photographic observer as passive, even
masochistic. For if the “stillness of the photographic sitter” renders him “conducive to
trance,” so too does the receptive stance of the viewer. Just as Stevenson tells us of Hyde,
Marsh’s Beetle has “never been photographed” (JH 49), unless one counts the indelible
images lodged within the minds of his witnesses.6 In their attempts at visual
apprehension, Marsh’s protagonists repeatedly turn to photographic apparatuses.
However, rather than functioning as the instruments of uncanny power that we see
elsewhere in other photographic Gothic fiction, they serve as emblems of a traumatic and
ineffable sensitivity to the external world.
The most striking incidence of this photographic receptivity occurs during Sydney
Atherton’s first encounter with the Beetle. Atherton writes: “I kept my glance riveted on
the creature, with the idea of photographing it on my brain. I believe that if it were
possible to take a retinal print—which some day it will be—you would have a perfect
picture of what it was I saw” (150). With these curious words, the reader is conducted
into one of The Beetle’s most climactic moments, in which the mysterious creature at last
reveals him—or her, or it—self to our narrator. The scene treats readers to not one but
two metamorphoses. There is, of course, the emergence of Atherton’s antagonist from his
“loose draperies,” revealing a golden-green creature “six or seven inches high, and about
a foot in length” (150). But in the midst of this mutation comes another just as startling.
Before the reader stands Atherton, and we watch him transform himself—through a
technological fantasy that enframes the gothic nightmare—into a photographic machine.
Marsh’s peculiar hero is a narrator less inclined to write than to be written upon.
Departing from descriptive narrative techniques, he appeals to his own body as an archive
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of the event. Yielding his “brain” and retina to the Beetle, he will passively receive the
imprint of the scene upon himself. In this way, the text orchestrates an ekphrastic relation
to its secret, making of the novel a caption read underneath a photograph yet to be
developed.
Atherton’s invocation of this visual index would seem here to privilege
photographic substantiation over the testimony of language, but for Marsh’s characters
the appeal of the photographic metaphor lies not merely in the new model of writing it
presents, but in the way the photographic process embodies a familiar sensation of being
written. It is not the stylus, but the surface of inscription that these characters identify
themselves with. It is this strange affinity that prompts the conversation between
novelistic and photographic method beyond consideration of the mimetic possibilities of
aesthetic forms, to consider changes in the subject of representation itself. How is it,
Marsh asks, that we are stared back at by the world, and altered by our own instruments
of perception?
It is Lacan who provides us with the most sustained theoretical attempt at
grappling with these paradoxes of vision. Though psychoanalysis and the Gothic have
enjoyed a long and fruitful conversation, the prevailing tenor and atmosphere of Lacan’s
lectures and writings has generally proven less hospitable to ghost stories than Freud’s
corpus, which seems most at home when drifting through dream-states inhabited by
sinister shadows and menacing doubles. However, Lacan’s discussion of the gaze draws
upon imagery ranging from the surreal (the can of sardines that devours him with its
sunlit glint) to the gothic (the anamorphically distorted skull in Hans Holbein’s
Ambassadors).7 Lacan’s reference to the gaze in his first reading seminar (Freud’s
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Papers on Technique) presents us with a kind of “haunted” house, the darkened window
of which bears a distinct resemblance to the “aperture” that marks our entrance into
Marsh’s narrative. Lacan writes: “I can feel myself under the gaze of someone whose
eyes I do not see, not even discern. All that is necessary is for something to signify to me
that there may be others there. This window, if it gets a bit dark, and if I have reasons for
thinking that there is someone behind it, is straight-away a gaze” (215). And here is the
destitute Robert Holt, the Beetle’s first victim, standing outside the villain’s house on a
cold and rainy night: “I saw the open window. I stared at it, conscious, as I did so, of a
curious catching of the breath. It was so near to me; so very near. I had but to stretch out
my hand to thrust it through the aperture” (49). Once inside this darkened window,
however, Holt begins dimly to apprehend his mistake:
I became, on a sudden, aware, that something was with me in the room. There
was nothing, ostensible, to lead me to such a conviction; it may be that my
faculties were unnaturally keen; but, all at once, I knew that there was something
there. What was more, I had a horrible persuasion that, though unseeing, I was
seen; that my every movement was being watched. (49, emphasis added)
By unlinking eye and gaze, Lacanian optics proposes a counter-intuitive reversal that
discards commonsensical certainties concerning the presumed activity of the viewer and
the passivity of the viewed: “in the scopic field, everything is articulated between two
terms that act in an antinomic way—on the side of things, there is the gaze, that is to say,
things look at me, and yet I see them” (Fundamental 109). Lacan is attracted to the
paradoxical notion that the eye itself has become the blind spot of the subject, and
functions less as the instrument of vision than that of its censorship. Fixation on the eye
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enacts a critical displacement within the field of visuality that grants priority to the “I.”
This orientation schematizes vision according to the dictates of the imaginary, an
ordering of perspective dedicated to the erection and orthopedic support of the subject.
Lacan rejects this emphasis, reconfiguring the coordinates of the gaze to shift attention to
the seemingly subordinate principle of the objective gaze, the real upon which the
imaginary order is grounded. In doing so, his concept denies any simple equivalence of
vision with power. Surveillance of the world is no guarantee of the subject’s dominance.
Lacan’s preferred visual trope for this reversal is the trompe l’oeil, the painting that lures
its viewer into the frame with the promise of a certain perspectival order, only to collapse
this order in upon the subject. This “trick” of the image is withheld until the viewer hits
his or her mark, ensnared in the netting of the field of vision. Every picture, Lacan warns
us, is such a trap.
This is also the case within the darkened windows of Lacan and Marsh: the
intensity and concentration of the subject’s look results not in stricter control of the
objects he examines, but in a paradoxical submission to these objects of perception. Our
bodies become, in Lacan’s words, “photo-sensitive” (Fundamental 94). The longer one
stares into the darkness, the deeper and wider it spreads, as its shadows come to life. The
state of the body while under hypnosis provides a direct illustration of this point. When in
a deep hypnotic trance, the subject’s pupils dilate, and tend to remain in this receptive
condition, even when a bright light is shone into them.8 It is in this posture of openness
and impressionability that we are “photo-graphed” by the objects we view (Fundamental
106). It should come as no surprise that Lacan imagines the gaze in such photographic
terms. It is not that photography merely provides an available analogy for the
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unconscious. Rather, this technology makes the unconscious available. Without
attributing the “discovery” of the unconscious exclusively to technology, we can say that
it facilitated a new way of articulating and “imaging” the subject by giving concrete,
objective expression to invisible internal psycho-physiological processes.
The conjoined history of photography and of the subject demonstrates Lacan’s
assertion that “the slightest alteration in the relation between men and the signifier . . .
changes the whole course of history by modifying the moorings that anchor his being”
(Ecrits 174). The gaze is not intrinsic to the subject, but arises in large part through
technologies that broker the prosthetic invention of the human. Borrowing from
photography, psychoanalysis and the Gothic account for this reciprocal influence of the
visual relation, and point to the possibility of an inverted optics that charts the changes in
the subject of representation brought about through the act of looking.
Typically, discussion of photography within Victorian culture pointedly turned
away from this photographing subject, insisting that the significant work of photography
was performed by the machine and not the operator. Among photography’s creators,
much of the rhetoric enframing photographic “description” tended to emphasize the way
in which the automatic processes of the apparatus sidelined the photographer, eliminating
the subjective element of previous strategies of depiction. From one point of view, the
camera presented a model of vision decoupled from the body, introducing an objective
mechanical eye that corrected subjective human error. Early photography texts such as
Philip Henry Delamotte’s The Sunbeam (1859) and Marcus Aurelius Root’s The Camera
and the Pencil (1864) stress the primacy of nature’s inscriptions. Likewise, Oliver
Wendell Holmes’ “Doings of the Sunbeam” (1863) solicits the photographer’s humility
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in the face of nature’s powers. Outlining the detailed process of making photographs, he
intermittently pauses to check the presumptions of his own language: “while we make a
photograph,—say, rather, while the mysterious forces which we place in condition to act
work that miracle for us” (3). William H. Fox Talbot, who patented the calotype (or
talbotype) process and determined a method for the development of multiple prints from
a photographic negative, insists on this deferral of authorship as well, conceiving of the
photographic process as one through which the object composes its own self-portrait. In
“Some Account of the Art of Photogenic Drawing,” presented to the Royal Society in
1839, he describes his photograph of Lacock Abbey in such terms: “this building I
believe to be the first that was ever yet known to have drawn its own picture” (46).
Talbot’s The Pencil of Nature (1844), touted in its 1969 reprinting as the Gutenberg
Bible of the photographic age, was the first book to be illustrated with mass-produced
photographs, images derived from his calotype process. Talbot prefaces this work with a
“Note to the Reader” informing his audience that the following plates have been
“impressed by the agency of Light alone, without any aid whatever from the artist’s
pencil” (n. pag).9 If the artist has refrained from tampering with the images themselves,
his pencil has been doubly occupied in delineating the discursive support framing
precisely what it was his viewers were intended to see. The true artistry of Holmes and
Talbot emerges in their pivotal roles in promulgating the mythology of photography as a
distinct language affording privileged access to things in themselves.
Certainly, many of Talbot’s contemporaries resisted this myth, maintaining that
even a “senseless machine” such as the camera could produce representations in which
one can “clearly perceive a human mind at work” (103 Sizeranne). Sir William de
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Wivelesley Abney, three-time President of the Royal Photographic Society and editor of
the Journal of the Photographic Society from 1881 to 1894, concedes that photography
“can be, and very often is, a purely mechanical production” (303). However, he maintains
that many photographs obtain to his criteria for works of art; these are “productions of the
hand” in which “we can see an impress of the mind” (303). Traces such as these were
persistently invoked in the defence of photography’s status as Art.10 Participating in an
1899 Magazine of Art symposium organized around the question “Is Photography Among
the Fine Arts,” Robert de la Sizeranne emphasizes the photographer’s “interventions” in
the process—from composition to developing to printing—in order to demonstrate the
means by which the artist “impresses his personality so strongly on the operations that the
result is completely transfigured” (103). These impressions are evidence of the creative
mind exercising its “will to art” upon a malleable reality. Within critical discussion of
photography, the question as to whether it is the subject or the object that writes has
remained an insistent problem. Recent attempts at tackling the issue of photographic
agency have tended to insist on photography’s art (or artifice), though the prevalent tone
has shifted from celebration of the artistic impulse to a more skeptical, iconoclastic
account of how discourse frames its object. “When we press the button of a camera,”
argues Walter Benn Michaels, “we are writing” (222). This “writing” translates physical,
indexical marks into symbolic signs, prompting the dutiful poststructural installation of
scare quotes around “the world” and scuttling myths of transparency with the opacity of
semiotics. We make photographs when we “take” photographs (Lewis 5); the marks that
emerge are indices of reality’s production, not its retrieval.
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Such are the questions that realism and its critique make possible. However,
within the bounds of this questioning, the subject all too commonly escapes interrogation
by posing as the a priori of representation.11 The camera cannot merely be considered as
another tool at the disposal of a relatively stable viewing subject, endowed with an everwidening arsenal of representational techniques to choose from. For the tool brings about
not only the extension of the subject (through the colonization or domestication of the
perceptible world), but its metamorphosis as well. Consequently, genealogies of media
cannot credibly organize their evolution of forms along the lines of a presumed shared
genus, naming for instance the camera obscura as the primogenitor of the daguerrotype,
which in its turn begat the cinema. This history of progressive invention obscures the
true, miscegenous nature of machine and human lineage, a shared evolution that proceeds
not along parallel lines, but as the double helix of a shared DNA strand.
It is chiefly through Atherton’s imperious attitude toward science that Marsh’s
text represents human resistance to such technological implantations. Atherton’s
distinctly colonial understanding of technology imagines his inventions as extensions of
the body and instruments of British imperialism. Indeed, the patent for his “System of
Telegraphy at Sea” has just been purchased by the Admiralty (109). Atherton uses
technology as weaponry; he is always at work on “new projectile[s]” (109) that assert his
dominance, and that of the British empire. In a manner highly reminiscent of the contest
staged between Dracula and Stoker’s techno-savvy Crew of Light, Atherton’s powers as
an inventor are explicitly pitted against the Beetle’s magic. In his second confrontation
with the Beetle, Atherton rehearses an old chestnut of techno-colonialism, terrorizing his
visitor with “a little exhibition of electricity” and a demonstration of the combustible
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properties of phosphorus bromide. These displays of superior modern “firepower” leave
the Beetle “prostrated on his knees,” and “salaaming in a condition of abject terror”
(145). “My lord! my lord!” the creature whimpers, “I entreat you, my lord to use me as
your slave!” (145). Exploiting the “shock and awe” that advanced technology instills
within all such supposedly credulous and superstitious ethnic creatures, Atherton’s
technological mastery countermands the Beetle’s insubordinate position.
What is it then that prevents Marsh from employing a camera to similar ends,
granting Atherton visual dominion over the Beetle by “capturing” it photographically?
Historically speaking, the camera would have long been available to Marsh; other
novelists had put the machine to use in their narratives. In the same year as The Beetle’s
publication, for instance, Stoker will provide Jonathan Harker with a Kodak camera (54),
allowing him to chart out a photographic map of Count Dracula’s Carfax estate.
However, for all of its photographic reflections on vision and memory, there are no
cameras in The Beetle. They make no objective appearance within the novel’s mise-enscene, existing only within the minds and bodies of characters. Photography manifests
itself not as a technology but as a quality of feeling, and an embodied metaphor for the
impact of experience. Producing the latent print lodged within Atherton’s retina, it is an
impression, rather than a means of expression available to Marsh’s characters.
Robert Holt, the novel’s first hapless victim, imagines his psyche as a
photographic surface as well. When he first finds himself outside of the Beetle’s
residence, his perception takes in the scene with the startling precision of a camera-eye:
“I realised, and, so to speak, mentally photographed all the little details of the house. An
instant before, the world swam before my eyes. Now I saw everything, with a clearness
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which, as it were, was shocking” (47).12 Holt’s “so to speak” brackets his expression as a
figure of speech, subordinating photography to language as merely one of many
analogies at its disposal. And yet, before long, this analogy has turned on Holt, as the
photographic capacity of the psyche comes to illustrate not his determined will-toperceive, but a helpless inability not to see. Holt finds that under the Beetle’s trance,
“every detail of my involuntary actions was projected upon my brain in a series of
pictures, whose clear-cut outlines, so long as memory endures, will never fade” (71).
This internalized camera cannot be brandished as a weapon, or bandied about like
the auxiliary phallus so clearly envisioned by McLuhan when he subtitles Understanding
Media “Extensions of Man.” Though the notion of a photographic memory commonly
signifies a clarity of visual recollection that allows for startlingly objective control over
past impressions, Holt finds to his dismay that one does not possess this ability so much
as one is possessed by it. The Beetle coaxes us out of the bounds of realism by
internalizing the terms of the photographic analogy. Marsh’s writing experiment is not
merely a remediation of the novel through the camera, nor are his narrators simply
writers who fantasize about being photographers. In a much more integral sense, they
dream of becoming photographic.
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FIGURE 3.1
“Elephans Photographicus.” From Punch 44 (1863): 249.
A satirical Punch illustration published in 1863 offers a glimpse of such a
becoming in its depiction of the “Elephans Photographicus.” While this “Curious
Animal” will most likely be unfamiliar to a twenty-first century audience, its descendents
can today be observed, among other habitats, in the films of Terry Gilliam and Tim
Burton. In films such as Brazil and Sleepy Hollow, the act of looking—extended and
retooled through ocular prosthetics—transforms the seer. Through such surreal bodies a
certain technique of visualization becomes itself visible, as we find ourselves looking
through the magnifying glass from the other side at the contorted gaze of prying eyes,
subject to effects of distortion that range from the ridiculous to the grotesque.
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In the Punch cartoon as well, the purportedly disinterested gaze of realism
facilitated by the camera eye becomes monstrous. The photographer’s head has been
swallowed up by the hood of the camera, locked into its Cyclops-eye through a process of
prosthetic fusion. The unsettling insectoid features of this strange beast, including its
delicate segmented forelegs, would almost seem to nominate the human-machine-insect
hybrid as an imaginative condensation of the Beetle’s twin metamorphoses. Beyond this
striking homeomorphic identification, however, the image fittingly illustrates Marsh’s
novel in its depiction of the fixation of the operator’s gaze. It suggests that, as irrevocably
as the subject of any photograph, the operator is fixed, or stuck in position (that of taking
the photograph), in her own way captured by the camera eye. Resisting alignment with
the photographer’s perspective, the Punch cartoon reverses the gaze to suggest that
photography’s true impact has less to do with the evolution of representational techniques
than with the metamorphosis of the human body as a “viewing machine.”

“Everything is just as wrong as it can be”: The Development of the Negative
If photography facilitated a new photographic understanding of the human body, the
daguerrotype was hardly the first optical instrument to inspire analogies with the
physiology and psychology of human vision. The camera obscura had long been utilized
as an illustration of the workings of the eye and mind, our internalized darkened
chambers. In the seventeenth century Johannes Kepler, the German astronomer
responsible for coining the term “camera obscura,” used the mechanism to illustrate “how
an infinity of rays from each point in the visual field is drawn into a coherent, point-topoint correspondence in the eye.” Kepler argued that, like the convex glass lens of the
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camera, the eye’s crystalline lens and cornea refract and refocus incoming rays. These
rays are received upon the “plate” or “canvas” of the retina (Lindberg 7).
The camera obscura operated upon a relatively simple optical principle deduced
by the ancient Greeks: that the passage of light through a small aperture into a darkened
chamber will project an inverted image on any surface facing the aperture. To find the
first comprehensive scientific description of the camera obscura, our investigation returns
to Cairo. It is here that the Arabian astronomer and mathematician Ibn al-Haytham (9651039) conducted a series of experiments that convinced him of the fallacy of the ancient
Greek hypothesis that the eye scanned objects by sending out tractor rays to apprehend
the image. Rather, al-Haytham argued that images were impressed upon the anterior wall
of the eye through light reflected into the eye, by a process that came to be modeled by
the camera obscura’s darkened room.
Stationed inside this chamber that essentially functioned as a giant eyeball, men
of art and science cast themselves into a mise-en-abime of the optical situation. The
darkness of the room—this eye within an eye—established a private space of
contemplation. The occupants of the camera obscura were not shackled like the slaves of
Plato’s allegory, but entered the cave to see more clearly the exterior world. The use of
the camera obscura in solar observation provides the most straightforward enactment of
this logic, allowing as it does the astronomer to circumvent the paradox (the painful
ramifications of which were explored by scientists such as Joseph Plateau) that one
cannot see the sun as long as one is looking at it.13
Jonathan Crary speaks succinctly about the “operation of individuation” carried
out by the camera obscura, exploring the manner in which this device facilitated the
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definition of “an observer as isolated, enclosed, or autonomous within its dark confines”
(29). The mechanism requires
askesis, or withdrawal from the world, in order to regulate and purify one's
relation to the manifold contents of the now ‘exterior’ world. Thus the camera
obscura is inseparable from a certain metaphysic of interiority: it is a figure for
both the observer who is nominally a free sovereign individual and a privatised
subject confined in a quasi-domestic space, cut off from a public exterior world.
(29)
Inside this temple of the eye, the observer found sanctuary from the troubled dynamic of
visual experience. Now one could see without being seen, without being “touched”
by the things one viewed.
The essential innovation of the photographic negative is that this surface
apprehends not only the projection of light (as had the camera obscura), but also its
inscriptive powers. These two distinct functions correspond to the paradigmatic shift that
Crary identifies between the geometrical understanding of optics in circulation
throughout the eighteenth century and the physiological theories that dominated
nineteenth-century research on the topic. As a technology of visualization, the
photograph embodies this new way of understanding the phenomenology of vision. The
camera obscura had literally removed the body from the field of vision so that it could
organize objects in space by way of abstract geometries. Conversely, the seat of vision in
photographic visuality is materially present to the objects it sees. Perceived affinities
between photographic and human perception engender a new observer, one whose body
is marked by the irreducibly physical acts of “exposure” and incorporation that are the
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prerequisites of vision. This exposure of the body gives rise to what Steven Shaviro has
described as “a new regime of the image, one in which vision is visceral and intensive,
instead of representational and extensive.” (139). This subject experiences vision in a
manner that would later be theorized by Maurice Merleau-Ponty as “palpation of the eye”
(“Intertwining” 251-252), a cross-examination that entwines seer and seen in a visceral
chiasmus. Marsh’s narrative helps us to imagine this “carnal density of vision” (Crary
150), as his characters strain to grant expression to the palpable and traumatic experience
of seeing.14 Scenes such as Holt’s initial victimization communicate the equivocal nature
of photographic capture, a process whereby the world acts upon viewers with or without
their consent, imprinting indelible images upon bodies that emulate the responsive
passivity of the index.
This automatic writing, which proceeds without the inclination of the subject,
challenges the integrity and autonomy of the subject’s interior life. The photographic
method bars the subject from the process of inscription; the images that emerge from the
negative are but the traces of prior writings that she has no “hand” in. The primary shift
to be recognized within the passage to photography is the movement it effectuates from a
Cartesian model of consciousness (enframed within the camera obscura), to a model of
the unconscious (embodied in the “negative”). The photographic process passes through a
twilight zone that lengthens the shadow cast by the term “negative,” accentuating the
darker nuances of the word.15 John Abbott, writing for Harper’s New Monthly Magazine
in 1870, would address this issue these connotations in his piece on “The Negative in
Photography”:
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The word negative, which the photographer applies to the first image which he
obtains of the subject, whatever it may be, that he is to photograph, is rather a
misnomer, inasmuch as the properties which characterize it, though striking and
peculiar, do not seem very clearly to involve any idea of negation. If it had been
called the reverse, instead of the negative, its name would have been perhaps
more suggestive of its character. But the name negative is established, and must
stand. (845)
Abbott objects to this name, because it is not in accordance with his vision of
photography that its processes should be carried out under the sign of negativity. And yet,
he acknowledges that his own “positive” image of the art will always be underwritten by
the priority of this “misnomer’s” indelible trace. “The name negative is established, and
must stand,” Abbott concludes. This false name will always cast its shadow over any true
name given to photography.
If Abbott resists this undercurrent of negativity, Oliver Wendell Holmes exploits
it with relish. In Holmes’ view, the photographic negative is “perverse and totally
depraved . . . it might almost seem as if some magic and diabolic power had wrenched all
things from their proprieties, where the light of the eye was darkness, and the deepest
blackness was glided with the brightest glare” (“Stereoscope” 740). In Holmes’s writing,
the negative emerges as a world of perversion in need of redemption: “the glass plate has
the right part of the object on the left side of its picture, and the left part on its right side;
its light is darkness, and its darkness is light. Everything is just as wrong as it can be,
except that the relations of each wrong to the other wrongs are like the relations of the
corresponding rights to each other in the original natural image. This is a negative
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picture” (740-741). This darkness, however, is to serve as a prelude to a functional
dialectic of photo-synthesis (if I may be permitted to play along with Holmes’s rhetoric).
Holmes declares: “This negative is now to give birth to a positive,—this mass of
contradictions to assert its hidden truth in a perfect harmonious affirmation of the realities
of Nature. Behold the process!” (741). In his own exploration of the kinship between
camera and psyche, however, Freud maintains the persistence of unconscious remainders.
“Not every negative,” he reminds us, “necessarily becomes a positive; nor is it necessary
that every unconscious mental process should turn into a conscious one” (Introductory
Lectures 365). Freud employs the photographic analogy to demonstrate the “negative”
dialectic of the psyche, a darkroom littered with the unprocessed materials that form the
ground of the unconscious.16 This photographic negative, embedded within a body
waiting to be processed, emerges as a fitting emblem for Gothic writing. It develops the
genre’s tropes of haunted writing in the latency of the image and the automation of its
inscription, an invisible presence that endures as the trace of a prior writing.
Nearly twenty years before Freud, Joseph Mortimer Granville had opened his
discussion of photographic memory with the suggestion that the “subconsciousness”
might be structured like a camera.17 In an 1879 article for The Lancet, Granville asserts
that, “although the brain is undoubtedly capable of a process analogous to instantaneous
photographing, it rarely performs this function at the behest of the will” (458). “The
natural and only true basis of memory,” for Granville, “is a well-formed impression. It is
not essential that the impression should be fully understood at the time it is made” (459).
The imposition of memories upon a subject is non-consensual, a relation of force rather
than knowledge. Granville characterizes this automatic “storing of impressions” as a form
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of “instantaneous mental photography,” a faculty that is “more commonly the agent of
the subconsciousness than of the supreme consciousness” (458). This recalcitrant,
subterranean machine “takes in the impressions we would gladly have effaced, while
those it is desired to retain are obliterated almost as soon as they are registered” (458).
The essay’s title, “Ways of Remembering,” indicates its instructional tone, and
Granville’s advice in the cultivation of mnemonic techniques strives toward the
integration of understanding and memory. However, he describes the relationship
between these two functions of the mind as amounting “almost [to] antagonism,”
remarking that, for many, the faculty of apprehension is developed “at the cost of that of
mental registration or memory,” while, on the other hand, “idiots have often
extraordinary powers of retention and recollection” (458). Stimuli make the most
profound impression on bodies that fail to understand what they have experienced. The
strength of the “idiot mind” lies precisely in its weakness. It is impressionable in more
than a figural sense: easily influenced because lacking powers of discrimination, but also
possessing receptive capacities unattainable to the hardened wax of a more judicious,
critical mind.
Marsh’s novel is similarly concerned with the possibility that different bodies are
differently susceptible to external impressions. Unsurprisingly, gender is put forward as a
crucial criterion of impressionability, though Holt’s experience suggests that one’s
vocation and habits of writing may have detrimental effects as well. In an amusing turn of
phrase, Sydney Atherton describes Holt as a “quilldriver,” a vernacular term that Francis
Grose’s Dictionary of The Vulgar Tongue (1811) defines as “a clerk, scribe, or hackney
writer.” The last of these epithets for “inferior” classes of writers is the namesake of the
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Hackney coach-for-hire. The implied analogy suggests that this kind of “mindless
paperwork” is a task intended for bureaucratic beasts, bearing an informational burden
not their own. Wolfreys’ edition of The Beetle suggests the “pen-pusher” as an equivalent
term within contemporary idiom, and the more familiar connotations of this modern
expression of alienated labour also help illuminate those of the former. A contemporary
of the “typewriter girl,” Holt has long been trained to “take dictation,” and it is no doubt
this former experience that renders Holt most suggestible to the dictates of the Beetle.
Marsh devotes no small amount of energy to delineating the relative
impressionability of each of his characters, but even Paul Lessingham, whose
“impenetrability is proverbial” (75), nonetheless finds that the name of “Rue de
Rabagas,” the “dirty street” upon which he first met the Beetle, “has left an impress on
the tablets of my memory which is never likely to be obliterated” (238).18 All of Marsh’s
characters possess an unusually acute sense of the physicality and the traumatic force of
word and thought. Sydney, witnessing the Beetle’s fierce expression of hatred for
Lessingham, remarks that he “should hardly have been surprised if the mere utterance of
the words had seared his lips” (143). Robert Holt describes the Beetle’s tone as
containing “a mixture of mockery and bitterness, as if he wished his words to have the
effect of corrosive sublimate, and to sear me as he uttered them” (65). Moments later, the
Beetle’s purported wish begins to make its effect felt, and Robert struggles to explain
how the creature’s “sentences, in some strange, indescribable way, seemed, as they came
from his lips, to warp my limbs; to enwrap themselves about me; to confine me, tighter
and tighter, within” (66). It can hardly matter that, on a rational level, Holt remains
unconvinced by the creature’s “wild and wanton” words (66). They nonetheless perform
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their incontrovertible work directly upon his body, circumventing the mind to orchestrate
immediate and visceral communication between “lips” and “limbs.”

The Optogram: “Fleshing Out” the Negative
The traumatic dimension of this inscriptive memory is expressed vividly in the “urban
legend” of the optogram. This optical phenomenon—unauthenticated, yet unremitting—
is defined in Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) as “An image of external
objects fixed on the retina by the photochemical action of light on the visual purple.”
C.M. Archer’s fourth installment of “The Anecdote History of Photography” for
Recreative Science (1861) stands as one of the first attempts to gather evidence
supporting this theory. Archer’s article devotes itself to a survey of materials that have
been sensitized to receive photographic impressions. His overview considers the
treatment of wood, marble, lithographic stone, and concludes with “The Human Eye and
Its Similarity to the Photographic Camera.” This final analogy requires no such
manipulation of materials. Archer begins with the mechanics of the comparison,
describing the eye’s “lens and dark chamber” (350) and explaining the way in which an
image “is thrown on the retina and interior of the eye, just as the image is by the lens on
the plate or paper on the camera, or on the Daguerrotype plate” (351). From here, his
argument continues in an interesting and speculative direction, one worthy of the
fantastic fictions of Marsh and his contemporaries. Archer quotes R.W. Hackwood’s
1857 article for Notes and Queries, which claims, on the authority of unnamed American
doctors, “that the last image formed on the retina of the eye of a dying person remains
impressed upon it like the image on the photograph, and that [if] the last object seen by a
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murdered person was his murderer, the portrait drawn upon the eye would remain a
fearful witness in death to detect him and lead to his conviction” (351). Say, for a
moment, that life truly does flash before one’s eyes in that final moment. It would not
strain the imagination much farther to imagine that, “behind” one’s eyes, death—the
negative image of life—had imprinted itself.
Veronique Campion-Vincent provides a fascinating history of this piece of
modern folklore in her essay, “The Tell-Tale Eye.”19 Campion-Vincent attributes its first
mention to the French press in 1863, which reported the photographic experiments of an
English photographer by the name of Warner. Warner had allegedly fashioned a
collodian reproduction of a steer’s eye, taken immediately after its death: “Examining
this proof through a microscope he distinctly saw on the retina the lines of the
slaughterhouse’s pavement, the last object having affected the animal’s vision as it was
bowing its head to receive the fatal blow” (trans. Campion-Vincent 14). The article
concludes with the suggestion of this phenomenon’s forensic applications, surmising that
“if one reproduces through photography the eyes of a murdered person, and if one
operates within twenty-four hours of death, one reflects upon the retina thanks to the
microscope the image of the last object presented in front of the victim’s eyes” (14). In
June of 1866, Notes and Queries cited an article from the Memphis Bulletin “which had
asserted that the police had photographed and enlarged ‘with the aid of a microscope’ the
retina of a murder victim and found ‘perfectly delineated,’ ‘a pistol, the hand and part of
the face of the man who committed the crime’” (Achende 474). Such reports were
investigated by scientists such as Dr. Vernois of France’s Society for Forensic Medicine,
whose bizarre and grisly experiments were conducted upon seventeen animals, each of
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which Vernois “killed […] violently when their eyes were well-lit, and then immediately
photographed their retinas” (Campion-Vincent 15).20 Franz Boll's 1876 discovery of
“retinal violet” brought new physiological evidence to the hypothesis that external light
imprints itself in the eye to form visual images. A year after this discovery, a professor of
physiology at the University of Heidelberg by the name of Wilhelm Friedrich Kühne
produced perhaps the most distinct, even iconic, photochemical retinal image (which he
was the first to name an “optogram”) in the dissected retina of a rabbit.21

FIGURE 3.2
Wilhelm Friedrich Kühne. “Retinal Photograph.” 1878.
In his 1877 address to the British Medical Association, Professor of Physiology
Arthur Gamgee explained the rather grim process by which Kühne was able to obtain this
elusive image:
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Kühne took a rabbit and fixed its head and one of its eyeballs at a distance of a
metre and a half from an opening thirty metres [sic] square in a window shutter.
The head was covered for five minutes with a black cloth, and then exposed for
three minutes to a somewhat cloudy midday sky. The animal was then instantly
decapitated; the eyeball which had been exposed was rapidly extirpated by the aid
of yellow light, then opened, and instantly plunged into a 5 per cent. solution of
alum. Two minutes after death, the second eyeball, without removal from the
head, was subjected to exactly the same process as the first. (223)
Death never comes gently for these eyes: whether animal or human, the fatal tableau
frozen upon its surface it is invariably a violent one. One begins to imagine, recalling
Nietzsche’s painful history of mnemotechnics as traumatic understanding, that its clarity
has been achieved precisely through this violence.22 Gamgee insists that a clear retinal
impression is dependent on the destructive force of the visual stimuli, even before its
brutal extraction: “in order to obtain an obvious picture,” he advises, “the effect of light
would have to be so prolonged or so intense as to destroy the balance between the
destruction of the vision-purple and the power of the retinal epithelium to restore it”
(223).
Seeking professional corroboration of this extraordinary theory, Archer invokes
the same violence in his recounting of the tale of an American doctor who “examined the
eye of a murdered man at Auburn by means of the microscope, and found impressed
upon the retina the rude, worn away figure of a man, supposed to be the assassin!” (351).
Archer imagines death as the rigor mortis of perception, a final cooling and hardening of
this impressionable wax. And yet, the manifestation of the assassin introduces an element
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of condensation to this fantasy. The image seared into the eyes of the corpse could just as
easily have been that of a family member, a loved one, or vigilant physician, but the
exclamatory climax of Archer’s tale of murder serves to underscore the aggressive assault
upon the eye, the cumulative violence of all inscriptions upon this vulnerable surface.
Life is not ended, but emblematized by this figure. Is there such a thing as a “passing”
impression, or is it that the perceiving subject passes away, that all of life adds up to this
murder at the hand of the image? The dependably fatal trajectory of the optogram
narrative testifies to the insupportable weight of past impressions. The basic analogy
between camera and eye is scientifically sound, but the attempt to imagine the traumatic
permanence of the trace through the “seen but unseeing” gaze of this dead eye pushes the
theory into the realm of the Gothic.23
Oliver Wendell Holmes expresses the fantastic means by which technology
fixates upon such passing impressions when he describes the daguerrotype as a “mirror
with a memory” (“Stereoscope” 739, emphasis original). The phrase strikes me as an
extremely evocative one, not least because it is a catachresis. To begin with, the mirror
with a memory is a thoroughly useless one. Like a solar-powered flashlight, or fireproof
matches, the innovation directly contradicts the essential logic of the device. This new
feature is no improvement or natural evolution of the tool, but its very ruin. Holmes’s
striking description reminds us that the mirror’s principal value was its dependable
forgetfulness. Ordinarily, the mirror presents the viewer with an immaculate facade,
gathering no accumulation of traces and no residue of former encounters. It is a
perpetually innocent surface reflecting an eternal present. By contrast with this servile
affirmation of the present moment, Holmes’s mirror receives the trace and goes on
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bearing it upon its own countenance, preserving a history that will not be unwritten, a
slate that cannot be wiped clean. By endowing the implements of representation with a
consciousness, Holmes’s figure suggests a hidden reciprocity; the object also looks, the
mirror is both passive instrument and active agent of reflection. This mirror is an
animistic image, one that readers of the Gothic might be tempted to exhibit within the
gallery of that genre’s living portraits, those objects of representation that have taken on
lives of their own, each burdened by their own histories. Remembering when we would
forget, accumulating a visual static of past moments that fill up the field of representation
and choke the present and the living, these recalcitrant objects of representation
emblematize the traumatic core of gothic narrative.
Conversant with the modern myth of the optogram, Atherton’s “retinal print” and
Holt’s mental photography (47) indicate Marsh’s interest in employing photographic
analogies to develop a literalized understanding of the mind’s “impressionability.” Five
years after The Beetle’s publication, the retinal photograph emerges as a piece of crucial
forensic evidence in Jules Verne’s The Kip Brothers (Les Frères Kip 1902, English trans.
2007). An enlargement of a dead-man’s photograph reveals the image of his true
murderer engraved upon his retina, exonerating the Kip brothers who have been falsely
accused and thereby bringing about the sort of photo-synthesis envisioned by Holmes. In
Marsh’s novel, however, the retinal photography theory remains firmly within the realm
of speculation. Never objectively verified, this physiological negative goes unprocessed,
a traumatic secret that remains lodged within the body. Though each one of Marsh’s
characters are convinced they have been marked by their encounters with the monstrous
Beetle, they have no way of externalizing or objectifying their experience. In accordance
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with Freud’s negative dialectic of photography, “not every negative . . . becomes a
positive” (365). As it did for Freud, technology only gives them the materials to
indirectly express this inexpressibility. Photography submits these undeveloped materials
that haunt the margins of the text, lying just beyond the edge of objective visible
inscription.
This heightened consciousness of the body’s susceptibility to external impressions
inspires a fear of writing worthy of Judge Daniel Paul Schreber’s paranoid neurology. A
contemporary of Marsh’s, Schreber is a writer known to us primarily through his readers,
and the most formative of these readers is Freud. Freud had never met Schreber in person
(an unprecedented situation in his case studies), but responded to Schreber’s Memoirs of
My Nervous Illness seven years after its publication, in his “Psycho-Analytic Notes Upon
an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia” (1911). Freud understood the
Memoirs as a chronicle of Schreber’s descent into paranoid psychosis. Reading the
fantastic cosmology of the narrative, the unfolding of an elaborate delusion in which
Schreber is persecuted sexually and neurologically by his doctor, Freud interprets this
seemingly external threat as the projection of an impulse from within Schreber. This
homoerotic wish would only be frustrated by the external world, so Schreber’s response
(rather than repress the impulse as the neurotic would) is to remodel that external world,
and bypass the reality principle altogether.
Freud’s intervention here, as everywhere, is to uncover the erotic subtext of
psychic phenomena, a diagnosis that Sedgwick extends to the “paranoid gothic” (92) in
Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire. What both of these
readings obscure, however, is the primary status of writing within paranoid narrative. An
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analysis of writing need not—indeed, cannot—abandon the libidinal aspect of either
Marsh’s or Schreber’s texts. Rather, writing and bodies become indistinguishable in the
gothic. In the foreclosure of the symbolic (the anti-foundational ground of the psychotic)
the “literary” is invaded by the literal. Statues bleed, and portraits of the dead suddenly
surge into life; bodies ward off sublimation, resisting incorporation as transparent
signifiers. This is the topology and tropology of Schreber’s paranoid (and quintessentially
gothic) scene of inscription. As delineated within Schreber’s Memoirs, the human soul is
“contained in the nerves of the body,” mental life arising out of nervous excitement
provoked by “external impressions” (45). The “impression” here describes both thought
and the imprint this thought makes in its collision with matter. Schreber understands God
to be an omniscient being. However, this divine knowledge is gleaned not out of constant
surveillance, but from a comprehensive postmortem. “After death,” Schreber explains,
“the nerves of human beings with all the impressions they had received during life lay
bare before God’s eye” (54). In the beginning was the Word, but in the end there will be a
book: a history engraved upon the parchment of the body, from which the final judgment
will be read.
This is not the book we are accustomed to reading. As consumers of fiction, we
may enjoy a God’s-eye view, which lays bare the hearts and minds of characters, but
rarely do we flinch at this intrusion, let alone manifest Schreber’s feverish paranoia.
What is more remarkable, I think, is that readers do not seem to flinch at making this
intrusion. Tracing the evolution of narrative technique in communicating this interiority,
Dorrit Cohn’s Transparent Minds (1978) remains an important study of this startling
communion that literature customarily holds with the private lives of its characters. What
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is most valuable about Cohn’s work is that she allows herself to be astonished by
literature, all that it is capable of and all that other readers have learned to take for
granted. Narrative fiction, Cohn reminds us, “is the only literary genre, as well as the
only kind of narrative, in which the unspoken thoughts, feelings, perceptions of a person
other than the speaker can be portrayed” (7).
Cohn concerns herself with one trajectory of this experimentation, a venture that
culminates in the Modernist novel and its eradication of any barrier between
consciousness and expression. Within The Beetle, the problem of permeability becomes
focalized around the hypnotist, whose uncanny ability to read and influence the inner
thoughts of other characters renders the conventional omniscience of fictional narration
suspect through a subversively analogous performance. (Put directly, it seems entirely
normal when a narrator peers inside a character’s mind, but disturbing when a giant
hypnotic Beetle does so.) This character grants readers access to interior life, but figures
the process as less a stream of consciousness than a rupture of the brain.
Menke’s reading of the telepathic—or telegraphic—register of George Eliot’s
“The Lifted Veil” holds much in common with Cohn’s text, but it may also help to trace
out the divergent strategies of Modernist and Gothic introspection. While many have
understood “The Lifted Veil” as an anomalous break from Eliot’s committed realist style,
Menke productively reads the novella as “a disenchanted account of realism” (154) that
directly confronts, rather than merely straying from, her “major” works. Her narrator
Latimer’s “uncanny access to information” (153), obtained through the involuntary and
deeply painful psychic interpenetration of his mind with those of others, serves to
“highlight and defamiliarize a convention so basic that it is difficult to fully recognize it
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as such: that realist fiction may without forgoing its realism pretend to give us access to
something we never encounter in real life—the unspoken thoughts of others” (151).
If the Gothic “defamiliarizes” and “disenchants” the conventions of realism, it
achieves these effects by way of a profound desublimation of narrative bodies. Eliot reimagines the psychic power of the narrating voice—a power extended to any reader who
picks up the book and intercepts the transmission—as physical vulnerability. She hovers
at the tremulous threshold of Latimer’s impressionable body; rather than the benign
registering of information, each psychic transmission strikes a visceral blow against his
unstable constitution.
The Beetle allows us to imagine the hypnotist as a similar allegorical figure, and a
critical anamorphic lens through which the Gothic represents narrative incursions into
subjective space. Recalling his encounter with the Beetle, Robert Holt surmises: “It may
be that he read my story, unspoken though it was,—it is conceivable. His eyes had
powers of penetration which were peculiarly their own,—that I know” (55). Tranceliterature rarely takes for granted the interior perspective (how it is, for instance, that we
read Holt’s story), carefully managing “unwarranted” intrusions into the interiority of its
characters. Every ‘passage’ is a breaching, the mind a site of dramatic penetrations and
extractions facilitated by various techniques and technologies of writing.
As practiced in The Beetle, mindreading and mindwriting are not strictly literary
activities. Consequently, Cohn’s “psycho-narration,” a narratological term for the
rendering of interiority, would seem inadequate for our purposes here. Cohn’s is a
taxonomical act, uncovering an interior subcategory of literary technique, rather than
exposing literature to an outside. She provides us with a careful study of the general
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tendencies within modern literature, but what remains unclear is any sense of a larger
context that would shape conceptions of what the literary ought to accomplish. In light of
the Gothic, the question of how interiority communicates itself is less a narratological
concern than an epistemological one. Thus, the Beetle is much more than an allegory of
reading in any narrowly literary sense. Resisting the sublimation of the apparatuses of the
inside, the novel questions how it is that interiority comes to be understood as the special
province of the literary, and why literature would concern itself with this space in the first
place.
When gothic fiction does present us with glimpses of pure interiority, its vision of this
space is thoroughly, and often grotesquely, material. We are less likely to see the stream
of consciousness than the oozing of guts or plasma. In such graphic scenes, the Gothic
provides nauseating confirmation of a materialist conviction that “inside the body there is
only more body” (Cohen 16). At the conclusion of Marsh’s novel, for instance, the
Beetle’s plot is brought to an end by the convenient, if not entirely implausible, incident
of a train wreck. Searching the carriage for the secret of the creature’s identity, our
protagonists find only the repellent residue of his insides. The reader is given a
description of the substance, as well as the range of speculations it provokes among the
experts:
On the cushions and woodwork . . . were huge blotches,—stains of some sort.
When first noticed they were damp, and gave out a most unpleasant smell. One of
the pieces of woodwork is yet in my possession,—with the stain still on it.
Experts have pronounced upon it too,—with the result that opinions are divided.
Some maintain that the stain was produced by human blood, which had been
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subjected to a great heat, and, so to speak, parboiled. Others declare that it is the
blood of some wild animal,—possibly of some creature of the cat species. Yet
others affirm that it is not blood at all, but merely paint. While a fourth describes
it as—I quote the written opinion which lies in front of me—‘caused apparently
by a deposit of some sort of viscid matter, probably the excretion of some variety
of lizard.’ (319)
Effectively “swatted” by the machinations of Marsh’s plot, the crushed insect’s body
offers no resistance to inspection. One could only object that it yields too completely, as
Marsh’s act of grotesque desublimation pushes matter beyond the point of intelligibility.
The Beetle’s exoskeleton imposes structure, and the coherence of a body, from without.
In its absence, we find there is no way of conceptualizing what lies within; none of the
experts can say precisely what these stains might be.
If Marsh’s depiction of human interiority never reaches such limits of abjection, it
is nonetheless just as resolutely grossly material. Frankly, Marsh’s characters do not
possess a “depth” of character or psychological complexity that would render their
interior worlds worth discovering. In composing these characters, Marsh was either
incapable or uninterested in depths; he attends rather to the vulnerable physical surfaces
of these admittedly stock types. While the modernist novel of consciousness accentuates
the emanation of spirit, the paranoid Gothic text obsesses over the penetrability of bodies.
Marjorie Lindon is also trapped in the train carriage, and though she survives this
violent impact, she suffers from another sort of trauma. Her scars are on the inside; in the
literal sense if not quite the figural, they compose that interiority. On the final page of The
Beetle, the reader is informed of Marjorie’s compulsive writing. “Told, and re-told, and
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re-told again” (322), her story traces an endless circle, each recital beginning and ending
with the scene of her seduction at the hands of the Beetle. Like Atherton’s internal
camera, her body produces an endless stream of negatives of narrative, destined never to
see the light of day. This story, transcribed countless times, has nonetheless been rescued
from the brink of extinction. Marjorie’s many versions “have all of them been destroyed,
with one exception. That exception is herein placed before the reader” (322). This direct
and singular address inscribes the scene of our reading within the margins of the text.
Moreover, the presentation of this mass-produced text as manu-scripture (a sacred and
auratic text, resurrected from the grave or plucked from the flames, from the brink of
extinction) removes writing from general circulation in order to imagine the text as a
token of direct commerce between two bodies. The hallucination of reading thereby
induced transforms the surface of the paper into a palimpsest, within which the
manuscript (along with all of the destroyed versions lying underneath) has been buried.
This fantasy recasts fictional writing as an artifact possessing the singularity of an index,
a piece of evidence “placed before the reader” that retains the direct imprint of the body
writing. In this way, Marsh’s text promises to sidestep the tone of epistemological
ambivalence that closes Stoker’s Dracula, where the Crew of Light’s victory over the
Count is undercut by Jonathan Harker’s acknowledgement that nothing but a “mass of
inauthentic documents” remains as testament that any of these events actually happened.
The indexical power of the photographic apparatus promises a documentary
realism, but Marsh’s novel stakes its claim to authenticity on the incorporation of its
narrative into bodies. Sharing the curiosity displayed within Archer’s “Anecdote History
of Photography,” Marsh experiments with the photographic propensities of other

160
materials, reserving its highest interest in the exploration of the human body as an
impressionable surface. The truly innovative aspect of Marsh’s use of photography is that
he denies the camera any objective presence in the narrative. Instead, it remains lodged
inside the imaginations of its protagonists, a recalcitrant machine that performs its work
stubbornly within, allowing the text’s narrators to gesture towards intensive experience
without ever quite managing to express, externalize, or objectively account for what has
been implanted. We are still waiting for a future when the body will be able to speak, and
deliver itself from the burden of all it has seen. For now, all we hold as readers is this
oblique text, which affords only glimpses of fragments embedded within the body,
traumatic negatives of narrative. The photographic metaphor illuminates our inability to
reflect, to know ourselves except in a mirror, through an other, in reverse and retrospect.
It presents us with the possibility that our own processes of reflection might be as
superficial as those commonly ascribed to the looking glass, our interior read only
through compulsive reference to the outside.
Marsh’s integration of Victorian optics and the psychophysiology of perception
within The Beetle develops this deepening sense that the gaze radiates not from within the
subject, but towards it from the objects it views. The photographic model of observation
requires that we look by first being looked upon, stared at by the sun. This mutual
exposure and fixation constitutes the “apprehensive dilemma” of the Gothic – namely,
that in order to capture whatever is out there, one always ends up having to expose
oneself to that outside. The “negative” bears witness to the impact of that inverse gaze,
embodying the dimly understood influence of another that founds the shadowy substrate
of our being.
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The novel first appeared in serialized form within the pages of Answers. Bearing the
title The Peril of Paul Lessingham: The Story of A Haunted Man, it made its debut on
March 13, and was published in fifteen weekly installments. Later that same year,
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Tennyson’s “the same, but not the same” (In Memoriam LXXXVII, 14).
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compound microscope or a photographic apparatus, or something of the kind” (574). See
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5
“Cruelly true”:
Media, Immediacy and Fidelity in Bram Stoker’s Dracula
“Let us define our terms. A woman who writes her lover four letters a day is not a
graphomaniac, she is simply a woman in love. But my friend who xeroxes his love letters
so he can publish them someday - my friend is a graphomaniac.”
(Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting 127)
“We were struck by the fact, that in all the mass of material of which the record is
composed, there is hardly one authentic document; nothing but a mass of typewriting. . .”
(Bram Stoker, Dracula 419)

Jonathan’s post-script is the final nail in Dracula’s coffin. With the words quoted above,
the novel itself crumbles to dust, felled by a few simple, yet devastating strokes of the
typewriter. The novel’s self-identification as a work of fiction in the age of mechanical
reproduction signals Dracula’s precocious modernity; on nearly every page, Stoker
works tenaciously to destroy the auratic power of the “found” manuscript so hallowed
within Gothic fiction. This “master copy” is a hollow relic. The Count betrays a fatally
outmoded overestimation of its powers when, having ransacked the Crew of Light’s
headquarters, he throws their manuscripts and phonograph cylinders in the fire.1 He fails
to understand that this gesture, far from frustrating Mina’s efforts, merely presages his
own fate at her hands. Because the endlessly industrious Mina has made and
disseminated other copies, these masters are utterly devoid of value, except perhaps as
kindling for the Count’s own funeral pyre. Destroying the masters, Dracula initiates the
ceremony that confirms his own obsolescence.
Mina Harker controls the narrative not by “mastering” it, but by copying it. Her
crucial textual submissions are works of diligent reproduction rather than authoritative
production. However, if Stoker’s text is unrepentantly inauthentic—valorizing as it does
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the copy over the original, and reproduction over production—it nonetheless attempts to
control the channels of reproduction with tyrannical rigor. Stephen Arata has written
cogently of the fears of miscegenation encoded within the novel’s valuations of blood.2
When, having succumbed to the foreign influence of the Count, Lucy’s tender flesh
compromises the integrity of the national body, the full weight of the empire is leveled
upon her corpse in order to staunch the bleeding. In a brutal scene that Christopher Craft
has memorably described as an act of “corrective penetration” (118), the band of men
violently reinscribe Lucy’s bond with Arthur through a ritualistic disinterment and
staking that serve as grotesque sacraments of marital wedlock and consummation.
Just as the blood of many characters circulates freely through Lucy’s body, so
their writing flows through Mina.3 This informational permeability invites comparison
between Lucy’s fold of men and Mina’s “manifold” technique.4 “Why can’t they let a girl
make three copies,” Mina might ask, “or as many as she wants?”5 Stoker’s novel
frequently connects circulation with infidelity: Van Helsing encourages the association
when he suggests that his donation of blood to Lucy has made of him a bigamist, while
Arthur understands the transfusion as a kind of marriage (211). Mina’s commitment to
the open circulation of information, particularly when manifest as a desire to reproduce
the most intimate emotions of her male allies, proves just as troubling for the Crew of
Light as Lucy’s sexual indiscretions.
Attuning itself to the disruptive undercurrent of Mina’s textual reproduction,
recent criticism of Dracula has in many ways mirrored the narrative progression of
Stoker’s novel. Once upon a time, it was Lucy’s body that solicited the most significant
amount of critical attention. Critics were drawn to the exhilarating climax of her
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desecration, after which many would promptly nod off. “Fortunately,” as Geoffrey
Winthrop-Young ironically noted in 1998, “the dreary days when Dracula was read
predominantly as a twisted yarn about really strange sex are over” (“riposte”). Citing
Kittler’s revolutionary reading of the novel, Winthrop-Young claims: “we have come to
appreciate [Dracula] as the ‘perennially misjudged heroic epic of the final victory of
technological media of the blood-sucking despots of old Europe’” (“riposte”). Sexuality
has been reread as textuality, and Lucy’s body has yielded to Mina’s machine. And yet, if
Winthrop-Young’s statement serves as a fair description of the critical turn in Dracula’s
reception, it runs the risk of reinforcing the novel’s polarizing contrasts between Lucy’s
“feminine” body and Mina’s “man’s brain” (274). In Stoker’s novel, both female bodies
are the object of intense scrutiny, even if the text fixes a decidedly less lascivious gaze
upon Mina. The subtexts of information-flow in Dracula are no less carnal than the
“undercurrents” of bloodflow; as I will argue, the conjugal sense of fidelity channels
desire into the emergent rhetoric of technological fidelity.6
This chapter explores the careful discipline and management of textual
reproduction in Stoker’s novel. The conjugal and technological definitions of fidelity are
neatly synthesized in Mina’s writing practices; insofar as she imagines an act of
reproduction that performs a perfect echo of production, these conjoined ideals of fidelity
endorse a conservative technological and sexual value that preserves the master of the
text and of the home. Fidelity is a criterion of value applied to reproduction machines,
and one could certainly argue that this includes women living within a patriarchal society
that is deeply invested in certifying the authenticity of patrilineal inheritance. The
tendency for Stoker’s narrative to dramatically transpose questions of fidelity from

168
textual to sexual registers—culminating in the final moment where the “inauthentic”
typewriter in Mina’s lap is replaced by her and Jonathan’s more “legitimate” infant son—
should serve as a reminder that one cannot identify Dracula as an allegory of writing,
without then tracing out the problems of gender, technology and epistemology, that
intersect with cultural values of writing.7
But how compatible are these ideals of sexual and textual fidelity within Stoker’s
unfolding narrative? Ironically, while Stoker’s text is at great pains to assert its indexical
faithfulness to the events transcribed within its pages, it simultaneously stages the utter
failure of human fidelity. The integrity of subjects is incessantly compromised, their
mental borders, physical bounds and social bonds breached through scandalous
intimacies with other bodies. Stoker’s characters find they cannot be true to themselves or
to one another. They depend instead upon the integrity of machinery, which recuperates
their falseness as a deeper kind of truth. These machines unlock the graphomaniacal
tendencies of our protagonists, enjoying an intimacy with the body that is barred to the
subject. They are im-mediate media, already inside and operating under the threshold of
consciousness. Indeed, Van Helsing’s strict regimen of automatic writing requires that his
subjects disable themselves (and particularly the censorial mechanisms of the ego) in
order to enable their writing machines. In this sense, Bram Stoker’s Dracula stands as the
first machine-novel, the first to acknowledge the technological feedback jointly
responsible for the inscription of its narrative.
Dracula is a text that flaunts this hybrid form of modern writing, taking
undeniable delight in the modern cogs and wheels that turn its narrative. Every
blockbuster needs a catchphrase, and critical consensus would seem to have nominated
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Jonathan Harker’s “nineteenth-century up-to-date with a vengeance” (67) as Dracula’s.
Jonathan’s enthusiasm is typical of a novel that is full of characters that spend an
inordinate amount of their time writing about writing, in all of its guises, techniques and
technologies. Contemporary reviews of the novel registered dissatisfaction with this
technologized gloss of the novel. A reviewer for the Spectator suggested Stoker’s tale
“would have been all the more effective if he had chosen an earlier period. The up-todateness of the book -- the phonograph diaries, typewriters, and so on -- hardly fits in
with the mediaeval methods which ultimately secure the victory for Count Dracula's
foes” (151). Anachronism, of course, is not only one of the central tensions of Stoker’s
novel, but perhaps the most persistent concern of the Gothic genre. Jonathan’s signature
phrase encapsulates Stoker’s productive exploitation of this tension, typifying a text torn
between an extreme commitment to modernity and an obsessive preoccupation with the
past.
Charting this tension within the novel, the first section of this chapter examines
Dracula in light of the novelistic tradition of “writing to the moment,” exploring how
writing mediates the action of Stoker’s narrative. The chaste nature of Mina and
Jonathan’s relationship (so at odds with the private sexual adventures of each) is clearly
“underwritten” by their shared commitment to the purification of communications media.
While this analysis of the transliteration of sex into text is informed by Foucault’s work
on the “putting into discourse of sex” (HS 12), it is especially aided by Kittler’s reading
of Dracula in “Dracula’s Legacy” and Discourse Networks—each of which plug
discourse theory into the specific technologies that allow writing to reify sex and subjects
as quantities of information. If epistolary form foregrounds discursive mediation between
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its characters by dramatizing the act of writing, Stoker’s technologized retrofit of this
conceit struggles to repeal this distance through the deployment of what I have named
“immediate media.”
Exploring the tensions of this paradox, the second section of the chapter attempts
to contextualize literary technique within the technological ecology of Dracula’s
historical moment, examining the transformative effects of speed-culture upon the
composition of the novel and the constitutions of its characters. The perceived necessity
of synchronizing writing with the narrative’s other acts prompts Stoker’s narrators to
cultivate automatic habits of writing. While the graphomania of his main characters
yields an exhaustive record of events (for which the epistolary novel since Richardson
has been infamous), the sheer quantity of writing produced therein is less significant than
its peculiar quality. Stoker’s machine novel generates a langue inconnue in the special
sense I have intended within this dissertation: that is to say, a language that remains
unknown to itself, and hidden from its own author. In Stoker’s novel of possession, then,
the vampire is not the only force capable of robbing the protagonists of their faculties.
Jonathan seems to intuit the mesmeric power of media when, having witnessed his wife’s
hypnotism at Van Helsing’s hands, he remarks of her spellbound voice: “I have heard her
using the same tone when reading her shorthand notes” (353). Bypassing the
consciousness of its narrators, the novel’s array of automatic writing technologies
generates not transparently objective information, but evidence of a subject voided and
objectified by machinery. In Dracula, the familiar gothic figure of the living-dead returns
as media-effect.
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The graphomaniac writing produced by Stoker’s body/machines brings to light
the paradoxical relation between mechanical fidelity and infidelity; we find a
technological (p)reiteration of the heimlich/unheimlich dynamic in the uncanny and
subversive echo of Seward’s “cruelly true” phonograph. The machine’s unthinking
loyalty to sonic phenomena inevitably amounts to a betrayal of the speaker, primarily in
its leaden refusal of any subjective view of the subject. In the chapter’s two final sections,
I examine how the Victorian “phonographic imagination” reconfigured human and
animal understandings of fidelity. This phrase is derived from Ivan Kreilkamp’s
“phonographic logic,” a term devised to describe: “a certain logic of modernity as
governed by mechanical reproduction” (211). However, if Kreilkamp’s title signals his
interest in the phonograph-sponsored “awareness that language might function with no
clear connection to its human source” (211), this section charts out divergent
phonographic intuitions that erupt within Stoker’s novel and resonate elsewhere in
phonographic fiction of the Victorian period. Within such texts, the phonograph models
an analog experience of communication rooted in indexical relations between bodies in
contact. This logic of analogical inscription has largely been neglected in studies of
Dracula that overstress the dissociative and disembodying effects of writingtechnologies. The “wonder and terror of the phonograph” (183) recognized by Kreilkamp
issues not only from its ability to dislodge voices from bodies, but also from the uncanny
means by which the machine grants a body to ephemeral sonic phenomena.
As critics have noted from the beginning in one way or another, Stoker’s text is
persistently disturbed by the body of its own writing. If Dracula frequently gives voice to
an urgent desire for instantaneous and transparently legible communication, its obsessive
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pursuit of this makes writing present in a way seldom seen in the modern novel. I have
written earlier that Gothic media are distinguished by the stress they lay upon the
physical dimension of acts of inscription. Instead of the eradication of physical
interference, the experience of immediacy offered within the Gothic depends essentially
upon the presence of bodies and the intimacy of their contiguity. Gothic signification
presents itself “in the flesh,” understanding physical presence as the criterion of
authenticity. The Gothic hysterically insists upon an embodied, phenomenological
poetics: to “conceive” an idea, we must first pass through the flesh, with all of its noise
and distortions. By contrast with transcendent fantasies of technology, Stoker advances a
resistant vision of communications channeled through human terminal points. Here is a
novel that imagines a mode of telepathic “information processing” made possible through
two punctured bodies, draining languidly into each other. This logic survives within the
indexical register of the novel, where the truth of bodies is attained through touching and
tracing—from the “cruelly true” (261) sound of Seward’s voice on the phonograph, to the
monstrous and sublime intimacy into which the vampire’s mouth initiates Renfield, Lucy
and Mina.

Writing to the Moment: Gender, Fidelity, Inscription
Stoker opens his novel with the question of fidelity, pledging the immediate and
uncompromised faithfulness of the text to its moment. Dracula’s prefatory note returns
us to Walpole’s Castle of Otranto, and the conventionally Gothic problem of the past’s
reconciliation with the present. “All needless matters,” Stoker assures us, “have been
eliminated, so that a history almost at variance with the possibilities of later-day belief
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may stand forth as simple fact” (29). To remark that the tale of a vampire who descends
upon London to ravage the locals is not “faithful” to reality must read as an
understatement bordering on the absurd, and yet Dracula does take great pains to
reconcile these fantastic events with “the facts.” Stoker’s acknowledgement of the
novel’s oscillation between fantasy and “fact” echoes Walpole’s balancing of “invention”
and “truth” (61) in his own narrative—though the authors have antithetical strategies for
managing the uneasy relation between these two registers.
To begin with, Walpole presents his text as a found manuscript, while Stoker
submits an edited typescript. The former is an auratic text imbued with its own history,
rooting its authority in the past. Indeed, Walpole’s second preface—which crumples up
the found manuscript once its conceit has been found no longer necessary—nonetheless
features another appeal to history, shielding Otranto’s fantastic elements behind the
authority of the English canon. “The great master of nature, Shakespeare,” Walpole
insists, “was the model I copied” (66). Walpole retains the myth of the deferential scribe,
though now it is from the text of the English literary tradition that he copies.
For Stoker, by contrast, authority is to be attained through the uncompromising
faithfulness of the record to its moment. While the novel clearly departs from any
mimetic criterion of writing, its text is tightly bound by the principle of fidelity. Mimesis,
the artful imitation of the real world, exists within the domain of aesthetics, while
Stoker’s “verbatim” records (219) import technical and legal discourse. From classical
aesthetics to modern cultural theory, mimesis has been understood as a distinctly human
enterprise. Aristotle understood mimetic performance as derived from human instincts
(Poetics 4.1448b), while Walter Benjamin found in the mimetic impulse an enduring and
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defining human trait (“On the Mimetic Faculty”).8 If mimesis is bred in the bone, fidelity
depends upon the calibration of machinery. In deferring to these apparatuses, the
discourse of fidelity adopts a more stringent criterion of comprehensiveness and
exactitude. This precision relies crucially upon the immediate inscription of events:
“There is throughout,” Stoker promises, “no statement of past things wherein memory
may err, for all the records chosen are exactly contemporary” (29). Memory is the great
enemy of the text: there can be no looking back, only an immersion in the moment,
realized and intensified through acts of writing.
Stoker’s attempt to perfectly synchronize word and act mimics Samuel
Richardson’s technique of “writing to the moment.” Richardson had first named this
device in his introduction to History of Sir Charles Grandison (1753),9 but it is his earlier
preface to Clarissa (1748) that best clarifies the emotional intent of this method. This
novel is presented to the public as a series of letters abounding in “instantaneous
descriptions and reflections” (5). “Much more lively and affecting,” Richardson writes,
“must be the style of those who write in the height of a present distress; the mind tortured
by the pangs of uncertainty (the events then hidden in the womb of fate) than the dry,
narrative, unanimated style of a person relating difficulties and danger surmounted, can
be; the relater perfectly at ease; and if himself unmoved by his own story, not likely
greatly to affect the reader” (5). Here, as in Pamela, Richardson’s intention had been to
elevate the intensity of scenes by setting writing and action in dramatic tension with each
other. Richardson’s chief interest seems to be with capturing the emotional fidelity of an
instant, opting for the confusion of the moment over the composed outlook of
recollection. Placing the writer squarely on the axis of action, as it were, destabilizes
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narration by rendering it vulnerable to the world it describes. The epistolary scene of
writing finds the female writing without “a room of her own.” The composure one
ordinarily associates with the act disappears when the door to one’s study can only be
locked from the outside, and when the violent plots of others are expected to interrupt
writing at any moment.
Dracula retrofits the novelistic technique of “writing to the moment” by
deploying the arsenal of writing technologies currently at its disposal in order to present
writing that is also unmistakably of its moment. Expanding beyond the correspondence of
letters, to the collection of telegrams, phonograph recordings, train schedules, newspaper
clippings, and more, Stoker’s archive upgrades the epistolary mode to encompass a more
comprehensive documentary form. While imagining the modest beginnings of the “little
oak table” that now supports his own highly sophisticated stenographic labours, Jonathan
Harker gives us a glimpse of his perspective on this contrast. His haughtily modern
fantasy of “old times” invites a comparison between the epistolary novel and Stoker’s
own “state-of-the-art” narrative technologies:
Here I am, sitting at a little oak table where in old times possibly some fair lady
sat to pen, with much thought and many blushes, her ill-spelt love-letter, and
writing in my diary in short-hand all that has happened since I closed it last. It is
nineteenth-century up-to-date with a vengeance. And yet, unless my senses
deceive me, the old centuries had, and have, powers of their own which mere
‘modernity’ cannot kill. (67)
Jonathan imagines his own modernity as male, defined against an epistolary scene
featuring “some fair lady,” a quaint description that evokes the chivalrous tone of the

176
romance. The young solicitor finds himself correcting the hypothetical spelling mistakes
he has supplied for his predecessor. In addition to these errors, Jonathan notes that she
writes with “much thought and many blushes.” Her script, then, is characterized by
imprecision, hesitation, and discomposure. Jonathan’s missives, by contrast, are pure
speed, unencumbered by the discourse of sentiment and the excesses of emotion typically
associated with the epistolary genre of the eighteenth century.10 Even letters to his fiancée
are written in shorthand: no lover’s discourse, but the colorless signature of the business
world. Communicating through channels better suited for the transmission of information
than poetry, Jonathan and Mina’s sexless, almost contractual stenographic relationship
(her labour as amanuensis will promote the progress of his career) participates in the
ambiguously gendered rhetoric of our contemporary “partnerships.”
Jonathan’s writing is an act of conscious “remediation” (Bolter and Grusin), a
process “by which new media technologies refashion prior media forms" (273). Driving
this remediation is Jonathan’s desire to re-gender the scene of writing, thereby banishing
this conspicuous (and vulnerable) female body. But Jonathan’s repudiation of the “fair
lady” is written in a moment of deep uncertainty and insecurity, as he finds himself in a
position quite familiar to the typical epistolary heroine, fending off the advances of an
amorous host with dishonorable intentions who has held him captive in his tower. Thus,
the comparison he devises, though intended as a point of contrast, instead represents a
projection and disavowal of the feminine role that has been thrust upon him. Trapped in
this room, Jonathan is dimly aware that writing grants him some sort of power: if his
neck is bared to the Count, his thoughts at least can be veiled in shorthand. Writing of his
correspondence, Jonathan notes: “I understood as well as if he had spoken that I should
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be careful what I wrote, for he would be able to read it” (63). Jonathan rests easy in the
knowledge that he need not censor his letters to Mina, “for to her I could write in
shorthand, which would puzzle the Count, if he did see it” (64).
Writing technique is understood in terms of power, and this power is imagined in
distinctly gendered terms; Mina must also work to avoid the perils of female inscription,
dangers realized in Lucy’s example. Geoffrey Wall’s “Different From Writing” delivers a
plausible reading of Mina and Lucy’s childhood intimacies, detecting a “specifically
feminine idiom of the erotic and the confidential” (17) shaped within their adult
correspondence. He cites Lucy’s intimate letter to Mina: “I wish I were with you, dear,
sitting by the fire, undressing, as we used to sit; and I would try to tell you what I feel”
(88). Significantly, the letter’s erotic undertones, imagining confession as an
“undressing,” are creations of Lucy’s mind. Far from evincing a generalized “feminine
idiom” the passage does much to explain the differences between these two women, as
well as hinting at why it will be Mina and not Lucy who transcribes our story. Lucy’s
intercourse is consistently susceptible to innuendo; as both vampire and victim, her
correspondences are invariably sensual. Letters to Mina are smudged with Lucy’s tears
(90), making her bodily present in her writing, and threatening that this uncontained body
may erase the significant content of her writing. Spilling ink as liberally as tears, Lucy
recognizes her letter is “sloppy … in more ways than one” (91). The image of both
liquids upon the page intimates the foolishly sentimental style of Jonathan’s “fair lady.” It
will be Mina’s task as typist to desiccate these pages for the Crew of Light’s inspection
(and ours as readers as well).11 Lucy’s epistolary work is suffused with feminine
sexuality (if different in tone from the kind that always stood behind the pretexts of

178
instruction in Richardson’s novels). Her contributions to the narrative are invariably
defined by a scandalous contiguity between body and writing. In the moments before her
death, Lucy provides her best imitation of Mina’s discursive exertions. Dutifully
documenting her final moments, she tucks the letter into her bosom, somehow knowing
this is the place her protectors are sure to find it (181). Mina’s interactions with the men
cannot be conflated under a generalized conception of the feminine, as they fail to evoke
the same connotations as Lucy’s. Consequently, understanding Mina's discursive position
requires a careful reading of her activities, considering how these intimacies are
negotiated within the text, and the scrupulous sublimation of her body’s presence within
her writing.
The “instrumental” role of Mina’s body within Dracula’s network enacts a
recurring Victorian lesson concerning technology: every step that communications seem
to take towards disembodied experience is in fact always reliant upon physical (if hidden)
networks. Whether in the field of spiritual messages or telecommunications, these
networks have most often been facilitated through female bodies, and Mina’s experience
epitomizes the careful negotiation of the burdens and scandals associated with serving as
the “medium” of communications.
As the chief information processor of Stoker’s narrative, Mina’s discursive
control is unparalleled. Training as a faithful wife and typist, Mina disciplines and
domesticates her own writing practices in order to take dictation exclusively from her
husband. She has “been practicing shorthand very assiduously” (86), as she explains to
Lucy. If Mina fails to denounce the possibility of “pre-marital stenography” outright, it
seems that, in her fantasy, this bureaucratic relationship will have to wait for its
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consummation: “[w]hen we are married I shall be able to be useful to Jonathan, and if I
can stenograph well enough I can take down what he wants to say in this way and write it
out for him on the typewriter, at which also I am practicing very hard” (86).
This sublimation prevents Mina’s discursive work from being obscured by her
gender; by strong contrast with Lucy, Mina’s bedroom scenes attract little in the way of
“ungentlemanly” attention from the men. Seward gives us a glimpse of his perspective in
one description of the newlyweds’ exertions: “After lunch Harker and his wife went back
to their own room, and as I passed a while ago I heard the click of the typewriter. They
are hard at it” (263). The remark is made without any perceptible aspersions: the couple’s
conduct is unimpeachable because Mina’s sexual and textual work exertions are mutually
exclusive activities. Proposing the “unusual” act of “break[ing] into a lady’s room,” Van
Helsing explains to his crew that: “All chambers are alike to the doctor” (321). The “lady
journalist,” we may assume, exhibits the same professional indifference to such
nominally private spaces. To her, the bedroom is a writing-space just like any other.
Kittler’s Discourse Networks casts Mina as a “discourse functionary,” arguing
that her “desexualization permits the most intimate diaries and perverse sexualities to be
textualized” (355). Mina’s journalistic objectivity is evident also in her lack of observable
sentimentality towards her newly-wed husband’s travel-diary: the wedding present
entrusted to her as a gesture of their mutual confidence. Upon recovering from the shock
of reading Jonathan’s sexual escapades with the Count’s daughters, Mina’s thoughts
immediately turn to circulating the story. “There may be a solemn duty,” she imagines,
“and if it come we must not shrink from it…I shall be prepared. I shall get my typewriter
this very hour and begin transcribing” (216). It is through this act that Jonathan’s
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indiscretions with the vampresses come to be recorded not only for Mina, but broadcast
to the other men as well. In each of Mina’s mediated relationships, her loyalty to the men
is manifest through (and hence subject to) her loyalty to the text. As such, she seeks the
exposure of intimacies rather than their preservation. This desire extends new
possibilities for containing her discursive promiscuity, but presents previously
unimagined obstacles as well.
Mina and Jonathan’s marriage obliges the couple to put their most private
thoughts in circulation, with each other at the very least. Though one does not necessarily
get the sense she is ready for this sort of commitment, Lucy intuits this marital obligation
in a letter to Mina: “A woman ought to tell her husband everything – don’t you think so,
dear?” (89). Lucy’s tone is uncertain, and clearly defers to Mina’s much stronger
convictions, but it serves as a succinct description of her friend’s marital “journalism,” a
vocation that associates romantic fidelity with the responsibility of “telling everything.”
Mina’s devotion to this task is relentless: “lest it should be that he should think for a
moment that I kept anything from him, I still keep my journal as usual. Then if he has
feared of my trust I shall show it to him, with every thought of my heart put down for his
dear eyes to read” (296). Mina fears that any gap within her text could be construed as a
lapse in fidelity, read as a sin of omission that would open up a chasm of silence between
the two newlyweds.12 Seward laments “that men cannot be trusted unless they are
watched” (313), but Mina aims to prove to her husband that she is capable of the most
vigilant self-surveillance. After her rendezvous with the Count, Mina’s pen does falter, a
development that has her attendant quite uneasy. Picking up the pen in her stead, Van
Helsing notes that Mina “was not like herself,” reasoning: “She make no entry into her
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little diary, she who write so faithful at every pause. Something whisper to me that all is
not well” (404). Van Helsing’s observation integrates the diaristic and diagnostic. For the
doctor, hovering at his patient’s bedside, the cessation of writing is a matter just as grave
as the interruption of his patient’s vital signs.
Stoker’s characters inhabit a universe composed of writing, millions of little
scraps of paper held together by “the Great Recorder,” a being constantly in their
thoughts.13 This divine creature’s eternal occupation is writing, an act that imbues life
with meaning and provides evidence that one’s life has been “profitable” (104). Even
heaven, it would seem, is bound by the requirements of its bureaucracy. The Recording
Angel serves as an accountant, counting up sums and tabulating “ledger account[s] with a
balance to profit or loss” (104). If there truly is “a Recording Angel,” Jonathan knows his
wife’s noble and selfless acts will be “noted to her ever-lasting honour” (367). Should no
such being exist, the Crew of Light always has Mina herself.
Jonathan, we know, has not exactly been an angel at the Count’s castle. But he at
least records his infidelities as faithfully as he can. Describing his “wicked, burning
desire” that the Count’s vampresses “would kiss me with those red lips,” Jonathan writes:
“It is not good to note this down, lest some day it should meet Mina's eyes and cause her
pain, but it is the truth” (69). The merit of this painful writing is the truth it produces:
inserted into discourse, sex immediately becomes symbolized as sexuality.14 Furtive
passions, once defanged, serve as useful information. Some consolation is to be found in
writing’s constancy—though a husband may stray from his wife, his hand never strays
from the page.
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The text exhibits a handful of these hesitant submissions. Lucy chastises herself
for her own polygamous desires, admitted in her letter to Mina. She writes: “this is
heresy, and I must not say it” (91). Initial resistances give way to, and “give up” writing.
After Mina’s decision to transcribe the evidence (263) is itself documented, recaptured
voices cannot help but take on some of the mechanical echo of the machine through
which they come to us. Insofar as one remains conscious of Stoker’s narrative
contrivance, Mina’s mediated transmissions make deliberations about whether or not to
speak ring hollow, seeming a posture or rhetorical strategy. Though formed (then
reformed) as a question, the answer—that the confession will be incorporated—is always
directly in front of us. As such, the machine carries out the logic of Van Helsing’s
“knowing” that seeks confirmation only (355). The very presence of the question on the
page closes down precisely as it opens up the possibility of not writing.
Mina likewise honours her commitment to the textualization of even the most
painful experiences. Even the sudden, traumatic recollection of Mina’s “baptism of
blood,” where she is seduced and initiated into the vampire’s sanguine information
network, cannot derail the continuity of her documentation. Mina writes that the vampire
“seized my neck and pressed my mouth to the wound, so that I must either suffocate or
swallow some to the… Oh, my God! My God! What have I done?” (328). Mina’s
revulsion at the thought of her violation forces out her interjection: “Oh, my God! My
God!” This felicitous interruption of Dracula’s sexual climax leads Christopher Craft to
note that “Mina’s verbal ejaculation supplants the Count’s liquid one” (278). This is the
prophylactic of the symbolic: the inescapable propensity of language to expurgate sex in
the very act of naming it. But perhaps the most striking aspect of this textual moment is
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that Mina’s “verbal ejaculation” is simultaneously written, suggesting that typing for her
is an involuntary physical reaction every bit as instinctual as her cry. This peculiar
graphomaniacal instinct, which Mina shares with her husband, insulates their marriage
from the wayward actions of their bodies. This is why the novel comes closest to
depicting the consummation of marriage in its ceremonies of writing, rituals of textual
exchange and binding.15
It is this insistent textualization of sexual dynamics that leads Kittler to propose
the typewriter as a complex emblem of Mina and Jonathan’s quintessentially modern
relationship. In the long shadow cast by Kittler’s powerful and imposing interpretation of
the novel, the typewriter has been commonly approached as the master technology, and
the technology of mastery. Kittler argues that the typewriter instates a new management
of bodies under the regime of the symbolic, a system organized through a “spacing” that
dissociates bodies as well as characters on the page. Assimilating the male instrument of
stylus, along with the female apparatus of the sewing machine, the androgynous
typewriter renders obsolete the gendered metaphysics of earlier writing-systems (351).
Observing her carefully managed transformation into a “discourse functionary,” Kittler
submits Mina’s typewriter-work as evidence that the discourse network of 1900 dissolves
“any sexual relation between the sexes” (DN 359). This is an audacious and compelling
statement, but one that is simply not borne out with any consistency in Stoker’s text. For
if the mediation of Jonathan and Mina’s relationship through the typewriter facilitates the
sublimation of the narrative’s libidinal undercurrents, numerous other techniques and
technologies of writing pull us in precisely the opposite direction, towards an immediacy
of bodies and machines.
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In what follows, I will address two of these strategies at length. The first attempts
to secure a temporal immediacy through techniques of speed-writing, while the second
plays with spatial immediacy, primarily through the text’s “phonographic logic.”16 Both
techniques attempt to harness the power and truth of writing as an automatic act,
emerging at the point where human and mechanical expression blend into each other. In a
machine-novel such as Dracula, “writing to the moment” still provides glimpses of the
chaotic interior life of the writing subject, but the technical apparatus of writing disrupts
any fantasy of this interiority as simply human. Stoker’s vision of the writer as a
distracted subject, persistently (and ideally) blind to the truth of what she writes, shortcircuits the autonomy of writing, making it an obsessive, mechanical process. The
phonograph, on the other hand, frustrates the distancing techniques of writing. If the
typewriter organizes texts and bodies through spacing, the mechanics of the phonograph
(which operates through indexical touching) inspired within the Victorian consciousness
an entirely different fantasy of signification—that of a system of signs that is material
rather than abstract, analogical rather than digital. It is this form of palpably immediate
inscription that my reading of the novel understands as figured by the phonograph and
enacted by the vampire. The “writing” performed by this creature presents us with the
painful and stigmatic signs of bodily contact, enigmatic symptoms of a monstrous act of
reproduction that results in an uncanny attachment of the subject.

Graphomania: Speed, Machinery, Distraction
True to the informational impulses of its cultural juncture, Dracula is a novel that
exhibits considerable impatience with the belatedness of writing, and excitement over the
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imminent possibility that inscription technologies would participate in the moment, rather
than merely picking up the pieces afterward. The text intends to set the act of writing in
the present tense, but instead ends up underlining the tensions of presence. Friction arises
out of the text’s paradoxical straining towards an immediacy of media, a commitment
that turns to an array of writing techniques the truth-value of which hinges upon
automatic and instantaneous reproduction. When Mina presents Van Helsing with her
detailed and exact transcription of all communications between the Crew of Light up
until that morning, the professor can only respond by asking: “But why not up to now?”
(274-275). Van Helsing’s relentless desire for immediate disclosure and documentation
serves to underline the Sisyphean task of writing within this uniquely obsessive text. His
frantic concern with remaining technologically “present”—along with the profound
labour this immediacy requires—has only become more resonant within the current age
of so-called “connectivity” mapped out by cellular phones, social networking sites,
instant messaging, and other codes and machines that we use to constantly “keep in
touch,” but that so often seem only to frustrate and obstruct possibilities for first-hand
experience and direct communication.
Particularly from the digitized perspective of the twenty-first century, we tend to
imagine “im-mediacy” as the disappearance of mediation: a state of instantaneous
communication attained through the elimination of opaque bodies that obstruct flows of
perception and information. Victorian technophiles commonly vaunted this immediacy of
media. We might turn, for instance, to George Wilson’s rapturous description of the
telegraph in 1852. Penning what would become a much-repeated phrase in Victorian
discussions of technology, he marvels at the machine’s ability, “so far as the conveyance
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of our thoughts is concerned,” to “annihilate space and time” (36). In its relentless pursuit
of temporal immediacy, the modern logic of Stoker’s text strains toward this
transparency, employing diverse writing techniques and technologies to break down the
mechanics and streamline the physical act of writing by transmuting inscription into
increasingly mobile and transmissible forms of information.
From the outset, the problem of “timeliness” impacts Stoker’s narrative. The first
detail Jonathan notes of his journey is that he “should have arrived at 6:46, but train was
an hour late” (31). When a second late train leaves him waiting at the Transylvanian
station, his slight setback inspires our Occidental tourist to press a general distinction
between East and West. “It seems to me,” the seasoned traveler notes, “that the further
East you go the more unpunctual are the trains” (33). Clearly we are led to infer that it is
not only the trains that are “running behind the times.” Their disorder is understood to be
symptomatic of a much more fundamental delay: that of the Orient’s arrival at the dawn
of modernity. Even with the proper technology at hand, Jonathan suggests that the East is
ill-equipped for the present moment, incapable of keeping up with the pace of late
nineteenth-century life. A number of critics have noted the essential role speed plays
within Stoker’s text, concentrating predominantly on the radical acceleration of transport
and communications networks exploited by the Crew of Light.17 My interest here is in
questioning the extent to which such readings echo the dominant rhetoric of technology
within the Victorian period, tending to showcase the efficacy of machines in perfect
working order. Dracula dislodges the significance of speed from a familiar idiom of
capital that strains to emphasize efficiency and productivity, in order to unmask its
obsessive, repetitive, and destructive tendencies.
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It is not only that these speed-machines sometimes break down, though Victorian
critics of technological progress have furnished us with many examples of how they have
failed us.18 Beyond malfunctioning in ways we had failed to anticipate, however, speedmachines often work in ways we do not realize, their effects lost in the blur. Matthew
Arnold affords a glimpse of this condition when he writes of the “strange disease of
modern life / With its sick hurry” (“Scholar-Gipsy”). Max Nordau, who describes the
pathological nature of modern existence in no uncertain terms, warns of “the little shocks
of railway traveling, not perceived by consciousness” that “cost our brains wear and
tear” (39). Though many of Degeneration’s conclusions are indefensible, Nordau’s
concerns remind us that it is not the catastrophes of the industrial age that solicit our most
careful attention, but the often devastating effects of its routine functioning. Even when
operating smoothly and without incident, technology ceaselessly performs its silent work
upon us, just below the threshold of our perception. Through an exploration of the
emotional and psychical investments in writing within Dracula, we can begin to discern
the affective and obsessive relation to writing within the Victorian scriptural economy.
The diaries of Jonathan and Seward in particular betray the crucial psychological
undercurrents running deeper than the practical effects of informational exchanges.
Speed-writing represents a unique development within modern culture because it
accelerates the mind rather than the body, streamlining, blurring, and disorienting the
interior life that it inscribes. Within Stoker’s novel—and Victorian culture more
broadly—speed is not merely a principle of acceleration, but of transformation. Beyond
certain limits of the human (mental, physical, psychical), the machine takes the wheel,
and one of the most compelling subtexts of Stoker’s novel of “possession” is its
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underlying fascination with how bodies and minds yield to the automatisms of
machinery.
One of the most compelling aspects of Dracula’s epistolary structure is its
recognition of the mechanics of expression as a problem of speed. With the hindsight of
the Modernist perspective, the narrative contrivances of diaristic and epistolary forms are
often characterized as premature expressions unequal to the task of keeping pace with
thought. The study of “Diary and Continuity” conducted within Dorrit Cohn’s
Transparent Minds, for instance, focuses on the incongruities of the epistolary mode,
wincing as writing improbably reaches the full presence of the present. As perhaps the
most familiar formulation of this coincidence of writing and presence, “writing to the
moment” aspires to an unprecedented immediacy of the novel, but results in a thoroughly
mediated narrative (an opaque text that goes on writing right through the moment). In its
persistent dramatization of the scenes of composition and transmission, the epistolary
conceit designates writing as the only present action of the novel. Richardson’s narrators
have had their hands tied, bound to the dutiful inscription of the world they inhabit. There
are so many moments when Richardson’s reader marvels that Pamela, even in the face of
imminent danger, fails to put down the pen and act. But this act of writing is her role; her
primary obligation is not to her own life, but to the account of that life.
Though her concerns are securely couched within the realm of literature, Cohn’s
history of literary innovation strangely echoes the rhetoric of technological innovation
during the Victorian era. Cohn maintains: “a different form is needed to synchronize
language and experience, a form whose reality model is faster and freer than a written, or
even an oral record” (212). Compare this statement on the novel’s future with an early
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speculation on the future of the phonograph from 1878’s Nature: “some substitute or
substitutes for the clumsy mode of recording our thoughts by pen and ink, so inconsistent
with the general rapidity of our time, must be close at hand” (117). The author’s closing
sentiment might have been snatched straight from the pages of Transparent Minds, a
congruence that impels us to trace out the affinities between aesthetic innovation and
technological inventions within a culture pressured by a dawning sense of “the general
rapidity of [its] time.” The accelerated pace of modern life cannot be documented with
archaic writing tools. In an era of remarkable technological development, the relative
belatedness of writing as a technique for the transcription of thought is almost an
embarrassment; it is “clumsy” and outdated, straggling behind in clear violation of the
laws of the general acceleration of culture. There remains a troubling asymmetry between
industrial and informational structures at the close of the nineteenth century. Machines do
not bring about writing’s obsolescence; in fact, they often seem to require more writing.
Dracula’s hybrid of technique and technology facilitates a convergence of
novelistic and bureaucratic concerns, grappling with their shared, modern desire for an
im-mediate method of registration that is no longer subject to the operations of deferral
and difference that typically govern writing. Critical response to this convergence must
fuse literary technique (“writing to the moment,” which foregrounds the novelistic
tradition) with writing technologies (“writing of its moment,” which situates inscription
with regard to the historically specific fantasies of immediacy circulating through
Victorian culture).
Aspiring to a perfect synchronicity between the event and its inscription,
experience and its representation, Stoker’s characters try their hand at stenography,
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phonography, telegraphy, photography, and typewriting, among other technologies. The
end result of this towering stockpile of technology is that, although Stoker’s prefatory
note promises accuracy secured by presence, the only “exactly contemporary” act within
Dracula is writing itself. Headnotes designating the time, location, and medium of
different inscriptions incessantly interrupt a narrative within which it might otherwise be
quite easy to forget that the action is being recollected at a remove, often a double
withdrawal of composition and transcription. The pleasures of any imagined immediacy
are denied with these interruptions, the cumbersome nature of the typewriter ushering in
Stoker's explicitly mediated narrative. As such, each headnote registers both a presence
and an absence, dramatizing the scenes and seams of writing that gather themselves
around the incident, attempting to recapture it “verbatim.” It takes an act of rigid critical
circumvention to ignore the text’s “hardware.”
Dracula’s parallel narrative and libidinal economies are defined by what Jay
David Bolter and Richard Grusin have identified as “our culture's contradicting
imperatives for immediacy and hypermediacy” (5). In Remediation: Understanding New
Media (2000), Bolter and Grusin have described the longing for immediacy as “the desire
to get beyond the medium to the objects of representation themselves” (83). This
inclination guides audiences towards immersive styles of “representation whose goal is to
make the viewer forget the presence of the medium (canvas, photographic film, cinema
and so on) and believe that he is in the presence of the objects of representation” (272273). However, Bolter and Grusin argue, modern media are defined by a “double logic of
immediacy and hypermediacy” (viii), with the latter logic serving to foreground the
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medium in order to draw the viewer’s attention (in a strategy similar to corporate
branding) to the unique affordances of a particular medium platform (272).
Dracula is “nineteenth century up-to-date,” but “with a vengeance”; every page is
marked by a conspicuous excitement regarding its incipient modernity. Geoffrey Wall
has characterized the enthusiastic manner in which Stoker’s novel “contemplates its
materials and methods” as “innocent [and] unironic” (15), and perhaps this is the
inevitable fate of discourse concerning new media that have since grown old. But we
must be careful not to let our own professedly “disenchanted” modernity blind us to what
Dracula has to say concerning technology. Featuring prominently and conspicuously the
implements and pretexts of writing, along with everything considered “exterior” to
thought, this mode of fiction expresses the difficult labour involved in “coming to terms”
with thought (and with the interiors of others, which we can only apprehend by drilling
through their exteriors). This irreducible presence of the novel’s hardware testifies to the
difficulty, or impossibility, of any unmediated experience of the present moment.
We need, then, to resist the tendency to see such representations of narrative labor
as simply opaque: they contribute something more than just “a rather tantalizing and
somewhat wearisome form of narration,” as one Victorian critic of Dracula had it
(“Booking” 327). To borrow from Thurschwell and Price’s Literary Secretaries/
Secretarial Culture (a collection in which Mina plays a starring role), Stoker is concerned
with “the representation, self-representation and non-representation . . . of those who do
write” (1). Rather than a clumsy impediment to the proper contents of the novel, these
bodies and machines are the material bedrock of what surfaces, typically in a highly
sublimated form, as “textuality.” Stoker’s novel, by contrast, is one that “shows its
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work,” rendering the patient and diligent labour that brings text into being. Dracula
presents writing as the indigestible, inassimilable substrate of the text. These are stories
about writing, not ones merely told through its transparent medium.
In sharpening our focus from the abstract concept of “textuality” to “the
representation . . . of those who do write,” we might begin with the observation that the
narratological breakthrough of “writing to the moment,” depends crucially upon a
characterological innovation. The fundamental difficulty this mode of narrative presents,
of course, is a question of motivation: one must invent a plausible reason for anyone
wanting so desperately to write so much. The pretext for all of this textuality must be
found in characters for which writing is an almost involuntary reflex. If there is no text
without the act of writing, the novel requires characters that are virtual ”writing
machines,” for which writing is as instinctive as breathing, let alone speaking. In her
moment of deepest responsibility to the Crew of Light’s shared text, Lucy Westenra
becomes just such a being: “I feel I am dying of weakness, and have barely strength to
write, but it must be done if I die in the doing” (178-79). The physical exertion of writing
is a necessary sacrifice, warding off the possibility that her corpse will be illegible, its
history unintelligible.
This cultivation of the compulsive habits of writing thought necessary to justify
the very existence of the narrative is not unprecedented within the novel’s history. One
and a half centuries earlier, Richardson’s Pamela had explained: “I have got such a knack
of writing, that I cannot sit without a pen in hand” (367). Pamela sounds as if she is
describing here a habit of nervous agitation, the kind of fidgeting one indulges in when
one can neither sit still nor act out. Stoker’s text is composed through a similar agitation,
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by authors who “fear to be idle” (356) and most often turn to writing and reading merely
in order to soothe themselves. As Clive Leatherdale wryly notes, “The Count, it seems,
has the knack of making everyone with whom he has any dealings take up their pencils”
(214). It is these tiny sharpened stakes that are thrust at Dracula’s heart with the most
tireless determination. The primary difference to be marked between the early epistolary
novel and Dracula, however, is the latter’s institutionalization of the graphomaniacal
imperative. For Stoker’s narrators, the compulsion to write is an automatic reflex
conditioned by professional and other external obligations. Under the discursive
requirements of bureaucracy, the novel becomes so many forms to be filled out, so many
papers in need of proper filing. In the administration of such texts, writing is only one
task among many: one must also document and duplicate everything, a tedious, often
ridiculous, but undeniably realistic part of our existence under the institutions to which
we are “accountable.” Leatherdale neglects to mention that most of Stoker’s heroes are
“pencil-pushers” of one sort or another. For the young solicitor, the aspiring “ladyjournalist,” and increasingly even doctors such as Seward and Van Helsing, the labours
of documentation and registration would have been an essential part of the job
description, an institutional imperative. Stoker’s characters are only “moonlighting” as
vampire-hunters, so it is perhaps not surprising that their daily habits of writing should
carry over into these pursuits.
Under Van Helsing’s directives, then, there is “wild work” (396), but also plenty
of paperwork, to be done. The clearest reason we are given for Van Helsing’s partiality
towards his former student is the fact that his “case-book was ever more full than the
rest” (155). Consequently, when Seward’s judgment falters, Van Helsing advises him to
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return to these texts, contending that: “knowledge is stronger than memory, and we
should not trust the weaker” (155). In the severe distrust it places in memory, Van
Helsing’s pedagogical strategy is absolutely antithetical to the Socratic method, which
insists upon the essential role of the subject in dynamizing knowledge as an activity
always in process. Socrates criticized writing by arguing it served not as a tool of
memory, but of forgetting.19 Writing for him can only inscribe the epitaph of knowledge,
marking the final resting place of a body whose spirit has fled.
Van Helsing, by contrast, would rather let thought calcify into writing. This
process transforms experience into “hard fact,” killing knowledge in order to preserve it.
In this sense, the doctor’s method begins to resemble vampirism itself, as Wicke
suggests. Rosemary Jann notes Van Helsing’s tendency to act “as if the very act of
ordering details and writing them down verifies the experience as authentic, even if the
meaning is not fully understood at the time” (278). It is not simply that Van Helsing
believes everything that he reads, but that setting down a thought or experience makes it a
piece of evidence, the subjective nature of which can be more easily assessed when laid
bare and open to view. Writing extricates (or abjects) experience from the body, forcing it
outside of the subject, where neither can contaminate the other. In the pursuit of fidelity,
subjective recollection stands as the principle impediment to narrative. Van Helsing’s
scientific objectivity principally concerns itself with the objectification and automation of
knowledge, turning thought into writing, and thereby purging it from the dark insides of
the self.
To revise Jann’s reading on one other point: is it not precisely because one’s
experience is misunderstood that its transcription remains authentic? Though commonly
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understood as a means of careful attention to the particulars of the self, Jonathan’s
journal-keeping, in its speed and comprehensiveness, actually aspires to the kind of
distracted activity most likely to keep secrets hidden even from one’s own consciousness.
It is clear that, for Jonathan, writing is the antidote to memory: a pharmakon that serves
as a means of burying experience somewhere distant from the self. Handing his journal to
his fiancé, Jonathan explains: “the secret is here, and I do not want to know it” (140). It is
almost as if he has not written it himself. In this moment, we have to wonder if
Jonathan’s shorthand technique has not been a way of encrypting secrets from his own
consciousness as well as his oppressor’s, using these coded signs to hide Dracula from
himself (particularly the ways the vampire is already buried inside Jonathan), as much as
hiding himself from Dracula.
Dracula is a text composed primarily by writers who find themselves unable, for
a host of reasons, to actually read what they have written. Mina’s trances, from which she
awakens utterly unaware of what has passed from her lips, are only the most spectacular
demonstration of this principle. The interior is always a surprise to the writer, with
another reader providing the critical distance required to make sense of his enigmatic
text. The assumption that the subject is illegible to himself, and cannot read what he
himself has written, is an essential characteristic of the rhetoric of graphomania. Van
Helsing’s speculations concerning Renfield further illuminate his interest in this relation
between blindness and insight. It is Renfield’s “very obliquity of thought and memory”
that “fascinates” the doctor, who surmises: “I may gain more knowledge out of the folly
of this madman that I shall from the teaching of the most wise” (295). This blind
textuality forms the necessary complement to Van Helsing’s incitement to transcribe
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everything, no matter how seemingly insignificant. As Jonathan writes in (and of) his
journal: “All, big and little, must go down; perhaps at the end the little things may teach
us most” (329). Van Helsing trains his pupils in the “indiscriminate recording of all
perceptions” that, for Nordau, marked Tolstoi and Wagner as consummate
graphomaniacs (199). This dutiful recording of the self, prompted by Van Helsing’s
contention that “[n]othing is too small” (156), depends crucially on a refusal of one’s
personal perspective—if one is to catch the details that may not, at first glance, seem to
be part of “the big picture.”20 Such perspective would only prejudice the writer’s frames
of reference and cause him or her to take on an editorial stance that, as Freud has argued,
cannot be distinguished from censorial mechanisms.21 Writing is not the mark of
consciousness, but serves primarily as a technique for stemming this activity.
In foregrounding the acts of transcription, editing and circulation that constitute
its text, Dracula dislocates truth from the hands of the author. The editor—intercessor of
the “found manuscript” device—arrives on the scene in order to convince the reader that
there was no “editing” consciousness in the writer, who scribbled away without second
thoughts or second-guessing, without any consciousness of a second body in the room
reading over her shoulder. Mina plays this role for the others, spelling out her role in
facilitating the unconscious in moments such as the one in which she returns Seward’s
phonographic recordings, telling him: “I think that the cylinders which you gave me
contained more than you intended me to know” (261). Within Dracula, the most direct
expression is the one without direction, the letter left unsent, a stray signal intercepted by
an unintended audience. The editor addresses the reader so that the writer may write
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without address. It is through this intervention that we find ourselves holding an
“unauthorized” text.
As a technique of distraction, writing to the moment generates many of the same
effects that Elizabeth Napier has attributed to the irresistible momentum of Gothic
plotting. While Napier sees the “frenetic air” of Otranto as “its most innovative and
compelling feature” (90), she finds the most “significant consequence of the speed and
fragmentation of narration in Walpole’s novel is a serious reduction of emphasis on the
internal lives of his characters” (92). Hollowing out the interior folds of a character
simply builds up too much resistance. Instead, Walpole streamlines his characters by
compelling them to act in “expected, or formulaic, ways” (92).22 Only through such
generic, conventional behavior can they “keep pace with the story he wants to tell” (92).
In the minds of characters and readers alike, the Gothic instills a sense of perpetual
distraction, relentlessly knocking us about from one explosive incident to another.
When critics speak of Gothic “machinery,” it is invariably in response to the
genre’s reliance upon such external sources of motivation. This term was commonly
employed by critics to dismiss the implausible nature of Gothic narrative, but in the latenineteenth century, the deus ex machina device might not have pressed the limits of
credibility nearly so acutely as before. (The crucial difference presented by the modern
novel is that the machine replaces, rather than represents, the divine.) Given the ubiquity
of mechanical processes within daily modern industrial life, it seems entirely reasonable
that machines would intervene within plots; realism, in fact, would almost seem to dictate
their inclusion. Mechanical disasters such as the train wreck that brings Richard Marsh’s
Beetle’s reign of terror to an abrupt end merely parlayed the kind of common
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technological fatalities to the fates of its characters.23 Such collisions suggest a fatal
incompatibility of bodies and machines, but the interpenetration of these realms is not
always figured through violence. The gothic presents us with many unsettling collusions
between human and machine, where the threat of the latter is converted into a promise
that mechanization can sustain (a kind of) life. Having signed this pact, characters
themselves take on mechanical traits, their voices developing a metallic resonance.
In granting its characters an exceptional consciousness of Gothic figuration and
convention, Charles Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer (1820) stands as an exemplary
reflexive study of the genre’s mechanisms.24 Maturin’s characters are deeply critical of
social conventions, but also uncommonly aware of the conventional nature of the genre
they inhabit. Maturin’s Alonzo, finding himself in the middle of the kind of flight
scenario described by Napier, addresses the mechanics at work within his story:
I appeared to myself like a piece of mechanism wound up to perform certain
functions, in which its co-operation was irresistible […] as the shortness of the
time left me no opportunity for deliberation, it left me also none for choice. I was
like a clock whose hands are pushed forward, and I struck the hours I was
impelled to strike. When a powerful agency is thus exercised on us,–when another
undertakes to think, feel, and act for us, we are delighted to transfer to him, not
only our physical, but our moral responsibility. (181)
While Maturin’s scene contextualizes Gothic machinery with reference to earlier
philosophical arguments about human nature that commonly employed the clock as the
emblem of a mechanistic universe, the forced hand of the clock also signifies the artificial
compression of time within gothic narrative, as well as the suggesting the effects of that
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acceleration on the subject.25 Under the influence of another, Alonzo finds cold
consolation in the thought that his circumstances have rendered him a kind of automatonsubject.
However, the awareness Maturin grants to his characters comes with a price. The
conscious automaton is implicated in its own compulsions; Alonzo must admit he is
“delighted” to submit to this fatalistic fantasy. Melmoth investigates the human desire to
yield itself to the inhuman, the scandalous wish “to be the clock,” in order that one
“might have no feeling, no motive for hurrying on the approach of time” (146-47,
emphasis original). Melmoth’s protagonists are driven to distraction by the constant hum
of machinery that administrates daily life under religious and civic institutions. The
wanderer himself may be the most explicit embodiment of the living-dead, but the most
sinister Faustian pact is one signed with the machine. Selling one’s “soul” reads as a
figure for the delegation of one’s will to an external agent.
In “Signs of the Times,” Carlyle had lamented the absence of internal,
“Dynamical” motivation within culture (72). His was the “age of machinery” because
individuals had systematically conceded their power to institutional imperatives.
Maturin’s Alonzo anticipates Carlyle’s critique of modern institutionalized life when he
remarks that: “The moment life is put beyond the reach of your will, and placed under the
influence of mechanical operations, it becomes, to thinking beings, a torment
insupportable” (111). However, Maturin is compelled to address as well the torment of
thought, a burden that becomes less and less supportable as the individual’s will is
relentlessly frustrated by the crushing, mindless indifference of social and religious
institutions. Wrongfully imprisoned in an asylum where, surrounded by the folly of

200
inmates and wardens alike, sanity becomes a “curse” (57), one character voices the “wish
to become one of them, to escape the agony of consciousness” (56). The appeal of this
conformity runs deeper than the lure of passivity Sedgwick finds in “paranoid gothic”
writers such as Thomas De Quincey and Daniel Paul Schreber.26 Alonzo’s temptation to
invite “the machine” inside stands as an early apprehension of the death drive, the desire
to kill a part of ourselves in order that the rest of us might continue on—deadened, but
free from pain.
Melmoth’s clock concretizes an artificial experience of speed that has nothing to
do with saving time. To resort to a dead metaphor, it manages only to “kill time” or, in
the popular idiom of Stoker’s historical moment, to “annihilate” it. The forced hand of
the clock empties out the meaning of time into meaningless revolutions, much like
Jonathan’s circular journey to the count’s castle, or Freud’s circuitous path back to the
red-light district in “The Uncanny.” If Renfield’s obsessive counting resembles the
actions of the man who counted out seconds like the clock, how different is Jonathan’s
prison diary? He has found another way of becoming the clock, of devoting himself to
recording every increment of time’s passage. In captivity, as the day after day passes by,
Jonathan denies his experience by “writing through” the moments. Realizing he “must do
something or go mad,” Jonathan devotes his nervous energy to his diary, reasoning: “I
must keep writing at every chance, for I dare not stop to think” (329). Writing is speed,
while thought brings one to a standstill. Jonathan’s statement pathologizes the novel as
the result of obsessive graphomaniacal activity, a performance that is less an antidote
against insanity than an escape from the very question. Skimming swiftly along the
surface of the page, Jonathan prevents himself from sinking into the depths of himself,
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and giving way to this interior. Behind the frantic plotting that is so familiar within the
Gothic genre, which identifies writing as necessary for the Crew of Light’s survival, there
remains this sense that writing is actually a means by which the living become the livingdead, refusing the primacy of experience through persistent mediatization, encrypting the
moment before it has even passed.

The Uncanny Return of Technology
Seward’s use of the phonograph is characterized by a similar desire to employ writing as
a means of encrypting secrets from himself. Ostensibly obtained for professional work,
Seward’s phonograph entries are nonetheless referred to (by Seward as well as our
copyist Mina) as a diary. By contrast with Jonathan and Mina’s “journals,” the term
betrays the informal and personal nature of its contents. Read in light of her professed
desire to “do as the lady journalists do” (86), Mina’s classification of her written
contributions as journal entries suggests the “extroverted” tendency of her own writing.
Seward’s case studies fail to retain the disinterested and authoritative tone of scientific
inquiry, as his recorded observations of Renfield repeatedly give way to private
reflections and personal doubts.
When he cannot speak to Lucy, Seward turns to the sympathetic ear of his
phonograph, into which he pours the plaintive tones of his unrequited love. For Seward,
the phonograph serves as a technology of interiorization, its concave shape suggesting its
discretion. The unreciprocated nature of Seward’s desire for Lucy finds its technological
analog in the fact that he has never imagined receiving anything back from the
phonograph. In his hands, the machine remains every bit as unresponsive as Lucy. When
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pressed for a demonstration of the phonograph, he sheepishly admits to Mina that,
“although I have kept the diary for months past, it never once struck me how I was going
to find any particular part of it in case I wanted to look it up?” (259). Seward’s was a
record never intended to be played back; he had seen it as medium of storage, and not
transmission. Entrusting these cylinders to Mina, he exhibits the same confusion with
regard to women. In accordance with the original meaning of the term, Seward’s
“secretary” is to serve as a repository of secrets (OED). He imagines speaking into a
void, blindly placing his private thoughts into another medium of which he has little
understanding. Seward thinks he has laid these feelings to rest, quietly suggesting to
Mina: “No one need ever know, shall ever know.” Mina’s grave response is sympathetic,
but unequivocal: “Ah, but they must!” (261). The doctor’s first bout of concern
(regarding the phonograph) pothers over the difficulty of retrieval, his second
(concerning Mina) over the impossibility of retraction.
Seward’s inability to decrypt his personal phonographic records belies Edison’s
claim that his “wax cylinders speak for themselves and will not have to wait centuries to
be deciphered” by future civilizations (“Perfected Phonograph” 645). In place of this
vision of universal comprehension, Seward’s “glitch” provides us with a momentary
experience of fundamental technological alienation, where even the speaker finds himself
exiled from his own words and voice. Edison’s statement is typical of what Jason Camlot
has identified as the Victorian “rhetoric of immediacy” (147) concerning the
phonograph.27 For Camlot, the most striking aspect of this rhetoric was its “enthusiastic
willingness to embrace the phonograph as something of a transparent medium” (149).
Camlot’s richly researched essay provides a wealth of cultural materials that advance this
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understanding of the phonograph, including a promotional recording that captures the
phonograph’s “own” voice declaring: “My voice is the clearest, smoothest and most
natural of any talking machine” (158 in Camlot). It is easy to imagine Victorians
fascinated by the “natural” sound of machines posing as humans, but they were also
curious about the many ways this technology might bring to light the unnatural aspects of
the human talking machine. It is here that the darker ironies of this technological
“immediacy”—ironies that were frequently acknowledged by Edison himself, as we will
see—begin to assert themselves. In Stoker’s techno-gothic imagination, the voice of
Edison’s “tongueless, toothless instrument” (Edison, in Kahn 93) is neither neutral nor
transparent. A technological iteration of the Gothic collapse of distinctions between
heimlich and unheimlich, the phonograph’s unsettling echo blurs distinctions between
fidelity and infidelity with technological reproductions that faithfully serve sonic
phenomena while utterly betraying the speaker.
Wandering among the vaults under the monastery from which he is determined to
make his escape, Melmoth the Wanderer’s Alonzo gives voice to an abiding Gothic fear
when he considers with dread the possibility that he may never find the exit. He is
overwhelmed by “the chance, the fear, that we may never come to light” (185). Dracula’s
characters are just as often moved by the opposite fear, that the protective shroud of
darkness will be torn away, that the labyrinth cannot not help them to “lose themselves.”
Freud, quoting Schelling’s definition of the uncanny, interprets this term as the name for
“everything . . . that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light”
(126). This uncanny return is inscribed within reproductive technology, the curse of
recursive writing machines.
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In critical readings of Dracula, the phonograph has often been lost within
Stoker’s sprawling network of writing and reading machines. Dracula is a novel that
concerns itself with the symbolic processing of the Real, an operation best exemplified in
Mina’s typewritten transcriptions of Seward’s phonograph cylinders. Returning to
Seward after her first experience with the machine, Mina reports that the phonograph “is
a wonderful machine, but it is cruelly true. It told me, in its very tones, the anguish of
your heart. It was like a soul crying out to Almighty God” (261). Perhaps it is Mina’s
maternal instinct that impels her to hush the plaintive cry of this phonograph with her
typewriter, muting its painful tones with the conviction that: “No one must hear them
spoken ever again!” (261). There is no doubt that the typewriter represents the dominant
register of the novel, and perhaps the prominence of the phonograph has suffered because
of the way the novel encrypts (or, as Jennifer Wicke has it, vampirizes) this medium
through type. And yet, if speech does occupy a lower rung on the media food-chain, it is
rarely fully digested by Mina’s typewriter. It is difficult not to think of the phonograph
when Harker describes the Count’s voice as a “harsh, metallic whisper” that emanates
from some unlocatable source overhead (77). We can still hear this voice, which enters
the novel in strange ways, disrupting the regularity of Mina’s “clean” copy that the text
requires.28 The epistemological bent of her textual strategy is fundamentally symbolic,
attempting as it does to modernize the Gothic, and revise the manuscript. This
mechanical process of symbolization, as I have remarked above, is the focus of Kittler’s
formidable reading of Stoker’s media-parable. Adopted from Foucault’s conception of
the episteme, Kittler’s “shock and awe” philosophy of media constructs a history where
one technology of writing is instantly and utterly overwhelmed by its successor (which
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brings with it a total regime change). The gothic imagination, by contrast, is obsessed
with the palimpsest: a model of textuality that hallucinates, within the placid surface of
present text, the ruin of previous writings and haunting echoes of departed voices. We
could turn, of course, to the example of the found manuscript, which receives its most
evocatively gothic treatment in Hogg’s Confessions of A Justified Sinner. Here, a text is
buried within the text, a facsimile of the hand behind the anonymity of type. To gothicize
McLuhan’s dictum, every new medium is erected amongst the ruins of previous mediaforms.29
Dracula is a text haunted by the voices within it, voices that frustrate and
interrupt the process of symbolization undertaken by Mina’s typewriter. The grooves of
the phonograph appear to Seward as a mechanical labyrinth, a place to safely bury his
secret by “engraving” it technologically. Having never considered the possibility that
these thoughts might find their way back out to the surface, the sight of their resurrection
inspires a dread akin to Lucy’s rising from the coffin (her body’s own unstable archive).
Edison intuits the uncanny nature of the phonographic encounter in his own writings.
Chief among the device’s suggested uses was the ability to hear voices return from the
grave. The phonograph is an open casket of sorts, allowing us to lovingly attend to the
departed. But while the voice of another allows for a sentimental reunion, the possibility
of one’s own voice returning from the dead is a profoundly alienating thought:
Your words are preserved in the tin foil and will come back upon the application
of the instrument years after you are dead in exactly the same tone of voice you
spoke in then . . . This tongueless, toothless instrument, without larynx or
pharynx, dumb, voiceless matter, nevertheless mimics your tones, speaks with
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your voice, speaks with your words, and centuries after you have crumbled into
dust will repeat again and again, to a generation that could never know you, every
idle thought, every fond fancy, every vain word that you chose to whisper against
this thin iron diaphragm. (qtd. in Kahn 93)
If Edison’s statement offers the promise of immortality, it is perhaps the least comforting
vision possible: a doppelganger voice that outlives its owner only to turn upon him. The
subject finds itself locked out of its own life, as the sound that once resonated inside—an
echo that seemed to constitutively shape that interior—returns as utterly exterior. This
partial object, an uncanny automaton without tongue or teeth, nonetheless speaks. If
writing in Plato’s Phaedrus inscribed the epitaph of thought—“dead discourse” (276a)—
Edison’s open crypt transmits a kind of “undead” speech. Unhinged from its authorizing
body, this mortifying sound sardonically and irreverently commits to posterity our most
idle thoughts and careless whispers. Mina’s description of the phonographic replication
as “cruelly true” (261) captures perfectly Edison’s apprehension of the phonograph’s
sadistic fidelity.
In 1878, the Journal of Science illustrated this machine’s upsetting tendency to
capture accidents of the voice in its account of an early phonograph demonstration:
songs sung into it by Mr. Spagnoletti, Mr. Edmunds, and Mr. Preece, were
reproduced with very respectable correctness; and even the breakdown of one of
the singers at a high note, accompanied by a little impatient remark, was faithfully
recorded, and given out again with exasperating fidelity. (“Phonograph” 252)
Having “faithfully recorded” the trio’s repertoire, the phonograph manages to reproduce
these songs with “respectable correctness.” A human voice breaks down, but the machine
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does not malfunction. In an act of “exasperating fidelity,” the phonograph presents us
with an unerring record of human error.
Edison’s playful promotion of the phonograph often suggested the machine was
as likely to betray the voice as to support it. Was the phonograph too close, and too
diligent a listener, to properly bear witness to the speaker? The exactness of the machine
laid bare a crucial irony within the concept of fidelity, prompting Edison to write in one
moment of the “faithful recording” produced by the phonograph, and note in the next
that: “This little instrument records the utterance of the human voice, and like a faithless
confidante repeats every secret confided to it whenever requested to do so” (“The
Phonograph” 249). The machine could be at once “faithful” and “faithless” because its
loyalty to sound extended beyond (and potentially compromised) the narrow signal of the
speaker. Edison’s rhetoric impishly exploits the pleasure and anxiety provoked by the
thought of a voice that was seemingly unfiltered, uncensored, and devoid of any capacity
for discrimination: “With charming impartiality it will express itself in the divine strains
of a lyric goddess or use the startling vernacular of a street Arab” (249). The phonograph
did not—indeed, could not—recognize the distinctions and divisions of culture. All
languages were the same to this illiterate and polyglot machine; it understood nothing of
what it heard, and so was uniquely qualified to repeat everything.
Of course, the incendiary juxtaposition of “goddess” and “street Arab”—
particularly when the machine-voice has been explicitly feminized as a “confidante”—
suggests that such recordings would only serve to more deeply entrench cultural
constructions of difference. If Edison’s first invocation of the “tongueless, toothless
instrument” serves to highlight the foreignness lodged within the subject, this latter
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experiment directs the alienating capacity of the disembodied voice against the other in a
strategic manner, furnishing physical evidence that seems to corroborate the prejudices of
the listener by tangibly confirming the other’s difference. The phonographic register of
Stoker’s novel—present in Seward’s cylinders, but also in Jonathan and Mina’s phonetic
shorthand— blurs this line between fidelity and faithlessness insofar as it serves to
highlight difference within the novel’s characters (playing back unacknowledged
differences to the self).30 The technological perfection of mechanical reproduction reveals
that human “fidelity” and “reality” were only approximate values, indistinct principles
that had to be tempered as they approached full disclosure.
Though it sometimes emerges from within Stoker’s “proper” English subjects, the
novel most often projects this noise upon classed and raced “others,” generating an echo
that denatures the language of the novel through exactness of its recording. In his
professional dealings with the Count, Jonathan courteously insists: “You know and speak
English thoroughly!” (51). Though he denies the exotic nature of Dracula’s speech,
Jonathan’s private writings are suffused with oral fascination, concerned with the sound
of words rather than their meaning, and convinced that these sounds tell us more than the
speaker knows. Jonathan and Mina’s shorthand technique records voices phonetically,
and the preservation of dialect within Dracula is a way of alienating the speaker from his
own words, highlighting his foreignness. Thus, the careful transcription of the “glitches”
of dialect mark the writer’s absolute fidelity to the voice, but also constitute, in their
betrayal of the speaking subject, an infidelity. When mimicry tends toward mockery,
Jonathan’s diaries read as “cruelly true.” Recording verbatim becomes an aggressive
practice, passively encoding implicit critical commentary in the refusal to edit. Jonathan
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may have been led astray by “phonetic spelling” (302), the external “dis-guise” of speech
whose corrupting influence Saussure had warned about, but when langue and parole
diverge, his text consistently chooses to follow the idiosyncrasies of the latter.31 In the
pursuit of accurate recording, the journalist always faces a dilemma: whether to remain
faithful to the exact transcript, or to charitably filter out any “noise” that might interfere
with the “ideal” of the speaker’s intended message. Absolute fidelity is maintained at the
expense of the subject.
In Dracula, writing swallows speech whole. Mina refrains from assimilating (or
digesting) the irregularities of speech into the standardized system of “proper” language.
Her devotion to “verbatim” reportage does not content itself with capturing
communications “word-for-word,” but burrows into the voice at a deeper level. Mina’s
precise technique narrows in upon components of speech ordinarily rendered invisible by
type. The phonograph (and the novel’s strict reproduction of its transmissions) provides
an aural equivalent of Edweard Muybridge’s motion studies, dissecting and preserving
for minute analysis the negligible details and irregularities typically smoothed out in the
“flow” of written records. Stoker shares with Muybridge a fascination with deformities
and abnormalities of movement (the former being concerned with expression, the latter
with locomotion); both are interested in correcting the blindness brought on by
idealizations of the body. Mina makes no attempt to straighten out Van Helsing’s “disfigures” of speech; comic malapropisms such as “the milk that is spilt cries not out
afterwards” (274) provide the grain of his character.
If Van Helsing’s speech reveals Stoker’s somewhat clinical interest in the speech
of “others” (evident in the dialects of the raced and classed mouths that resonate within
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his text), the faltering speech of the novel’s “proper” English subjects in their more
emotional moments seems calculated to imbue the protagonists with pathos. Voices are
nowhere more conspicuously present in Dracula than when they are on the verge of
breaking down. Mina transcribes Seward’s floundering description of her own preventive
burial service, during which the doctor stutters out: “I--I cannot go on--words--and--vvoice--fail m-me!…” (373). Wicke reads this transmission as “the immaterialization of a
voice” (470), but we are witnessing precisely the opposite phenomenon here. Working
from Seward’s phonograph cylinders, Mina demonstrates the “minute accuracy”
promised by Edison in his essay concerning “The Perfected Phonograph.” According to
Edison, the machine would duplicate an “unimpeachable transcript” of any conversation,
reproducing not only voices, but “every break and pause, every hesitation or confident
affirmation, every partial suggestion or particular explanation, infallibly set down in the
wax” (648). Mina’s type redoubles this transformation, its indelible imprint granting a
new materiality to the voice. The text represents a voice breaking down, but also
performs the breaking down of the voice, dissecting every insignificant grain and
presenting it for examination. Transcribing her own struggles with the unspeakable, Mina
stutters across the page: “the...the...the...Vampire. Why did I hesitate to write the word?”
(395). An exemplary display of obedience to Van Helsing’s counsel “to put down in
record even your doubts and surmises” (156), her entry does not actually hesitate to write,
but literally writes hesitation. Silence itself is called to account, graphically represented
by Mina's ellipses. Rather than a “proper” translation from one medium to another,
moments such as this one find the typewriter mimicking the phonograph by making a
kind of analog-based gapless recording, where stuttering, second thoughts, and
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interjections are all recorded upon the page. There is something jarring about these
remnants of the voice that have survived their remediation into written text, a process that
normally tends to formalize speech by flattening out the glitches of oral communication.
Mina’s “exasperating” commitment to absolute fidelity kindles unrest within the text;
under her stewardship the novel becomes the site for a “live burial” of the voice.
Noting this strange survival of orality within Dracula, John M. Picker finds at the
core of Stoker’s tale “a distinctly late-Victorian fascination with the primacy of the
voices that pulse through it” (776). Though Picker contends that “Dracula only nibbles at
the possibilities for serious problems with the notion of a phonographic voice” (779), his
reading of the novel nevertheless does an excellent job of gathering the phonographic
figures that surface within this “novel of indentations” (including phonographic
inscriptions, vampiric penetrations, and typewriter impressions). For Picker, the
phonograph “acts as a locus of sexual anxiety and symbolism among Seward, Lucy
Westenra, and Mina” (777). My aim in what follows is to explore in greater depth
Dracula’s techno-eroticism, through consideration of the mechanics of desire set in
motion by the phonograph—a device that embodies the intimacy of communication by
linking orality and touch.
Discussion of Dracula’s “oral fixation” has typically centered upon the figure of
the vampire.32 The erotic charge with which Stoker alights the seduction of both Jonathan
and Mina has a distinctly oral character. Possessed by the “wicked, burning desire” that
his three temptresses “would kiss me with those red lips,” Jonathan lies recumbent as
“[t]he girl went on her knees, and bent over me, simply gloating.” Likewise, the
spectacle of Mina’s “baptism of blood” (384) holds for Seward “a terrible resemblance to
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a child forcing a kitten's nose into a saucer of milk to compel it to drink” (322). If the
Count has been saddled with a “child-brain” (382), he has also been cursed with an
infant-mouth. Like the child, whose oral fixation is understood by Freud to be
“associated, in the first instance, with the satisfaction of the need for nourishment” (Three
Essays 182), the vampire’s unquenchable thirst for blood comes from a shadowy place
between need and desire. Dracula’s relation to his victims vacillates between mastery and
dependence, ecstasy and desperate compulsion (due to the abject hunger for the bodily
fluids he craves in order to survive). If the phrase “sexual appetite” has long been interred
within the graveyard of dead metaphors, Dracula’s disturbing hunger revives the primal
truth of this state of confusion, where “sexual activity has not yet been separated from the
ingestion of food” (Three Essays 198).
This reading of vampirism as the monstrous perpetuation of oral desire finds its
reciprocal analogy in Freud’s schema of libidinal development in Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality (1905), where he proposes that the oral phase might be considered
“cannibalistic” in nature (273). The note first appears in a 1915 revision of the Three
Essays, at the same time Freud was exploring the complex relation between desire and
destruction in his “Mourning and Melancholia.” Here Freud argues that the ego “wants to
incorporate” its object of desire, and “it wants to do so by devouring it” (250).
Anticipating Freud, Stoker imagines the mouth as primarily a site of compulsion, and
only secondarily as a means of communication. The vampire’s mouth transmits the
“unspeakable” because it writes without speaking. This assertion of the priority of writing
is not a playful deconstructive reversal, but the traumatic force of an incomprehensible
law, one that imposes itself without concern for the subject’s testimony, or even

213
understanding. We have not the proper mirror to read what has been inscribed on
ourselves.

The Phonographic Imagination: Indexing Bodies
We find evidence of this bodily trauma in a number of different origin-stories of the
phonograph, one of which has been preserved within Theodore Achille L. Du Moncel’s
The Telephone, The Microphone, and The Phonograph. Du Moncel relates the story of
Edison’s “accidental” discovery with the skeptical distance one ought to maintain when
relating accounts by “American journals” (310):
In the course of some experiments Mr. Edison was making with the telephone, a
stylus attached to the diaphragm pierced his finger at the moment when the
diaphragm began to vibrate under the influence of the voice, and the prick was
enough to draw blood. It then occurred to him that if the vibrations of the
diaphragm enabled the stylus to pierce the skin, they might produce on a flexible
surface such distinct outlines as to represent all the undulation produced by the
voice. (310)
Du Moncel concedes this to be “an ingenious story,” but insists that “we would rather
believe that the discovery was made in a more serious spirit” (310). This is an ingenious
story, rather than a story of genius, because it confers agency upon the “accidental”
operations of the machine, while representing Edison as a receptive medium that serves
as the surface of experimentation. Bitten by the stylus, Edison is infected with the idea
rather than inventing it. The possibilities of the machine become real through the piercing
of skin and the drawing of blood, rather than dawning upon the intellect in a moment of
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scientific deduction. Edison’s own body serves as the prototype for the phonograph,
which now must reproduce and improve upon the receptive penetrability of skin.
In their introduction and elaboration of the concept of “vampiric typewriting,”
Kittler and Wicke provide some of the most insightful connections between biting and
writing, though their shared commitment to the typewriter as Dracula’s master
technology obscures the vital significance of the index within Stoker’s novel. Bite-marks
are the record of a needle that has been dropped into a permeable surface, and may at any
time return to the groove that has been cut. The Count taunts Mina with the countless
times he has returned to re-open her wound: “It is not the first time, or the second, that
your veins have appeased my thirst!” (327). Leaving behind a trace that serves as
evidence of his victim’s possession, Dracula’s vampirism retains the classical definition
of stigmata as brandings that identify the bearer’s enslavement. In its more metaphorical
sense, the “stigma” denotes an enduring trace (literal or otherwise) left by shameful
bodily contact. The marks on Lucy and Mina’s necks are scarlet letters, bloody
inscriptions that, in accordance with the Gothic law of externalization, provide evidence
of physical commerce with impure forces. The lover’s adulterous kiss remains eternally
upon one’s throat, its irreversible mark binding two bodies together in calamitous
sympathy.
The Gothic imagination has always had a special fascination with stigmata; its
fictions tend to employ the needle rather than the stylus, and engrave themselves upon
flesh and blood rather than paper and ink. Following in the tradition of Victorian Gothic’s
forensic dramas, the Count contributes no writing to Stoker’s narrative, save these legible
traces of his body. These signature marks remain inarticulate wounds until Van Helsing
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identifies Dracula as “of a type,” initiating the forensic process of symbolization that
narrates a history of bodily contact. Once the Crew of Light finally learns to properly
interpret these enigmatic, yet indelible markings, every other sign within the narrative
begins to make sense. A more common variety of criminal might have left fingerprints,
but the Count’s teeth-marks serve as reliable indices to his villainous actions. Embedding
signs within flesh grants them a unique material permanence and irrefutable stamp of
authenticity that the body—more often than not unwillingly—corroborates.
Whenever popular fin-de-siècle literature borrows the phonograph to perform its
writing, the results turn out to be scandalous. The stigmatic marks of the machine
introduce to narrative the discourses of gossip and indiscretion. The machine commonly
plays the part of Edison’s “faithless confidante,” inciting and affirming defamatory
rumours. Robert Ganthony’s comic poem “The Phonograph” (1900) finds a man
recording a simulated “volley of kisses” in order to see “How a kiss would come out / In
a phonograph way.” When his maid walks in on the performance in flagranti and
confusedly blurts out, “Oh, sir, how can you? What are you doing?,” the man falls into a
panic, upon realizing that the record will appear to testify to the seduction of his maid,
rather than his new gadget. The speaker’s peculiar impulse to caress the machine would
seem to illustrate Picker’s claim that, for nineteenth-century writers, “the phonograph
seemed not only possessed, but more specifically charged with a dangerous sort of
sexualized femininity” (“Aura” 772).
In fiction of the Victorian period, bodies both innocent and guilty are betrayed by
their voices. In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s “The Voice of Science,” the phonograph allows
Rupert Esdaile to call into question the integrity of Captain Beesly, his sister’s suitor.
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When his sister refuses to hear the rumors surrounding Beesly’s time in India, Rupert
records the names of various women with whom he has been said to have had affairs, and
broadcasts them at a party. The voice of the machine immediately turns Beesly’s
complexion “the colour of cheese,” and sends him running, without any attempt to refute
these unsubstantiated claims. Doyle’s title suggests the authority that the phonograph
grants to scandalous discourse. The same words that have been rejected as slander from
the brother are received as truth when passed through the “scientific” machine. Another
of Doyle’s short stories, “The Story of the Japanned Box,” features a narrator by turns
upset and intrigued by the mysterious female voice that emanates nightly from his
master’s study. After a youth squandered away in thoughtless intemperance, and curbed
only by the intervention of his (now deceased) wife, this man has led an upright and
ascetic existence, one whose only contradiction would seem to be the open secret of his
nightly rendezvous with this “other” woman. Who is she, and how has she gained
entrance to his room without ever once being observed by the staff, whose extraordinary
vigilance is underwritten by their prurient curiosity? Of course, Doyle’s title hints at the
answer. The peculiar “Japanned Box” contains a phonographic recording of the deceased
wife’s voice, which recites nightly her sweet assurance that she watches over her husband
still. The “kept woman” turns out only to be a preserved voice, but we are left to imagine
why the master cloaks the signs of the husband’s fidelity under the guise of duplicity.
Taken together, these texts suggest that the essential scandal of phonographic
inscription lies in the medium itself, rather than any particular message it might convey.
This analog recording machine relies fundamentally upon the intercourse of bodies for
the transcription of sounds. If the phonograph detaches voices from bodies, it does so by
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apprehending the voice as a body, capturing sonic vibrations in physical contact with the
recording cylinder. Consequently, an innocent conversation can be re-read as an
enigmatic moment of physical contact. The physical intimacy between signifier and
signified captured by this machine subjects all communication to innuendo, transferring
the concept of reproduction from a textual to an erotic register. What sort of thing would
the phonograph record? Most often, we find, scenes that reproduce the logic of its
functioning, by exploiting this new and extraordinary sensitivity to touching. Like a
fingerprint left at the scene of the crime, the record is an indexical mark that invites us to
trace out the body, because we know it has brushed up against this surface at some point.
Though one Victorian satirist might have insisted that: “a man prefers / Direct and
labial contact,” for many, Edison’s “preposterous plan / For kissing by machinery!”
(Punch 1888) offered tantalizing possibilities for otherwise unacceptable communication
between the sexes. American writer Edward Bellamy’s “With the Eyes Shut” (1889)
explores the phonograph’s ability to return the erotic quality of the voice back to reading.
Bellamy’s title suggestively indicates not only the practical possibilities of reading by
phonograph, but the dream state this fantasy-machine inspires. Even the most
commonplace information, such as the telling of the hours upon a clock, takes on a most
enchanting ring when imparted by “the strong, sweet, musical tones of a perfect mistress
of the art of story-telling” (338). The phonograph translates the “arbitrary symbolism” of
the clock to “the presence of this young woman in my room” (339-340). Initially startled
by the voice of this “young” and “charming” woman, “who could not have been standing
more than ten feet from my bed” (339), our narrator turns out the lights in order to better
enjoy “the bewitching presence which the voice suggested” (340).
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This confusion of vocal with physical presence was a familiar experience within
the Victorian imagination, and the most indelible illustration of this uncertainty would
have to be Victor/RCA’s “His Master’s Voice” trademark, an iconic image that speaks
volumes about the ways this machine has reconfigured understandings of fidelity.
Adapted from a painting by Francis Barraud, which depicted his brother’s fox terrier
peering quizzically into the brass horn of a gramophone, the charm of this enduring
image depends centrally upon its playful juxtaposition of two different versions of
fidelity: one animal, the other technological. Nipper, the Victor Talking Machine
Company’s mascot, embodies the former. The textual invocation of the “master,” whose
voice we suddenly hear emerging from the trumpet, confirms the message of loyalty and
obedience communicated by the dog, with its renowned fidelity to “man.” Taking its cue
from the terrier, the gramophone is equipped with an embossing-point capable of
“follow[ing sonic phenomena] with such fidelity as to retransmit to the disk . . . any
property essential to producing upon the ear the same sensation as if coming direct from
the original source” (“The Phonograph and Its Future” 528). Following the voice
wherever it may go, the gramophone represents the technological appropriation of this
devoted attention to man.
Human civilization’s domestication of phonographic technology further
establishes its mastery over the animal, which retains a credulous relation to the indexical
sign (manipulated here to comic effect). Nipper fails to understand that his master’s voice
has broken from its leash—that the reverberation of the voice no longer necessarily
heralds the appearance of the body. The fixity of the indexical trace outlasts the
impermanent presence of the thing itself.
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And yet, if they knew better than to be led astray by these voices, the question
remains as to why the Victorians took such pleasure in divorcing sound from the other
senses, and willfully surrendering themselves to the illusions such sensory deprivation
could produce. Listening with his eyes closed, Bellamy’s narrator knowingly submits to
ontological uncertainty in order to enjoy the sensual fantasy conjured by the erotic
presence of the female voice. We experience this same pleasure when Ganthony’s poem
enters “playback mode,” and we are asked to forget what we have “seen” and simply
“listen” to the encounter. Neither is Stoker’s novel immune to this phonographic
fascination. On her first visit to Seward’s study, Mina mistakes Seward’s conversation
with his machine for human dialogue, but enters the room to find “He was quite alone”
(258). Mina’s “intense surprise” in finding “there was no one with him” (258) dramatizes
the powerful consolatory functions of technology and the degree to which our
monologues with technology are capable of replicating human intercourse.33
It seems that whenever the phonograph appeared within popular literature of the
period, it was set in motion with the express purpose of exploring the novelty of the
voice’s extraction from the body, and exploiting the misapprehensions caused by this
division. If Mina’s introduction to the phonograph presents a rather quaint instance of this
confusion, the voices that assail Renfield’s troubled psyche provide a wretched portrayal
of a body fatally bound to follow the remote influence of “his master’s voice.”34 Renfield
is the novel’s nightmare of fidelity, embodying the point along the darker end of the
spectrum where loyalty deepens into the slavery of absolute possession.
In The Beetle, Marsh’s characters had given voice to the impression that their
bodies might faithfully serve as indices to the identity and actions of their antagonist. In
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Dracula, this internal conviction becomes a matter of public record. Harker interprets
Renfield’s actions as “a sort of index to the coming and going of the Count” (264). A
week later, Seward augments Harker’s term to describe Renfield’s peculiar relationship
with the Count when he remarks that the two are “mixed up […] in an indexy kind of
way” (287). Diagnosing Renfield as “indexy” represents possession as a relation between
signifier and signified. Renfield’s indexical link to the Count illuminates the Gothic
subtext of Charles Sanders Peirce’s contention that the index is “forced by blind fact to
correspond to its object” (“Telepathy” 628). Stoker and Peirce’s twin texts of telepathic
influence cast the involuntary fidelity of the sign as a form of hypnotic possession,
suggesting that the signified acts “under the influence” of the signified. In the body of the
index, an automatism, and even a certain uncanny helplessness, steals into Peirce’s
thought. Here the notion of a ‘motivated’ signifier (as opposed to Saussure’s arbitrary
link between signifier and signified) must be read as a conceptual euphemism, one that
only dilutes the strange power under which these signs operate.
If Seward detects a “method in [Renfield’s] madness” (102), the latter’s feverish
writing also reveals the madness of the Crew’s graphical methods. Renfield’s cannibal
ledger, where he obsessively tabulates the mounting insect and animal lives consumed in
preparation for human blood, proffers a grim parody of Seward, Mina and Jonathan’s
graphomaniacal exertions. This “little notebook in which he is always jotting down
something” (105), like the anorexic’s caloric diary, substitutes ingestion for introspection;
it chronicles the abject narrative of the outside becoming inside. Seward confides to his
phonographic diary his envy of Renfield’s ability “to begin a new record with each day”
of his life (104). For a moment at least, the deranged contents of his patient’s records
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appear as entirely beside the point, so long as one has “a good unselfish cause” (104) to
write. Pages later, Mina begins to detect traces of this uncanny selflessness in her fiancé’s
subtly disfigured writing, finding that his strangely impersonal correspondence with her
has been written in a hand that “does not read like him, and yet it is his writing” (106).
His signature has become the index of something other than his own self-possessed
subjecthood. Indeed, as we have seen, this dispossession of authorship is precisely the
point of Van Helsing’s strict regimen of graphomaniacal production. To apprehend the
vampire, each of our writers must become an index, cultivating an impressionable nature
that can be marked by, and legible to, others. If Seward intends that Renfield’s
“unconscious cerebration […] will have to give the wall to [its] conscious brother” (102),
the Crew of Light find themselves making the opposite capitulation, inciting unconscious
cerebration through automatic writing techniques that decentre consciousness and make
way for the other.35
Mina’s “baptism of blood” marks her initiation within this same unconscious
network. Needless to say, blood in Dracula carries much more than nutrients and oxygen;
it is coded with the essence of class, race, masculine vigor, and feminine sexuality.36
Mina’s “baptism” sees the vampire’s blood finally exploited as either mesmeric fluid or
electrical conduit. Under its influence, Mina becomes the “faithless confidante” of
Edison’s phonographic nightmare, a double agent without loyalty to either the Count or
the Crew. Lacking even the ability to discriminate, she gives way to the “street Arab” as
readily as the Englishman.
As a description of Mina’s remote correspondence with the Count, the strictest
etymological definition of telepathy—that of “touching at a distance”—is the most
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precise; theirs is an exchange of sound and vibrations, rather than thought. Listening in
on the scene, we find a portal to a place that is at once strikingly intimate and utterly
impersonal (352). Sounding only like a telephone left off the hook with no one holding
the other end, Mina registers sound and sense without language; she gains entrance to
Dracula’s coffin, but cannot pry into his mind. There is no interior, audible self—only
sensations from which the Crew must deduce the Count’s location. Is this because
Dracula has no internal monologue that could be “overheard”? It is true that the Gothic
tradition strictly disallows this interiority to its monsters. In the empty mirror of vampire
folklore, we find the vampire incapable, at least in the literal sense, of self-reflection. And
what do we capture when Mina is employed as the mirror? As far as the Crew of Light’s
cutting-edge psychotechnics can determine, Dracula is something less than a “mental
child,” practically a non-entity. His crypt brims with the same blankness as Renfield’s
“little notebook.” His thoughts simply do not register: only the body speaks. As Van
Helsing relates in his journal: “Mina's morning and evening hypnotic answer is unvaried.
Lapping waves, rushing water, and creaking masts” (376). Mina reproduces sound
without a subject, noises that have not been sculpted into the consciousness of an
individual, communicating instead an oceanic feeling that—provided we read Dracula’s
location as something more than incidental—imparts a sense of the sublime carnal
immediacy promised by the vampiric body. Though it serves the narrative by orienting
the Crew of Light, this primal flood at the heart of the novel ought to disorient us as
readers. The scene challenges us to discard outdated notions of fidelity premised upon the
“integrity” of the body, in particular the voice as the sounding out of a subject’s resonant
interiority.
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If Kittler’s reading of Dracula’s “typographic logic” explores the potential,
through modern media, to communicate without touching, the phonograph raises the
traumatic possibility of touching without communicating. Mirroring the culture in which
it was written, Dracula’s networks are fundamentally dependent upon the bodies of
female operators, and so it is that Mina’s relations with Jonathan and the Count,
respectively, most clearly enact these two capacities of technology. The chaste nature of
Jonathan and Mina’s relationship exemplifies the disembodied communication typical of
modern conceptions of immediacy, depending as it does on the streamlining, and even
eradication of bodies, for the instantaneous communication of information. Stoker’s
vampire, on the other hand, embodies the Gothic intuition that communication is always
a matter of intercourse between bodies, no matter how intercessory machines may work
to sublimate that process. The spatial immediacy of the index, as Dracula’s gothic modes
of inscription make clear (and as the phonographic valence of the text mimics), interposes
the oblique (and most often painful) presence of the body.
Are humans truly capable of fidelity? Despite Mina and Jonathan’s private
liaisons, the novel suggests they are. However, the means by which this fidelity is
maintained turn out to be more disturbing than the couple’s frequent failures. On one
hand, we find a faithfulness to the truth that is underwritten by technology, characterized
by distraction and detachment, mechanical values that rest uneasily in the human breast.
On the other hand, we witness the uncanny fidelity that is the symptom of extreme
attachment and the overpowering force of one body upon another. Within Stoker’s novel,
it is our protagonists’ capacity for fidelity that is most troubling, because neither
experience is “true” to the individual: the first breaks down the self by privileging
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mechanical drive over subjective will, and the automatic over the autonomous gesture.
The second abdicates the will to the other, arousing the fear that the mind is not strong
enough to resist being drawn to the brink of possession.
Breaching the self-imposed limits allocated by the subject, Mina’s body serves as
medial instrument and object of the other, dispersed within a depersonalized psychical
network. It is this communion of bodies that the gothic imagination nervously
approaches. Its advances are guided by a Victorian dialectic of physical expansion and
retraction that oscillates between distracted and productive bodies that dilate
sympathetically with nervous energy, and attentive and restrictive examiners that
apprehend, codify, and institutionalize these bodies.
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Conclusion
This dissertation traces the networks Victorian culture established between bodies,
machines, and novels. These networks were founded upon a cultural premise that bodies
and machines share a common, yet deeply enigmatic, language that placed them in
cryptic correspondence, if not direct communication, with each other. In the novels and
technologies studied here, these indirect correspondences are traced via the logic of
indexical marking. I have argued for the index as a privileged signifier within gothic
narrative: the form routinely exploits these signs for their evidential power, and (more
fundamentally) for the involuntary nature of their emergence. Peirce referred to this
quality of the index as a kind of “blindness,” while Marey had attempted to harness its
automatic nature to forge a langue inconnue of the phenomenal world.
Exploring the Victorian scriptural economy’s exhaustive attempts to capture this
hidden language of the world through automatic writing technologies, my first chapter
explored the graphomaniac as a quintessentially Victorian construction, and a projection
of the culture’s mingled enthusiasm and anxiety concerning the period’s comprehensive
expansion of what could be apprehended as writing. If the objective and mechanical
process of the “graphical method” was intended to automatize and thus neutralize the
examiner’s input, the correlative figure of the graphomaniac, embodying the fantasy of a
transparent relation between exterior and internal “character,” promised a radical
simplification of the problem of the subject. Capable only of composing the signs of his
own discomposure, this pathological writer’s output lacked the versatility of the
professional author, and yet the “unauthorized” or involuntary nature of his writing held a
forceful attraction for readers fascinated by the symptomatic value of inscriptions that
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were no longer subject to the mediation and self-censorship that marked intentional acts
of writing.
It is this unknown language—hidden even from itself—that Gothic narrative
struggles to communicate to its readers. In highlighting the Victorian techniques and
technologies of writing that underwrite this struggle, I have sought to situate historically
Sedgwick’s key observation concerning the Gothic—that it “literalizes and externalizes
[…] conflicts that are usually seen as internal.” Late eighteenth-century Gothic (the focus
of Sedgwick’s study) tended to exploit a more overtly superstitious relation to the index,
employing living tapestries, bleeding statues, and stigmata to demonstrate the unnerving
vitality of signs. A century later, the “supernatural machinery” that had driven the Gothic
novel since its inception would be re-mediated through thoroughly natural machines that
literally externalized the internal, and objectified the subject.1 If Gothic is to be
distinguished, as I have argued here, by its corporeal strategies of indexical inscription,
this figural tendency signals a distinctively Gothic epistemology. Late-Victorian Gothic
novels are decidedly not vehicles for the transmission of othered voices, which are
routinely suppressed. They are rarely interested in hearing what the monster has to say
for itself. They refuse the possibility of autonomous narrative in pursuit of the body’s
story, one captured through a matrix of inscriptions.
Though Anne Rice will one day conduct a cordial Interview with the Vampire,
Bram Stoker’s Count will have to settle for a polygraph examination. The instrument
serves as a fitting emblem for the novels at each chapter’s core. Insofar as they employ
the multiple-narrator formula adapted from the epistolary novel, where a number of
parallel narratives are sequenced within the novel so that the text’s truth can emerge from
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the spectrum, Jekyll and Hyde, The Beetle, and Dracula are polygraphic narratives. More
fundamentally, however, the polygraph symbolizes the varied adversarial tactics of
indirect correspondence resorted to within a form driven by a hermeneutic of suspicion.
These texts cannot simply tell the truth, but must instead detect the lie. Utterson will give
voice to this interpretive impulse when he intuits that Hyde’s pseudonym is a falsehood
to be exposed through the graphological examination of his signature. Along with the
amateur detectives who police each of these novels, Utterson turns to the involuntary
indexical traces of the body to determine the hidden identity and deep “character” of his
antagonist. In doing so, he upholds the fundamentally conservative project of the
Victorian scriptural economy, conscripting the graphomaniac through the apprehension
of his involuntary acts of self-registration. For the uncanny ways in which Hyde’s writing
denatures the discourse of autobiography, I have read Stevenson’s text as a “paranoid
critique” of modern regimes of self-registration. However, no small part of this story’s
terror arises from the ease in which such resistant and disruptive catachreses of the body
can be re-incorporated as legible signs.
If the introduction and first chapter leave this relay of dispersal and apprehension
relatively intact, observing how graphomaniacal bodies are patiently archived and
codified through graphical method, the turn to the Gothic within the following chapters
finds the methods of the examiner gradually absorbed into the delirium of the
graphomaniacal subject. Scientific rhetoric rationalizes and economizes experimental
bodies, characterizing the examiner’s abdication of will as an act of restraint that
neutralizes the subject. The Gothic imagination—which marks the speculative science of
Atherton’s optogram and the pseudo-sciences advanced by Van Helsing—radicalizes that
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same body, characterizing the will not to will as release, exposing a body dispossessed of
subjectivity and fundamentally open to the world outside itself.
Critical interpretations that stress Gothic’s discursive debt to phrenological,
physiognomic and degeneration theories of the period—specifically, the speculation that
bodies bear the stamp of their essential character—identify only the most conservative
logic of corporeal inscription imagined within the genre. Gothic characterization, I argue,
theorized a radical dispersal of inscribed signs, alternately intrigued and troubled by the
possibility that encounters with alterity could remotely mark our own bodies. In chapter
three, the dawning sense of impressionability that haunts Jekyll’s pursuers has been given
more concrete shape in the body of the photographic negative. This impression
corresponds with a historical shift towards an embodied understanding of the observer,
who finds that in order to bear objective witness to the scene he must objectify his own
body. Seeing and seen in striking moments of mutual apprehension, Marsh’s observers
recognize their bodies as the indexical instruments of narrative.
If Dracula stands as the dissertation’s most thoroughly networked novel and the
pinnacle of techno-gothic, it also showcases the most methodical enlistment of
impressionable human bodies as media. Focalizing Dracula through the complex of
fidelity, I have asked precisely what kind of truth might be produced through the
“immediate” transcription of events the novel promises. Stoker’s novel offers a number
of possible answers to this question, each encoded within different technologies of
writing—instruments that I broadly categorize in relation to two contradictory strategies
of immediacy within modern thinking on communications. The first, touted
enthusiastically by Jonathan and practiced religiously with his fiancée, strives for
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temporal immediacy through the renunciation of the body. The mechanics of shorthand
and typewriter abolish physical obstacles to communication and approximate the
symbolic dream of communicating without touching: even sexual infidelities can now be
discursively rendered as bloodless information.
The second register of immediacy, personified by the vampire and emblematized
by the analog inscriptions of the phonograph, introduces the scandal of touching without
communicating. Here, only the body is retained, understood not as an obstacle, but an
instrument of contiguous impressionability. In a text composed by dedicated
graphomaniacs, Renfield is the sole writer to be institutionally committed, and Seward’s
observation of his patient reveals his obsessive writing not to be the symptom of a
personal pathology, but the index of another’s influence. Through his cultivation of
bodies as indices of the Count’s identity and movements, Van Helsing exploits the
evidential power of the index to locate and apprehend bodies. However, his experiment
with human media culminates in Mina’s final instrumental role as mesmerized medium,
an encounter that exposes us to a more fundamentally disorienting experience of voided
subjectivity absorbed into carnal immediacy with the other.
In these pages, I have considered the Victorian scriptural economy through the
lens of the gothic in order to uncover the uncanny power of automatic writing
technologies to transcribe the automatisms of the subject. Externalizing internal
“character,” these graphical machines bring on the panic of finding the self objectively
rendered outside oneself. However, the more radical estrangement brought on by such
technologies lies in their function as metaphor and means for the internalization of the
external. In the strange tremor that mars Jekyll’s signature and Jonathan’s, in the
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obsessive writing of Lindon and Renfield, in the carnal immediacy of Atherton’s retinal
print and Seward’s phonograph cylinders, and in the eerie transcript of Mina’s trance, the
Gothic imagines bodies as impressionable media, compulsively reproducing the sign of
their traumatic encounters with the other.

1

For early considerations of the genre’s dependence on “supernatural machinery,” see
Walpole’s preface to Otranto, as well as assessments of the novel by Clara Reeve (1777),
Thomas Macauley (1833), and Sir Walter Scott (1881).
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